Letter dated 15 September 2023 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 21 (c) of resolution 2653 (2022).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti on 18 August 2023 and was considered by the Committee on 8 September 2023.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022)
Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022)

Summary

Since the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 2653 (2022), the security situation in Haiti has further deteriorated, mostly in the West and Artibonite departments, with increased levels of armed violence and human rights violations and gangs extending their control over new territories. At the time of submitting the present report, the whole of Port-au-Prince is affected by gang violence. While gangs control and exert strong influence over 80 per cent of the metropolitan area, the remaining 20 per cent of the territory is also not spared from their incursions.

With the absence of any elected representatives, the acute political divisions and the slow progress of the political transition, governance remains very weak, hampering the efforts of the authorities to effectively address the current security, social and economic crises. The organization of long-awaited and crucial elections remains unforeseeable in the context of the current political challenges and levels of insecurity.

The Haitian economy continues to be controlled by a relatively small group of powerful families and is shaped by their competing commercial interests and networks that include some political actors and government officials. Several members of the economic and political elites have been threatening the peace, security and stability of the country by syphoning public resources and using gangs and violence to secure their political and/or economic objectives while undermining the rule of law to preserve their impunity.

With elections unlikely to take place any time soon, the diversification of gang revenues and the unilateral sanctions adopted against a number of prominent figures in Haiti, gangs appear to be gaining increasing autonomy from their traditional backers. However, the current lull in visible collusion between gangs and some members of the political and economic elite does not point towards a complete disengagement.

During the reporting period, in Port-au-Prince, the G-Pèp coalition and its allies strongly reinforced cooperation and diversified their revenues, in particular by committing kidnapping for ransom, which has enabled them to strengthen their fighting capacity. Johnson André (alias “Izo”), a leader of 5 Segond, is playing an increasingly influential role in the wider G-Pèp alliance and is supporting allies through the provision of men and firearms, including to serve his own criminal objectives. Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque”) (HTi.001) – the only individual designated pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) at the time of submission of the present report – continued to lead the opposing G9 alliance into major bloody offensives against neighbourhoods under the control of rival gangs, resulting in many killings, rapes and displacement. Gang violence also severely increased in the Artibonite department, north of the capital, where multiple gangs continued to commit appalling crimes against the population and the Police.

Levels of violence and the depths of cruelty that gangs will go to in violating human rights are unprecedented, with regular indiscriminate attacks against the population and the obstruction of humanitarian assistance. Sexual and gender-based violence and rape in particular have become one of the most horrific expressions of violence over the past two years. Such violence and insecurity not only undermine the political transition, but also decimate the national economy and threaten the future
of the country, with many children not going to school and skilled people leaving the country.

With the near absence of convictions over the past three years and the resulting sense of insecurity and perceptions of impunity, the Bwa Kale mob justice movement initiated in April 2023 has spread out throughout the country. Bwa Kale has resulted in several hundred atrocious executions of alleged gang members, as well as the reinforcement of existing self-defence groups and the spawning of new ones.

The security and institutional vacuum and weak border controls present a favourable environment for criminals, including drug traffickers, to scale up their activities. The Haitian crisis is having an impact on transnational criminal activity in the region, with the demand for and circulation of illicit firearms in Haiti fuelling trafficking in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.

The trafficking of arms and ammunition is a primary driver for the expansion of gang control and the extreme levels of armed violence in the country. The constant demand for firearms and ammunition by gangs and civilians, and the very high prices for both in Haiti, have resulted in the creation of a myriad transnational small-scale smuggling “ant trafficking” networks. Gangs are developing more sophisticated arsenals, and their firepower exceeds that of the Haitian national police, the only remaining operational security agency in the country, which does not have enough capacity to fight the gangs. In its current design, the targeted arms embargo imposed by the Council in resolution 2653 (2022) remains ineffectual; an expansion of its scope should be considered as a matter of urgency.

While Haitian stakeholders with whom the Panel met believe that sanctions alone cannot curb the current levels of armed violence in the country and should be complemented by strong international security support, they expressed their hope for the rapid expansion and implementation of the United Nations sanctions regime.
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Annexes
I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. In its resolution 2653 (2022), the Security Council established a sanctions regime consisting of a travel ban, an asset freeze and a targeted arms embargo, against individuals and/or entities designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. To date, the Security Council has designated one individual through the resolution: Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque”) (HTi.001).

2. The Secretary-General established a four-person Panel of Experts to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate, including by providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 2653 (2022). In addition, the Security Council requested the Panel to gather, examine and analyse information from Member States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in the resolution, in particular incidents regarding the source and routes of arms trafficking to Haiti and incidents undermining the political transition.

3. The Panel submits the present report to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 21 (c) of resolution 2653 (2022).

B. Fact-finding missions

4. Since its appointment, the Panel has conducted four visits to Haiti, including to Port-au-Prince (West department), Cap-Haïtien (North department) and Port-de-Paix (North-West department), as well as to the border town of Ouanaminthe (North-East department).

5. During the visits, the Panel met with representatives of Haitian institutions, including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the Haitian national police, financial and anti-corruption units, customs, as well as representatives of the political and private sectors, civil society organizations, former gang members, individuals living in gang-controlled areas and other victims of gang-related violence, including sexual and gender-based violence. In addition, the Panel interviewed national and international experts on political, economic and social issues working in or on Haiti, as well as analysts from the diaspora.

6. The Panel also met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), as well as with various sections of the Office of the Special Representative, a range of United Nations agencies, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and representatives of national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and diplomatic missions.

7. The Panel also travelled to Canada, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, France, Mexico and the United States of America to undertake fact-finding missions. In all the visits, the Panel received positive support from the various national authorities with whom they met. In addition, the Coordinator of the Panel accompanied the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) during his visit to Haiti and the Dominican Republic in June 2023.¹

C. Methodology

8. The Panel conducted its investigation in a professional and technical manner, adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. The Panel’s methods were in full conformity with the best practices and methods, as recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Panel placed particular emphasis on transparency and the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, independent verifiable sources and the opportunity to reply (see annex 1).

9. While the Panel is committed to transparency, it intends to take great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources, given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.

10. The Panel has sent a range of requests for information to Member States, including several members of the Committee (see annex 1). The Panel would like to thank those Members States that have responded to the Panel’s requests and further emphasizes the critical importance of this information in supporting its work.

D. Cooperation with other entities

11. In line with resolution 2653 (2022), the Panel has been cooperating very positively with BINUH and UNODC and has been engaging with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), including the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS). The Panel has received excellent support from BINUH and UNODC, including for gaining access to several ports of entry, for which it is very grateful. The Panel welcomes the continuous collaboration it has received from various ministries and sections of the Government of Haiti.

II. Political, security and economic context

A. Political transition

12. The assassination of President Moise in July 2021 plunged the country deeper into an already deteriorating political and security crisis. Profound political divisions and bitter rivalries have hindered the political transition. With the expiration of the term of the country’s former senators in January 2023, no more democratically elected officials remain in office, resulting in very weak governance. The country has not held presidential, legislative or municipal elections since 2016.

13. During the reporting period (October 2022 to August 2023), advances were made in the efforts to achieve a political transition with the signing on 21 December 2022 of the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections – also known as the “21 December Accord” – by the Prime Minister and a range of political actors, as well as representatives of civil society and religious groups, and the private sector. While parts of the political scene and civil society questioned the legitimacy and legality of the Prime Minister and refused to join the Accord, it remains the most consensual effort to date. The Accord includes a number of steps towards the organization in 2023 of national elections and the formation by February 2024 of a new Government, as well as provisions for the revision of the Constitution.

14. While the implementation of the Accord remains slow-moving, and the proposed time frame seems impracticable, two milestones have been met. The first is
the establishment of a High Transitional Council, responsible for defining a strategic direction for the transition and for coordinating political dialogue. The second is the restoration of the Court of Cassation before whom the future members of the Provisional Electoral Council, the body in charge of organizing the elections, will be sworn in.

15. Efforts to broaden the political consensus have recently been conducted, including through the organization in May of a political forum by the High Transitional Council and the facilitation of dialogue by CARICOM. In June 2023, CARICOM organized consultations in Kingston, in which the Prime Minister and Haitian political and civil society stakeholders participated, including from the opposition, such as Parti haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK) and the Bureau de suivi of the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (known as the Montana Group). During the consultations, the Prime Minister reiterated his willingness to widen national consensus and to move towards the organization of elections by expanding the Council, launching a constitutional review and forming a government of national unity.2

16. While dialogue efforts are crucial to restoring security and democratic institutions in the country, many Haitian and international observers deplore the lack of willingness to compromise of the key political players in the country. Furthermore, despite efforts to define the structure of the Provisional Electoral Council, several sectors of civil society have refused to engage in the process, arguing that running elections is not realistic given the current insecurity.

B. Security situation

1. Security context

17. Since the adoption of resolution 2653 (2022), the security situation in Haiti has deteriorated further, mostly in the West and Artibonite departments, with increased levels of armed violence and gangs extending their control over new territories. Today, gangs exert their control and influence over 80 per cent of Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (see paras. 45–50).

18. Gangs are getting stronger, richer, better armed and more autonomous. Over the past three years, gangs have further diversified their sources of income, in particular through an increase in kidnappings (see section III.A.3). Furthermore, they have developed more sophisticated and deadly arsenals with the procurement of large numbers of semi-automatic rifles, resulting in firepower exceeding that of the police (see paras. 45–50).

19. The levels of violence and the depths of cruelty that gangs will go to in violating human rights are unprecedented (see section III.C). Such violence and insecurity not only jeopardize the political transition, but also decimate the national economy (see paras. 42–44 below) and threaten the future of the country, with many children not going to school and skilled people leaving the country. The security and institutional vacuum also presents a unique opportunity for criminals – including transnational crime networks – to scale up their activities (see section III.B).

20. The general sense of impunity, the weakness of the justice system and limited police capacity to respond have resulted in a proliferation of self-defence groups,

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which is a real concern. Self-defence groups only add additional armed actors\(^3\) to the already complex situation, commit human rights violations and often also develop into gangs themselves (see paras. 56–60). Since April 2023, a mob justice movement has been spreading throughout the country. Under the so-called *Bwa Kale*\(^4\) movement, hundreds of alleged gang members and individuals mistakenly identified as gang members have been executed by members of the vigilante movement in horrific ways (see annex 15). In retaliation, certain gangs have been attacking the population.

21. The vast majority of Haitian interlocutors met by the Panel have voiced strong concerns about the deteriorating situation in the country, which the Government does not have sufficient means to resolve, and advocate for an international specialized force to support the police in tackling gang violence.

2. **Law enforcement**

22. The Haitian national police is the only law enforcement agency in Haiti and one of the last institutions to remain operational in the country. The Panel met with the leadership of the police and members of several police units, all of whom were very willing to cooperate, despite their challenges. The police has limited budget, is grossly understaffed, is ill-equipped and ill-trained to tackle the complexity of the situation on the ground, and lacks the capacity to regain territory occupied by gangs (see para. 182 (f)).

23. Despite the Prime Minister’s call for support to the national armed forces in March 2023, the police remains the only line of defence against armed gangs. Disbanded in 1995, the Forces armées d’Haïti were reconstituted by President Moïse but have very little defence and security operational capacity.

24. The precise number of police officers on active duty is difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy. As at 30 June 2023, official figures put the number of officers at 14,087; however, this includes the coastguard and fire service and does not reflect the significant number of officers who have recently abandoned their posts, left the country or are on detachment to close protection units. Taking this into consideration, the number of police officers available on 12-hour shifts nationwide is likely to be closer to around 4,000, which is exceptionally low in any context, but even more so in Haiti.\(^5\)

25. Police officers are frequently targeted by gangs. Between January 2023 and mid-August 2023, 36 officers were killed in gang-related violence.\(^6\) Internally, the police force faces a range of challenges, including allegations of corruption, human rights abuses (see paras. 163–167) and collusion between officers and gangs.

26. The United Nations and international partners have created the security basket fund as a framework through which to provide support to the police. While the fund is key to enhancing the capacity of the police through the provision of training and equipment, it is unlikely to address the understaffing in the short to medium term.

3. **Justice system**

27. The Haitian judicial system has long suffered from politicization and entrenched corruption and has been deliberately undermined by successive Governments. As a result, today it is barely operational. The very low rates of prosecution and conviction

\(^3\) While most self-defence groups use blunt weapons, some are equipped with firearms, sometimes provided by gangs or other actors.

\(^4\) *Bwa Kale* is a creole term loosely translated as “peeled wood”.

\(^5\) The ratio is well under 1 officer per 1,000 inhabitants, while the United Nations suggests a ratio of 2.2 officers per 1,000 inhabitants. See S/2022/747.

also lead to dire living conditions in prisons that are overcrowded, with a cell occupancy at 332 per cent. As of August 2023, only 1,892 of the total 11,816 inmates in the country had actually been convicted of a crime.

28. Prosecutors (Commissaires du gouvernement) are appointed by the executive and can be removed at any time, often resulting in a lack of independence and high levels of influence by political and economic actors over the system. Alleged criminals are regularly released without trial or investigations stalled, owing to bribery, threats or intimidation through influence peddling, thereby further fuelling perceptions of impunity.

29. Judicial buildings and actors are regular targets of powerful players whose objective is to undermine the rule of law. Using gangs and protests, several key facilities have been stormed, occupied, ransacked or destroyed, which has had a significant negative impact on the legal process and resulted in the destruction or theft of key files and evidence. The Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince was ransacked in 2022 and currently remains under the control of the 5 Segond gang. Similarly, the courthouse in Gonaives was set on fire in October 2022.

30. Since their creation in the early 2000s, two specialized governmental anti-corruption units – the Unité centrale de renseignements financiers and the Unité de lutte contre la corruption – have handed more than 140 cases over to the courts. One single individual has been convicted to date. In June 2023, following investigations, a judge referred Youri Latortue, a former senator, to the criminal court for trial for misappropriation of public funds.

31. With regard to sexual and gender-based violence, despite the high number of victims, no prosecutions and no convictions have made in the past two years (see paras. 129–136).

32. Insecurity and threats have been impeding the work of many judges across the country, in particular those who are prosecuting key cases related to powerful political and economic actors. In May 2023, the vehicle of a judge working on main corruption cases was shot many times (the judge was uninjured). The extreme risk environment and lack of physical protection of judges inhibits judicial actors from conducting meaningful work and pushing for sensitive files to be prosecuted (see para. 182 (g) and (i)). Two years after the assassination of former President Moise, and despite the arrests of more than 40 suspects, including several convictions in the United States, the Haitian investigation has made no apparent progress.

33. A functioning judicial system is critical to addressing gang violence and reinstating the rule of law, including disrupting those actors that are threatening the stability of Haiti through the financing of gangs, fomenting demonstrations and blockades or syphoning public funds. In addition, the situation has had a negative impact on the morale of other actors in the Haitian system, including the police, with many officers discouraged by the lack of successful prosecutions.

34. After the resignation in November 2022 of the former Minister of Justice following sanctions by a Member State, the new leadership is making efforts towards building integrity and introducing a process of performance control for judicial actors. Between January and July 2023, the Superior Council of the Judiciary vetted 91 judges, 32 of whom did not receive certification, mostly owing to concerns over

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7 Ibid. This figure includes 288 women, 240 minor boys and 11 minor girls.
8 Information posted to the official Haiti national police Facebook page on 27 August 2022.
9 Interviews with a justice system specialist and with representatives of Haitian anti-corruption bodies (April 2023).
10 Source: Superior Council of the Judiciary (2023), and certified and non-certified magistrates (19 July 2023).
their integrity or intimidation and extortion of litigants. In the light of those events, several high-profile cases of alleged involvement in corruption and criminal activity – including arms trafficking – are currently being investigated more seriously.

4. Regional impact

35. The deterioration of the situation in Haiti has had an impact on Member States in the region. Authorities in the Dominican Republic, Mexico and the United States informed the Panel about challenges related to the migration phenomenon, as well as drug and arms trafficking.

36. Arms and drug trafficking in the region have contributed to high levels of armed violence and insecurity in several Caribbean countries. The Haitian crisis is having a further impact on transnational criminal activity, with the demand and circulation of illicit firearms in Haiti fuelling regional trafficking (see sect. paras. 45–50).

37. In the Dominican Republic, the authorities have recently made several arrests of Haitian gang members and disrupted transborder criminal efforts, including arms trafficking. Nonetheless, the treatment of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, in particular those with an irregular status, has been of great concern to local, regional and international human rights organizations.

38. Over the past three years, Mexico has become a significant destination for Haitians on their journey to try to reach the United States, resulting in Haitians being among the top three nationalities seeking refugee status in Mexico. While Mexico has recently implemented a proactive non-refoulement policy towards Haitians, there is still a need for a comprehensive human rights approach concerning migrants, as well as asylum and refugee seekers (see para. 182 (c)).

C. Unilateral sanctions and measures

39. A number of Haitian nationals have recently been targeted by unilateral sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes. To date, Canada has imposed sanctions on 25 individuals, while the United States has imposed sanctions against 9 Haitian nationals and denied or revoked visas to many more. In addition, 52 Haitians are also forbidden from entering the Dominican Republic. While the Panel reiterates its independence from those national processes, the impact they have on the situation in Haiti is of interest.

40. While the Haitian and international stakeholders with whom the Panel met believed that international sanctions alone cannot curb the current levels of armed violence in the country, many acknowledged that both unilateral and United Nations sanctions have had some relative impact, most notably in terms of change of behaviour, in particular of several political and financial actors.

41. Most Haitian interlocutors expressed their hope for the rapid development and implementation of the United Nations sanctions regime.

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11 See, for instance, A.S. Fabre et al., Weapons Compass: The Caribbean Firearms Study (CARICOM IMPACS and Small Arms Survey, April 2023).
D. Economic situation

42. The general economic performance of Haiti has continued to decline in 2023, with about 59 per cent of the population living in abject poverty with limited access to basic services owing to political turmoil, insecurity, institutional and socioeconomic crises and natural disasters.\textsuperscript{15} With the decrease in national food production, the value of imports has continuously increased.\textsuperscript{16} Today, imports constitute about 70 per cent of the goods sold in the formal economy. For the fourth consecutive year, gross domestic product (GDP) again contracted in 2022, this time by 1.5 per cent, while inflation reached 38.7 per cent. Correspondingly, food prices increased by up to 44 per cent amid increases in food imports and disruptions in basic supplies, including fuel, occasioned by gang violence and some economic actors (see paras. 69–81).\textsuperscript{17}

43. Inherent institutional weaknesses in the country’s public financial governance and the judicial system, such as the absence of accountability, have emboldened criminal networks to divert public funds meant for the economic stability of Haiti. Some of the institutional factors contributing to the weakening of the economy and to the instability of the country include the following:

(a) **Diversion and embezzlement of public funds.** The economy of the country has suffered owing to the diversion of public funds meant for development, such as the diversion of public funds for emergency and reconstruction after the 2010 earthquake; the Panel documented the case of the Petrocaribe loan to illustrate how illicit diversion of funds of that magnitude continue to have a negative impact on the peace and security of the country;

(b) **Tax evasion.** Haiti is a near-net importer of most commodities, so whoever controls the seaports controls the country’s various supply chains. The import sector is controlled by family business conglomerates that have influence on the appointments and actions of some customs officials. Similarly, the container terminals at the seaports are owned and operated by those same families, with little oversight from State authorities. The oligopoly of the business sector by a few actors has contributed to tax evasion through underdeclaration, the mislabelling of commodities and fraudulent tax exemptions, among other malpractices that contribute to the loss of State revenue. Although the customs department has shown some increase in revenue collection in the most recent financial year (see annex 27), tax evasion remains a challenge;

(c) **Links between gangs, politicians and economic elites.** Haiti has a history of economic actors using gangs to secure their businesses and to sabotage their competitors, while the political elite have financed them to rally voters in their favour and control the constituency. Over the past two years, gangs have developed autonomous means of financing their activities (see paras. 69–81). Gangs carry out looting, kidnap members of the population, hijack trucks for ransom and extort road users.

44. According to the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, Haiti was ranked the 171st least corrupt nation out of 180 countries, having fallen from 164th in the previous ranking.\textsuperscript{18} Financial mismanagement contributed to the global Financial Action Task Force placing Haiti in 2021 under increased monitoring owing to its failure to

\textsuperscript{15} See https://www.unicef.org/media/132191/file/2023-HAC-Haiti.pdf.

\textsuperscript{16} See https://tradingeconomics.com/haiti/imports.

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with a leading government economist and a former member of Haiti chamber of commerce. See also https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/HT/indicateurs-et-conjoncture.

\textsuperscript{18} See https://tradingeconomics.com/haiti/corruption-rank.
comply with anti-money laundering standards. The passing of the anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism decree in May 2023, and the approval by the International Monetary Fund of the country’s first staff-monitored programme in December 2022, are significant steps in countering financial mismanagement, although meaningful implementation has yet to be realized.

III. Information relevant to the potential designation of individuals or entities that may have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti

A. Gangs in Haiti

1. Gang distribution

45. Since François Duvalier’s tenure (see annex 2) and in particular since the presidential mandate of Michel Martelly, gangs have been used to disrupt political processes, intimidate the opposition and the general population and secure votes and economic profits (see paras. 69–81). They proliferated further from 2018 onwards (see annex 3) as a tool for the political and business elite, as well as senior governmental officials, to suppress popular mobilization – for instance, in response to contentious affairs, such as the Petrocaribe scandal – commit massacres (e.g., La Saline) and paralyze social and economic activities (peyi lok, or “locked country”, see para. 72).

46. Gangs have increasingly joined forces through multiple alliances to exert control over large swaths of the territory. While estimations suggest approximately 200 gangs are currently active across Haiti, the Panel is of the view that not every grouping of individuals in Haiti is necessarily a gang. The challenge to providing precise figures includes the complexity in defining what actually constitutes a gang rather than a baz (base) involved in self-defence or petty criminal activities. In the context of Haiti, a gang is a group of individuals with an organized structure (e.g., chain of command and strategic functions – see annex 6) that uses armed violence with more sophisticated firearms to control and influence neighbourhoods and engage

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21 The present section was prepared mostly on the basis of exchanges undertaken from February to July 2023 with international and national researchers, gang and political analysts, former and serving government representatives, individuals living in gang-controlled areas, police officers and analysts and international law enforcement officers, as well as information published on the official Facebook page of the Haitian national police.
22 National investigations indicate that, in collusion with Jimmy Chérizier (HTi.001) and other gang members, three former governmental officials, including a former mayor of Port-au-Prince, a former director general of the Ministry of the Interior and a former coordinator of the Presidential security unit, were involved in the La Saline massacre that took place from 13 to 19 November 2018 (confidential report, 2019 – on file with the Panel). Two of them were also sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Department of the Treasury for their participation in the La Saline massacre. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1208.
23 Baz (bases) are spaces for local social gatherings where people can engage in political discussion, promote cultural activities and development projects, but also organize armed groups that can conduct activities ranging from crime to defence of the territory they belong to. Gangs are the most toxic facet of baz and comprise a group of people dedicated to crime who have a territory that needs to be defended. See Pedro Braum Azevedo da Silveira, “Rat pa kaka: politics, development, and violence in the heart of Port-au-Prince”, PhD thesis in social anthropology, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, March 2014 (available at https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/am-pdf/10.1111/aman.13344).
in illegal activities, such as illicit trafficking of firearms or drugs, extortion, kidnappings, murders, sexual violence and hijacking of trucks.  

47. Around 23 primary gangs operate in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (West department), clustered around two main coalitions (see annex 4). The so-called “G9 Family and Allies”, led by Barbeque (HTi.001) and the G-Pép, led by Gabriel Jean-Pierre (alias “Ti Gabriel”) (see annex 5). Alongside these, a range of other independent gangs undertake opportunistic alliances, both among themselves and with the G9 and G-Pép (see annex 6).  

48. The whole of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is affected by gang activity, to varying degrees. In their strongholds, gangs exert direct control and exclusive authority (areas of control). They threaten and hold to ransom members of their own communities, extort businesses, set up cells commanded by zone chiefs and install protective walls, called “VARs” (see annex 7). Gangs also exert influence on areas surrounding their strongholds (areas of influence). While more loosely controlled, these areas are only accessible by the gang and those with which they have agreements. Areas under direct control and under influence represent about 80 per cent of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The remaining 20 per cent suffers from the incursions by gangs looking to conduct kidnappings, robberies, murders and other crimes (see figure below).

Areas of control and areas of influence of gangs in Port-au-Prince as of July 2023


24 Some analysts distinguish armed gangs from other criminal groups in terms of headcount (from about 15 members), structural organization and type of illicit activities. In this way, more sophisticated gangs, such as those of the G9 and G-Pép, differ from geographically isolated groups composed mostly of a few young men who engage in armed robberies and theft.
49. The department of Artibonite, which is key for the country’s food supply, is the second largest hotspot for gang violence (see annex 9), much of which is also deeply rooted in land conflicts and politics (see paras. 69–81). The most active gang, Gran Grif (also known as the Savien gang), has exponentially enlarged its area of control and influence since 2022. To oppose Gran Grif, inhabitants of the Jean Denis locality created the Coalition des révolutionnaires pour sauver l’Artibonite (known as the Jean Denis coalition), which is considered a gang rather than a self-defence group. Kokorat San Ras, despite its limited numbers, is also a very brutal gang operating in the department (see annex 10).

50. With relatively lower crime rates, other departments are not spared from the influence of gangs. Some of the gangs based in Port-au-Prince have strategic operational branches that can be activated for criminal purposes. Criminal groups have also been reported in other areas of the country, including in les Cayes, Miragoâne, Petite Rivière-des-Nippes, Petit Goâve, Cap-Haïtien, Marigot and Port-de-Paix.

2. Gang dynamics during the reporting period

2.1 Fighting between G9 and G-Pèp

51. Since the blockage of the country’s main fuel terminal (Varreux) in mid-September 2022, Barbeque has led the G9 coalition in a new wave of violence against their rivals in the Port-au-Prince area.

52. From 27 February to 3 March 2023, Barbeque led G9 gangs (Krache Dife, La Saline, Wharf Jérémie, Tokyo, Belekou) in clashes with Les Argentins (G-Pèp), led by Kempes Sanon, in the Bel-Air and Solino neighbourhoods. Les Argentins were, in turn, supported by their G-Pèp coalition allies, the 5 Segond and Brooklyn gangs. The G9 offensive was in retaliation for the setting up of a Les Argentins local cell in the Solino area to manage operations in the zone, including multiple kidnappings in the Delmas area. As a result of the clashes, several civilians were killed and displaced and houses were destroyed (see paras. 147–154). On 17 August 2023, Kempes launched a reprisal attack against the population of Solino.

53. On 7 April 2023, several members of the Belekou gang were fatally shot during a sniper attack by the rival Brooklyn gang (G-Pèp). In a reprisal the next day, Terre Noire – led by Jonel Catel (incarcerated but still leading the gang) – used snipers to shoot at Brooklyn residents who, besieged by G9 gangs, used a northern passage to exit the neighbourhood, opposite Terre Noire territory. As a result, 72 residents of Brooklyn were killed, 52 injured and 19 women raped (including minors) by Terre Noire gang members.

54. G-Pèp and its allies (5 Segond, Kraze Barye, Grand Ravine, Canaan and 400 Mawozo) have enhanced their cooperation, resulting in a significant increase in their fighting and criminal capabilities. Under this arrangement, Johnson André (alias “Izo”), 5 Segond’s leader (see annex 11), has been playing an increasingly influential role. With substantial resources, strong criminal networks and expansionist ambitions, Izo exerts considerable influence – along with his allies – from the southern to the northern access roads of Port-au-Prince and up to the Artibonite department (see annex 17). It is also worth highlighting the role of Emmanuel Salomon (alias “Manno”), another leader of 5 Segond in charge of operations (see annex 11).

25 The Jean Denis Coalition regularly carries out attacks against the population of Savien, Artibonite department, killing inhabitants and burning properties.
27 United Nations data.
55. In a recent development in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, a priest brokered a “peace pledge” in July 2023 between Barbeque, Iskar Andrice and Mathias Sainthil of G9 and Ti Gabriel of G-Pép (see annex 12). The gang leaders promised “to work hard to end violence, to bring peace to all people”. Although the residents of Bel-Air and lower Delmas were able to return to the area, after having fled inter-gang clashes, and some barricades were dismantled, the general population remains sceptical of the lasting effects of the pledge. Neighbourhoods remain under the control of gangs, which have not laid down their weapons, and the true motives of the gangs for signing this “pledge” remain obscure.28

2.2 *Bwa Kale* and the strengthening of self-defence groups

56. The dynamics of gangs and associated violence have taken a new turn since late April 2023, sparked by *Bwa Kale*, a mob justice movement that had killed 479 alleged gang members across the country as of July 2023.29 The trigger for this phenomenon was the popular mobilization that accompanied police operations leading to the dismantling of the Ti-Makak gang, which operated in Laboule, in the heights of Pétion-Ville, Port-au-Prince.

57. Following the killing of Carlo Petit-Homme (alias “Ti-Makak”), on 14 April 2023 (see annex 13), 14 of the remaining members30 of the gang were arrested by the police in the Canapé Vert neighbourhood on 24 April 2023 as they were trying to escape to Village de Dieu to reinforce 5 Second and Grand Ravine gangs. Soon after, an angry crowd seized the individuals from police custody and lynched and burned them alive. Since then, the practice of lynching gang members and individuals associated with bandits has spread to all departments of the country (see annexes 14 and 15). The wave of executions has also ensnared people not involved with gangs.

58. While there are no proclaimed leaders of *Bwa Kale*, the movement is animated by messages from social and mainstream media encouraging the population to hunt down gang members. Self-defence groups, already active in several neighbourhoods, have taken advantage of *Bwa Kale* to assert their power in their respective communities and extend their influence into other areas.31 Self-defence groups benefit from the financial support of local entrepreneurs, as well as some members of the Haitian diaspora, to protect neighbourhoods. Some groups even collect a monthly fee to secure residences.32 In other areas, residents have started organizing themselves to prevent the entry of gangs in their neighbourhoods, by erecting barricades and closing the road at night (see annex 16).

59. With the rise of the *Bwa Kale* movement, the number of arms in circulation among the population has increased. Most of the firearms of the lynched gang members are not handed over to the police. From 24 to 27 April 2023, despite around 150 alleged gang members being killed, only five rifles and three pistols were seized by the police, together with some magazines and rounds of ammunition.33

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28 According to information from gang analysts, United Nations analysts, humanitarians and an individual living in a gang-controlled area, 2023.
29 United Nations data.
30 Following the assassination of Ti-Makak by a member of his own gang, 57 members of the gang were executed for conspiracy and negligence. A further 35 were killed by the police on 22 and 23 April 2023.
31 From late 2022 to mid-2023, self-defence groups have multiplied, with new groups established in Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre, Pétion-Ville, Grand Anse, Delmas, Port-au-Prince, Artibonite and Cabaret. Confidential document, 2023.
32 Information provided by a national gang analyst, 2023.
In addition, some self-defence groups have benefitted from gang support as a way of countering their rivals. The CASEC Belizaire brigade, in Croix-des-Bouquets, is supported by the Chyen Mechan gang in their fight against 400 Mawozo. As part of Bwa Kale, the inhabitants of Onaville also requested the help of the Chyen Mechan gang to expel Canaan gang members from the locality. It is important to note that gangs such as Base Pilate and Ti Bois started off as self-defence groups. The Panel is of the view that the proliferation of informal security provision through Bwa Kale and armed self-defence groups and the support given by some police officers risks plunging the country into a downward spiral of violence. Increasingly, self-defence groups have the potential to further destabilize the already dire security situation in the country.

### 2.3 Dynamics in the G-Pèp alliance

More than a week after the start of Bwa Kale, on 3 May 2023, Izo, the leader of 5 Segond, issued a video, launching the Zam Pale, a retaliatory movement against the popular mob. Ti Lapli and Vitelhomme also appeared on social media to denounce Bwa Kale, by referring it as a movement supported by the police to attack what they reported as innocent people. Other G-Pèp allies echoed Izo’s call, encouraging members to take up arms to launch reprisals.

While retaliatory attacks did indeed take place, the Zam Pale did not reach the extent promised by G-Pèp. Bwa Kale clearly had a negative impact on the coalition’s operational capacity. Moreover, in the aftermath of Bwa Kale, the recruitment of new members was inhibited by the fear of lynching, as well as police operations in the Village de Dieu neighbourhood, 5 Segond’s stronghold.

The capacity of the police to tackle gang activities in this controlled area has been hampered. Gangs control roads, including through the setting of concealed traps, and not only are heavily armed (see annex 32) and trained, but also know how to handle weapons, display combat techniques and operate strategically in neighbourhoods. Former police and military officers, as well as deportees from the United States, are among their ranks (see annex 4).

Due to the increased police pressure on his stronghold, Izo has used the maritime route to provide support to his gang’s northern cells – as well as to the Canaan gang – and strategically operates from there, conducting kidnappings in the Delmas, Bon Repos and Lilavois areas, hijacking trucks and stealing goods. In parallel, he has committed acts of piracy (see annex 17). Between 18 April and 23 June 2023, four attacks resulting in the kidnapping of over 30 individuals were attributed to the 5 Segond gang. Izo has also been reported by several sources as being involved in drug trafficking (see paras. 113–123).

Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli”), a leader of the Grand Ravine gang and Izo’s key ally, has continued kidnapping activities in his own zone.

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34 Confidential report, 2023.
35 Zam Pale, in Haitian Creole, means “speaking weapons”.
36 Videos on file with the Panel.
37 This was reiterated in interviews with gang and political analysts, national researchers and an individual living in a gang-controlled area.
38 The police destroyed houses serving as a bulwark and cover for bandits and killed gang members.
39 Information that gangs received training from foreigners received from serving government representatives, an international police officer, national gang analysts and an individual living in a controlled area.
40 Information obtained from sources in Matelas, Lafiteau and Lilavois.
41 Information obtained from confidential sources, 2023.
42 From the Village de Dieu area up to Martissant 23.
as well as hijacking trucks and vehicles passing throughout the Martissant area for extortion (see annex 23). Besides, Grand Ravine has tried at all costs to take control of the Carrefour-Feuilles zone, committing many abuses against residents, such as killings, robberies, rapes, looting and burning of residences, and continuous attacks against police officers. Two police officers were killed, on 4 and 14 August 2023. On 14 August, Grand Ravine attacked and rendered the Haitian electricity substation non-operational in the area. As at 15 August, approximately 1,020 households, comprising 4,972 individuals, had fled from Carrefour-Feuilles and Savane Pistache.43

66. Taking advantage of the police focus on Village de Dieu in the aftermath of Bwa Kale, Vitelhomme Innocent, the leader of Kraze Barye (see annex 19), has intensified attacks against residents of the Pétion-Ville, Kenscoff, Tabarre, Croix-des-Bouquets and Delmas communes. Although facing the resistance of the many local self-defence groups in the area, he has continued to attack the police and the population, including through the spoliation of land and property, killings, looting, stealing and kidnapping of influential individuals. Many have fled the area (see annex 35). Kraze Barye has become one of the most powerful gangs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, with an increasing number of fighters and semi-automatic weapons.

67. Previously one of the largest gangs in Haiti, the 400 Mawozo, led by Joseph Wilson (alias “Lamno San Jou”) (see annexes 4 and 20), has lost part of its territory and headcount, mainly owing to clashes with Kraze Barye, Chyen Mechan and CASEC Belizaire, as well as to police operations.44 With a reduced capacity to maintain its previously high record of kidnappings, 400 Mawozo has been failing to secure control over the Thomazeau area, formerly ruled by Ti-Makak. The gang is now more focused on conducting lootings, robberies and extorsion, as well as hijacking cargo trucks and smuggling contraband along the land border.

68. In the Artibonite department, the gangs of Gran Grif, led by Luckson Elan, and Kokorat San Ras, led by Meyer, have committed acts of extreme violence, forcing people to abandon large areas of cropland and threatening agricultural production (see annex 10). Reports indicate that both gangs have links with G-Pép gangs, as they have the same modus operandi as those in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, including kidnapping, robbery and hijacking of goods and trucks. They make incursions into other communes to kill, rob and harm residents. Victims of kidnapping are systematically tortured and subjected to serious abuses (see annex 21), including gang rape and death when ransom is not paid. They are not only supported by 5 Segond 45 in terms of weapons, but also by politicians, who maintain strong relationships with Artibonite gangs, including Raboteau (see paras. 69–81). Following the Gran Grif attack against the Liancourt police station in January 2023, in which six officers were killed, the police remains disrupted in the department, leading civilians to team up with the Jean Denis coalition, against Gran Grif (see annex 10). Clashes between these two groups have been marked by atrocities.

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43 See https://dtm.iom.int/node/27581.
44 In mid-2022, about 124 members of the 400 Mawozo gang were killed in fights with Chyen Mechan to regain control of the northern and central sides of the Plaine de Cul-de-Sac, in Croix-des-Bouquets. The gang lost the Santo territory. At the end of 2022, it was involved in a confrontation with Vitelhomme, who killed 70 members, after 400 Mawozo members had stolen Vitelhomme’s money for the purchase of weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, the police has killed over 100 members of 400 Mawozo in different operations. Several members have fled to other cities or been arrested on their way to or in the Dominican Republic. Information obtained from a gang analyst, as well as open and confidential sources, 2023.
45 Information obtained from gang and political analysts and individuals living in a gang-controlled area, 2023.
3. Financing of gangs

3.1 Links between political and economic actors and gangs

69. The influence of politicians and financial actors on gang activities is systemic in nature. Politicians and economic elites, seeking votes and the protection of their wealth, respectively, have tended to compensate gangs with money and other resources for offering those services, a practice that has gradually enriched and empowered gangs.

70. The Panel notes that some of these relationships may have shifted over time owing to a range of factors, including the recent unilateral sanctions targeting political and economic figures, as well as the delay in national elections and related political campaigns, which usually endear politicians to gangs. The development of autonomous sources of revenues by gangs (see below) has contributed to higher levels of autonomy from their traditional backers. However, the current lull in visible activities between gangs and some members of the political and economic elite does not necessarily mean a total disconnect. Rather, the relationship may remain fluid and be mobilized at short notice.

71. The Panel has evidence that Reynold Deeb, the Chief Operating Officer at Deka Group, a leading importer of consumer goods, and sanctioned by a Member State, has been financing members of gangs to protect his business and secure the transportation of the commodities he imports. In 2017, Mr. Deeb paid a leader of a gang to facilitate his business in one of the main ports. More recently, several independent sources explained that Mr. Deeb had been using gang members to put pressure on some customs officers at the port so that they don’t inspect or intercept his containers, thereby allowing him to bypass certain import duties. Finally, because G9 controls the area around the Autorité Portuaire Nationale (APN) port and roads leading to it, Mr. Deeb, like other main importers, has been paying gangs for the passage of his merchandise through their territory.

72. Between September and December 2019, Haiti was subjected to a blockage of all economic activities, commonly referred to as peyi lok. The political opposition, supported by economic actors, including Mr. Deeb, called on the population to stay at home in a protest move aimed at putting pressure on the then-President Moise to end his term. Public transport was paralyzed owing to a lack of fuel supply, schools were closed and food supplies dwindled as barricades and violence prevented the free movement of people and goods throughout the country, thus cutting off the provinces from the capital. In a calculated move, Mr. Deeb took advantage of the high demand for food supplies by bribing parliamentarians who would then pay gang leaders to unblock the streets by dispersing demonstrators so as to allow the transportation of his merchandise into the country.

73. Michel Martelly, who served as president from 2011 to 2016, used gangs to expand his influence over neighbourhoods to advance his political agenda,

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46 Information obtained in interviews with individuals living in gang-controlled area, national analysts, economic actors, politicians and a government representative working on gang-related issues, 2023.
48 Information obtained in interviews with government officials, members of a trade and commerce entity and representatives of civil society, Haiti, 2023.
49 Information obtained in interviews with former members of a trade and commerce entity, three Haitian economists from the diaspora and five civil society members in Haiti. See also www.gazettehaiti.com/node/2188.
contributing to a legacy of insecurity, the impacts of which are still being felt today.\(^{50}\) The Panel received information that, during his tenure, Mr. Martelly had sponsored multiple gangs, such as Base 257, Village de Dieu, Ti Bois and Grand Ravine, including through the provision of funds and/or firearms.

74. Several sources confirmed that Mr. Martelly created Base 257, which over time was financed and armed to prevent anti-Government demonstrations from taking place in Pétion-Ville, especially from 2014 onwards.\(^{51}\) The gang regularly conducts murders, kidnappings, thefts and drug trafficking.\(^{52}\) Mr. Martelly has also used intermediaries to build relationships and negotiate with other gangs, including through foundations and members of his security detail. For instance, Arnel Joseph, the former chief of the Village de Dieu gang, stated that he regularly talked with an intermediary working in the close protection unit of Mr. Martelly, adding that the intermediary provided him with firearms and significant amounts of cash.\(^{53}\) In a video, Ti Lapli, one of the current leaders of Grand Ravine, explained that the former president had given Tet Kale (former Grand Ravine chief) a Galil 5.56 mm rifle belonging to the police, as well as a similar rifle to Chrisla, chief of the Ti Bois gang. Following the assassination of Tet Kale, Ti Lapli retrieved the weapon.

75. From 2016 to 2020, Prophane Victor was a member of parliament for Petite Riviere, Artibonite department, an area with increasing levels of violence and gang control. To secure his election in 2016 and his control over the area, Mr. Victor started arming young men in Petite Riviere who went on to form the Gran Grif gang,\(^{54}\) currently the largest gang in the Artibonite department and the main perpetrator of human rights violations, including sexual violence. Mr. Victor continued to support the Gran Grif gang until 2020, when they had a falling out as a result of unfulfilled promises made during the election period. He has since been supporting rival gangs and self-defence groups in the area.\(^{55}\) In addition to the evidence collected by the Panel, Canada sanctioned Mr. Victor in June 2023.\(^{56}\)

76. Youri Latortue, from Gonaives, formerly the President of the Senate from 2017 to 2018, exerts considerable control over political and economic life in the Artibonite department, including through the use of gang members, in particular from the Raboteau gang, which he has been financing and arming. More recently, confidential sources explained to the Panel how Mr. Latortue had also been sponsoring Kokorat Sans Ras, an extremely violent gang from the Artibonite department, in collusion with Raboteau. Mr. Latortue has used gang members as close protection and to destroy property. In addition to the evidence collected by the Panel, Mr. Latortue has been sanctioned by Canada and the United States for supporting gangs. The Panel was

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\(^{50}\) Information obtained in interviews with individuals living in gang-controlled area, national analysts, politicians and a government representative, as well as confidential reports and videos on file with the Panel and information provided by a Member State. Mr. Martelly was also sanctioned by Canada. See [www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng).

\(^{51}\) Information obtained in interviews with current and former senior governmental officials, representatives of law enforcement, representatives of civil society from gang-controlled areas and governmental confidential reports, 2023.

\(^{52}\) Haiti national police information.

\(^{53}\) Confidential report.

\(^{54}\) Information obtained in interviews with a former member of police leadership, law enforcement officers, serving government representatives, inhabitants of Petite Riviere and civil society representatives of Artibonite department, 2023. Video evidence on file with the Panel.

\(^{55}\) Information obtained from confidential sources, 2023.

recently provided with a video recording featuring Barbeque (HTi.001) in which the gang leader stated that Mr. Latortue had given him $30,000.\textsuperscript{57}

77. The Panel is looking into the creation and financing of gangs by several economic and political actors, including through the use of foundations, and will continue with its investigations.

3.2. Sources of revenue

78. Kidnapping for ransom is one of the main sources of financing for gangs in Haiti and has recently reached unprecedented levels. While many cases go unreported,\textsuperscript{58} 2,441 persons were kidnapped from January 2022 to June 2023.\textsuperscript{59} Although Bwa Kale contributed to a drop in kidnappings,\textsuperscript{60} many cases have since been recorded in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the Artibonite department, including collective kidnappings by Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif. In cases reported to the Panel, the amounts paid in ransom vary greatly depending on the profile of victims, ranging from $7,000 to $300,000 for foreign targets and prominent figures (see annex 22).

79. Extortion, robberies and the hijacking of passenger, transport and private vehicles of all sizes represent a significant source of revenue for gangs controlling national roads. Cargo trucks are particularly high targets because of the value of the merchandise transported (such as fuel or manufactured goods). For instance, in October 2022, members of 5 Segond started to intensify the hijacking of freight trucks transporting containers of high value merchandise along the Canaan-Lafiteau road (RN1). Between this period and July 2023,\textsuperscript{61} hijacking incidents increased from an average of 4 to 5 per month to about 10.\textsuperscript{62} An extortion fee of between $1,000 and $3,000 is paid per truck hijacked, depending on its size and the value of its cargo.\textsuperscript{63} The situation is similar along the RN2 in Martissant, where 5 Segond, Grand Ravine and Ti Bois gangs carry out extortion operations.

80. Extortion along the road leading to the main petroleum depot has had a significant impact on the distribution of fuel in the country. In July 2023, the Association of Petroleum Professionals warned the authorities about potential blockage of supply from Varreux due to gang-related activities.\textsuperscript{64}

81. Gangs have been extorting businesses as well as institutions, including schools, in the areas they control. In addition, gangs collect taxes from the population for public services that they do not actually provide, such as water or electricity (see annex 23).

\textsuperscript{57} Videos on file with the Panel.

\textsuperscript{58} Some families do not report cases to avoid publicity and/or the possible risk of beingcompromised by dealing with the police.

\textsuperscript{59} Haiti national police/United Nations police, 2023.

\textsuperscript{60} In the first quarter of 2023, 5 Segond and Grand Ravine were key allies in cases of kidnapping, which led to a high rate of this crime. However, those gangs were greatly affected by the lynching of many of their members and impeded from freely operating due to police operations and Bwa Kale.

\textsuperscript{61} See, \url{www.facebook.com/pnh.ht/posts/pfbid04VizVoaVqA38zszQTD8woghxZDXQ5vZvPhXGHi7Xk36Har7whEWrljNGdxwNebZzzzQ}.

\textsuperscript{62} Information obtained in interviews with three businesspeople and four members of the public using route RN1, 2023.

\textsuperscript{63} Information obtained in interviews with a member of l’Association des chauffeurs et propriétaires haïtiens and two police officers, 2023.

\textsuperscript{64} Information obtained in an interview with an official of the Haiti land transport sector and a government official, 2023. See also \url{https://endijenenfo.com/terminal-varreux-controle-par-des-gangs-lappe-tire-la-sonnette-dalarme/}.
B. Transnational crime dynamics

1. Weak border controls and corrupt practices: key factors to criminal activities

82. The lack of effective border management capacity, weak customs controls and entrenched corrupt practices are among the primary enablers of criminal activities (see annex 24 and para. 182 (c)). There are 20 official maritime ports in Haiti of varying sizes (see annex 25), as well as multiple unofficial docking stations and moorings along the 1,771 km-long coast. In addition, there are four official land crossing points along the 392 km-long border with the Dominican Republic and countless other unofficial ones. Two of the five airports in Haiti are international, and there are a number of clandestine airstrips in the country.65

83. The Panel visited three public ports in the country – the APN port, Cap-Haïtien and Port-de-Paix – and interviewed many actors involved in port activities. State authorities, including customs, have limited control over ports and terminals, which are mostly controlled by businesspeople and merchant families. In the West department, there are two main cargo terminals: one is managed by Caribbean Port Services, which is located at the APN port, is privately owned and handles about 80 per cent of the cargo coming into Port-au-Prince;66 the other, Lafiteau Port, is owned under private-public partnership and receives mostly cargo vessels.67

84. Interviews with former civil servants from Mr. Martelly’s administration, customs officers, confidential records and information provided by a Member State to the Panel confirmed that the election of Mr. Martelly in 2011 marked the arrival of new economic players in the control of the country’s main ports of entry. Prominent among them was Reynold Deeb, who has unofficially maintained his grip on the choice of customs officials deployed across several main ports of entry to date.68 Sources explained that Mr. Deeb had deployed representatives to abet him in his activities linked to tax evasion through underdeclaration, mislabelling and the importation of contraband goods through various ports.

85. The Panel found that some customs officials had been implicated in financial malpractices. Romel Bell, the Director General of Customs from 2018 to 2022, committed and abetted tax evasion and other financial crimes, including suspicious bank transactions (see paras. 175–176, and annex 26).69 Mr. Bell condoned a corrupt system that compromised customs control processes that had an impact on not only customs revenue, but also the capacity of customs to prevent the trafficking of illicit goods, including arms and drugs, to and from the country, which has undermined the security and stability of Haiti. Mr. Bell is among several former and current State officials that have been interdicted from leaving the country owing to investigations related to funds diversion (see annex 26), in addition to being sanctioned for corruption by a Member State.70

86. Since the replacement of Mr. Bell in July 2022 and the reinforcement of institutional control, customs revenue collection has doubled. In its efforts to building

65 For more information on the Haitian port system and the illicit trafficking of goods, see www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf.


67 Information obtained in interviews with two customs officers and two shipping line officials, 2023.

68 Information obtained from confidential sources, 2023.

69 See also Unité de lutte contre la corruption, “Résumé exécutif du rapport d’enquête sur le patrimoine de l’ancien Directeur général de l’Administration Générale des Douanes, M. Romel Bell”.

integrity, the new administration has suspended a senior customs officer and revoked the licenses of several clearing agents.

2. Weapons and ammunition trafficking and diversions

87. The illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition to Haiti is one of the primary drivers of the expansion of territorial control by gangs and the extreme levels of armed violence in the country and represents a threat to regional stability. The Panel is of the view that disrupting the flows of arms and ammunition into the country should be a priority for the Haitian authorities and Member States in the wider region and that the targeted arms embargo provisions should be urgently and robustly reinforced (see para. 182 (a)).

88. Demand for weapons is increasing and prices are high, making the trafficking of weapons a very lucrative business, even in small quantities by what are known as “ant traffickers” – i.e the smuggling of arms and ammunition in small shipments. For example, 5.56 mm semi-automatic rifles that would cost a few hundred dollars in the United States are regularly sold for $5,000–$8,000 in Haiti, while a 9 mm handgun can be sold for $1,500–$3,000 and ammunition for $3–$5 a round. Seizures made on their way to or within Haiti are not huge in terms of quantity – the largest identified by the Panel since January 2022 has been of 23 items for firearms and 120,000 rounds for ammunition (see annex 29); however, trafficking is rife, resulting in a worrying accumulation of materiel in the country.

89. Various types of Haitian gun carriers procure weapons illicitly, including civilians, private security companies and gangs. Although trafficking networks are not very sophisticated, they involve a wide array of actors ranging from straw buyers in the United States, money carriers, freight forwarders, government officials and small illicit market traders in Haiti selling to the highest bidders. Some gangs have not only substantial financial means to procure expensive materiel, but also the networks to facilitate their purchases abroad and transportation to Haiti. The Panel is currently working on a range of trafficking cases by sea, land and air; while some are included in the present report, others are still under investigation and will be reported in due course.

90. In addition to documenting illicit weapons and ammunition in various locations across Haiti, the Panel was also provided with information regarding seizures both in and en route to the country. It furthermore conducted multiple interviews with intelligence and law enforcement agencies in Haiti and the region, as well as with local authorities and civil society organizations, individuals living in gang-affected areas and individuals possessing weapons legally and illegally.

91. The Panel sent tracing requests for 74 firearms to three countries where illicit firearms recently seized and documented in Haiti had been originally manufactured or exported to Haiti. At the time of submission, only one Member State had responded. The Panel would like to highlight that, without the support of Member States in tracing firearms, it will be unable to identify chains of custody.

2.1. Typology of illicit firearms in Haiti

92. While the extent of firearms ownership among the civilian population is very difficult to ascertain, available estimates from specialized research organizations, United Nations bodies and Haitian governmental agencies range from 291,000 in 2018 to 600,000 in 2022. With just a few thousand firearms licenses issued or

renewed each year (see below), the vast majority of firearms are being held illicitly. As in other countries in the Caribbean, 9 mm handguns continue to be the most sought-after weapon. The authorities seized 191 firearms between October 2022 and July 2023, including 102 pistols and 45 rifles (see annex 33).  

93. The firepower of gangs in the West and Artibonite departments has increased significantly over the past three years, with a clear shift in procurement efforts towards semi-automatic rifles. Gang members continue mostly to use 9 mm handguns and 5.56 mm semi-automatic rifles, as well as 7.62 x 39 mm semi-automatic rifles, although to a much lesser extent. Efforts to procure associated ammunition for each of these calibres are relentless (see annex 32).

94. The Panel is concerned about the presence of higher-calibre weapons and ammunition in circulation among gangs. The Panel received recent footage of 7.62 x 51 mm belt-fed light machine guns used by Canaan and 5 Segond. It also received footage of 12.7 x 99 mm ammunition – for heavy machine guns or sniper rifles – in the possession of Grand Ravine and Ti Bois gangs. The Panel has not been able to confirm whether these gangs own the corresponding weapons systems but received evidence that they had been trying actively to acquire them.

95. According to medical staff interviewed by the Panel, the increasing number of weapons in circulation, as well as the upgrading of arsenals, is having an impact on the lethality and severity of the wounds being inflicted. The Panel also documented the use of hollow-point ammunition on several occasions in Haiti. Hollow-point bullets expand upon impact and result in more devastating wounds.

2.2 Trafficking routes

96. On the basis of research and on-site observations by the Panel in Haiti, the majority of firearms and ammunition in circulation in the country are either manufactured and/or originally purchased in the United States. They reach Haiti directly from the United States or through the Dominican Republic. Other less common dynamics have also been identified, such as AK-pattern rifles recovered in Haiti that were diverted from a South American country and likely to have either been trafficked alongside drugs being brought into the country (see paras. 113–123) or imported from the Dominican Republic, where recent seizures have yielded weapons from South America.

97. Cases analysed by the Panel indicate that, while gangs can procure pistols, shotguns and 5.56 mm semi-automatic rifles and related ammunition from the Haitian illicit market or from the Dominican Republic, the largest and richer gangs have actually been trying to acquire specific materiel from the United States using direct channels, for instance for the purchase of higher calibre firearms, including 12.7 x 99 mm anti-materiel rifles, light machine guns and related ammunition or other uncommon calibres (see annex 32).

98. The lack of capacity of the customs administration and the high levels of corruption within the department are key enablers of arms trafficking into Haiti (see paras. 82–86, and annex 24). On the basis of the seizures reported since 2020, most ports of entry in Haiti – land, sea and air – are prone to arms and ammunition trafficking (see annexes 29, 30 and 31). For an overview of seizures made during the reporting period see annex 28.

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73 Information obtained in an interview with medical staff working in Port au Prince, May 2023.
74 Information obtained in an interview with a confidential source, May 2023, and with a regional firearms trafficking expert, June 2023.
2.2.1 Trafficking from the United States

99. Its relative proximity, the presence of a sizeable Haitian diaspora, low prices and limited controls over purchases make the United States an attractive source of materiel for gun carriers in Haiti (see annex 29).

100. The United States authorities have reinforced controls and seized a range of arms and ammunition bound for Haiti by sea and air. Between January 2020 and July 2023, United States Customs and Border Protection interdicted 15,938 rounds of ammunition of various calibres, as well as 35 receivers and 59 weapons, including 45 handguns, 1 shotgun, 12 rifles and 1 machine gun.\(^75\)

101. The vast majority of seizures made by the United States authorities have been conducted in Miami, a city that is a primary departure point for containerized goods to Haiti and is also the only location in the United States from which ships transport second-hand goods in bulk to Haiti. These vessels depart from shipyards on the Miami River, which the Panel visited, and have been used to traffic arms and ammunition to Haiti (see annexes 29 and 30).

102. Given the dependence of the (illicit) gun market in Haiti to that of the United States, it is key for the Panel to follow the evolution of technology, notably for producing privately made firearms. During the reporting period, the Panel documented the presence of privately made firearms, known as “ghost guns”, and identified in a number of recent seizures several factory-produced and computer numerical control (CNC) milled lower receivers used in the assembly of such weapons. This relatively new trend is of concern and presents a significant challenge to arms control efforts in the United States and the Caribbean,\(^76\) as ghost guns can be made relatively easily through the purchase of parts from online retailers, thereby evading the control processes that apply to manufactured firearms. They are also not serialized and are therefore untraceable (see annex 29).

2.2.2 Trafficking from the Dominican Republic

103. While most trafficking goes undetected, the Dominican and Haitian authorities have made several recent seizures on their respective sides of the border (see annex 31). Cases often include materiel originally purchased in the United States and trafficked to the illicit Dominican Republic market. Although less lucrative than direct imports from the United States, purchasing materiel from the Dominican illicit market is still an attractive proposition. A 5.56 mm semi-automatic rifle costing $500–$700 in the United States could sell for about $2,500 in the Dominican Republic or two to three times that amount in Haiti.\(^77\) One case also indicated that materiel had been sent from the United States to the Dominican Republic for direct onward transfer to Haiti.

104. Several gangs, in particular the 400 Mawozo, whose territory is closest to the border, are using Dominican traffickers to acquire firearms and ammunition. Other cases investigated by the Panel include details of networks that rely on corrupt officials, including police officers, civil servants and relatives of local authorities, to facilitate the ease of trafficking across the border. In most cases noted by the Panel, illicit trafficking takes place at the Belladere border crossing, where most official trade of goods enter Haiti from the Dominican Republic.

\(^75\) Data provided by Customs and Border Protection following a request made by the Panel under the United States Freedom Of Information Act, July 2023.

\(^76\) See A.S. Fabre et al, Weapons Compass: The Caribbean Firearms Study (CARICOM IMPACS and Small Arms Survey, April 2023).

\(^77\) Information obtained in an interview with law enforcement agencies, Dominican Republic and Haiti, 2023.
2.2.3 Trafficking from Haiti

105. The availability of firearms in Haiti results in further destabilization across the region, with illicit trafficking of firearms to Jamaica. Historic marijuana trafficking from Jamaica to Haiti by sea has, over time, turned into a “guns for ganja” trade (see paras. 113–123). According to regional security sources investigating the issue, 18 kg of marijuana can be traded for a handgun (approximately $2,000) given the particular level of demand for this kind of firearm in Jamaica.

2.3 Diversions of weapons and ammunition within Haiti

2.3.1 Diversion from national stockpiles

106. Diversion from police stockpiles – through theft or loss – has resulted in police weapons and ammunition regularly ending up in the hands of criminals and gang members (see annex 33). With support from international partners, the police is currently working on reinforcing their weapons and ammunition management capacity and addressing the main challenges (ibid.).

107. Between 2012 and 2023, close to 2,500 police firearms were declared lost or stolen. While police officers are regularly targeted by gangs and their weapons stolen, some officers have also been selling their own firearms and ammunition. The latter is regularly distributed within police units, even to those that do not typically use their firearms, resulting in some police officers selling their personal quota surplus.

108. Finally, police units regularly seize illicit firearms and ammunition; however, the lack of any regulatory framework, standard operating procedures or resources results in the mismanagement of seized materiel, including diversions (see annex 34).

2.3.2 Civilian ownership

109. In the absence of official arms dealers in the country, the vast majority of firearms for which ownership licenses are requested and issued have been imported into the country illegally. By law, Haitian nationals can apply for licenses to possess and/or carry certain types of handguns and hunting rifles. At present, the database of the police firearms licensing unit (SPAF) contains 47,000 registered handguns and hunting rifles, for which more than 40,000 are currently without a valid permit and are therefore unaccounted for. The firearms licensing unit does not have the resources to operate effectively or to monitor registered firearms. In addition, with the current control by gangs of roads going into Port-au-Prince, civilians from the rest of the country are not able to apply for or renew licenses at the unit.

2.3.3 Private security companies

110. There are currently 103 private security companies registered with the Haitian Ministry of the Interior, and many more are operating without a license. Oversight is extremely limited, resulting in many such companies committing violations of arms control legislation, which contribute to the illicit circulation of weapons in Haiti. Some corporate entities, as well as a number of political figures, also arm their own in-house security teams in an opaque manner.

78 A police 5.56 mm rifle was also recovered from criminals in Jamaica in 2017. See www.haitilibre.com/article-21139-haiti-securite-un-fusil-d-assaut-galil-de-la-pnh-retrouve-en-jamaique.html.
79 Interview with police officers and legal arm owners, Port-au-Prince, 2023.
80 Interview with the licensing firearms unit, Haiti, 2023.
81 The information contained in the present section is presented on the basis of interviews with representatives of private security companies and governmental officials in Haiti, 2023.
111. The regulation of private security companies represents a sensitive topic in Haiti, as it is a very lucrative business in which current and former senior governmental officials are actively involved. The companies represent a primary source of employment in the country, with estimates varying between 30,000 and 90,000 employees. By law, the permissible quantity of weapons owned by a company can equate to up to 50 per cent of the number of staff engaged; some of the largest companies in Haiti have a headcount of 2,000 people.

112. Private security companies often procure weapons on the illicit market. Sources with direct knowledge of the issue informed the Panel that many companies do not manage their weapons stocks properly, have not registered all their firearms and have too many firearms and types that were in violation of the legislation, including 9 mm pistols and semi-automatic rifles. Unreported diversions from the stockpiles of private security companies, including through theft and loss, also happen on a regular basis.

3. Drug trafficking

113. The present section was prepared on the basis of interviews conducted between February and July 2023 with national analysts, former and serving Haitian government representatives, police officers, international intelligence sources, international government representatives, international law enforcement institutions, international security officers, individuals living in gang-controlled areas, regional non-government organizations and agencies, as well as United Nations entities, including UNODC. The Panel also undertook fact-finding missions to Colombia, the Dominican Republic and the United States. The Panel sent requests for information to five Member States, of which two replied.

114. The small number of drug seizures is widely linked to the involvement of some of the country’s corrupt economic and political actors, through schemes involving border-control, law enforcement and some members of the judiciary. Some businesspeople and politicians hold sway over departmental heads, place acolytes in key authority positions and take advantage of the multiple “blind spots” across the country. In this way, they are able to use their assets (boats and planes) and power to move drugs with little interference, including in collusion with gangs.

115. Notwithstanding its challenging mandate, and despite its limited operational capacity, the Haitian bureau for the fight against narcotics trafficking (BLTS) seized about 104.7 kg of marijuana and 5.4 kg of cocaine in the first semester of 2023. This was less than in the same period in 2022, when seizures of 381.4 kg and 12.53 kg were made, respectively. In previous years, greater seizures were reported and major anti-drug operations were conducted, including the arrest of Jean Eliobert Jasme (alias “Eddy One”), with 83.97 kg of cocaine, in October 2020; and the dismantling of an African network of mules, between November 2021 and July 2022, with more than 20 kg of cocaine intercepted and 16 individuals detained.

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83 The United States sanctioned Haitian nationals for drug trafficking crimes, and the Panel sent an official communication to obtain more information.
84 A bureau agent was seriously injured in an armed attack on 19 June 2022 in the commune of Croix-des-Bouquets.
85 The bureau is present in les Cayes, Cap-Haitien, Port-de-Paix. A small team is based at the APN port and another at the international airport. It has a reduced staff in Malpasse, because of the 400 Mawozo gang. The southern detachment operates a boat that is currently under repair.
86 Haiti national police data, 2023.
87 Comprising 2 tons of marijuana and 35 kg of cocaine in 2022, and 3 tons of marijuana and 32 kg of cocaine in 2021. Haiti national police/United Nations police data.
116. A review of recent police seizures indicated multiple routes for the trans-shipment of drugs through Haiti (see annex 34). From November 2022 to July 2023, drugs were seized along the southern coast (Baie des Flamands, les Cayes, Ile-à-Vache and Plaisance-du-Sud) and northern Haiti (Cap-Haïtien, Port-de-Paix and Artibonite), but also in the Central (Hinche and Mirebalais) and West (Plaisance and Bon-Repos) departments. Southern Haiti is the key gateway for drugs coming into the country, including marijuana from Jamaica and cocaine mostly from Colombia, but also from other South American countries.

117. Multiple sources informed the Panel that the entry points for drug smuggling were spread across the southern coast, including Jacmel, Anse-à-Pitres, Grand Bois, les Cayes, Dame-Marie and Ile-à-Vache, as well as Port Salut and Jeremie. Clandestine airstrips are numerous, including Savane Diane, in the Artibonite department and towards the south and south-east, in Jacmel.

118. Findings from regional visits identified the Colombian department of Guajira as a strategic point for the shipping of cocaine to Haiti. This was corroborated by a reliable source, who indicated that drugs arrived from Guajira to the southern Haitian coast by boat or small planes that could fly under radars. The drugs were then moved by land across the Dominican border towards Punta Cana then on to Puerto Rico. Other sources indicated the use of small planes to drop drugs near the lake Etang Saumâtre, bordering the Dominican Republic, and over the Artibonite department.

119. At exit points, most of the cocaine is shipped to the Bahamas in small vessels and planes. Port-de-Paix and the tiny island of Ile de la Tortue, off the north-western coast, are strategic shipping stations. Shipments are also sent from Miragoane, Saint-Marc and Cap-Haïtien.

120. Several cases of seizures were reported at the Miami River in the past (see annex 29). Regardless of the decrease in seizures over the past two years, national and international law enforcement agencies explained how instability and weak port controls in Haiti provided favourable conditions for transnational illicit activities, including drug trafficking.

121. The 5 Segond gang has been exploiting the fragile security environment to generate additional revenue through drug trafficking (see sections III.A.2.3 and III.A.3). Some sources indicated that drugs were shipped directly from South America to the Village de Dieu area, including sometimes along with firearms. From Village-de-Dieu, Izo has the support of other gangs, such as Canaan, Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras, to move drugs up to Port-de-Paix and out of the country.

122. National roads from Port-au-Prince are under gang control (see paras. 4–50), and traffickers need to pay gangs to transport drugs and weapons through their territories. For instance, the Panel received information that Base Pilate was actively involved in facilitating the passage of drugs on behalf of influential individuals, using armoured vehicles with official licence plates to avoid control. The alleged use of police and official licence plates for the movement of drugs and weapons undermines the fight against illicit activities.

123. The Panel is of the view that the low number of cases of drug seizures does not reflect the actual level of trafficking. Drug trafficking is an important source of

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89 Haiti national police data.
90 Information obtained from international intelligence sources, 2023.
91 Information obtained from gang and political analysts, a government representative working on gang-related issues, a former senior police officer and an individual living in a gang-controlled area, 2023.
92 Information obtained from confidential sources, 2023.
93 Ibid.
revenue for some gangs and therefore has a negative impact on the peace, security and stability of Haiti. The expansionist territorial ambition of Izo is a case in point (see paras. 61–68). The Panel continues its investigation on this matter, notably the links between elite actors and gang elements implicated in drug trafficking, their networks and modus operandi.

4. **Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants**

124. The Panel visited Mexico, the Dominican Republic, the United States, as well as Port-de-Paix in Haiti, to understand the impact of the Haitian crisis on migrants and refugees. It engaged with Haitian migrants, members of the diaspora, government officials, international agencies and local NGOs to gather insights.

125. Migrant smuggling has become a lucrative business facilitated by a range of actors in Haiti and abroad, including smugglers, corrupt officials in passport and visa processes, immigration officers, travel agents, charter flight operators and vessel producers.

126. During its visit to Port-de-Paix, the Panel observed makeshift boatyards where vessels were being constructed to transport migrants to the Bahamas and the United States (see annex 36). The boats cost between $25,000 and $50,000 and take approximately three months to build. While typical vessels hold around 20 people, they often carry 80 to 100 individuals, sometimes more, leading to inhumane conditions and capsizing. The cost per passenger varies from $1,000 to $3,000, and the journey to the United States takes up to a week, if successful.

127. Haitian migrants face discrimination and xenophobia in the region based on their ethnicity, language and undocumented status. The lack of comprehensive support systems exposes them to harsh conditions, increasing their vulnerability to labour exploitation and criminal organizations (see para. 182 (c)).

128. The Panel received information on cases of human trafficking, which it is currently examining.

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94 Information obtained in interviews with gang analysts and a government representative working on gang issues, 2023.
95 The Panel follows the definitions of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants contained in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. See also annex 35.
96 See Panel’s first periodic update to the Committee, annexes 37 and 38.
97 In the Dominican Republic, 16 Dominican nationals were recently convicted for the trafficking of migrants. See [https://pgr.gob.do/tribunal-de-montecristi-impone-18-meses-de-prision-preventiva-a-16-imputados-de-trafico-ilicito-de-inmigrantes-en-operacion-frontera/](https://pgr.gob.do/tribunal-de-montecristi-impone-18-meses-de-prision-preventiva-a-16-imputados-de-trafico-ilicito-de-inmigrantes-en-operacion-frontera/). In another case, on 27 July 2013, a Dominican national who was illegally transporting Haitians in the municipality of Jicome was detained. See [https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2023/07/28/detienen-dominicano-transportaba-haitianos-indocumentados/2417154](https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2023/07/28/detienen-dominicano-transportaba-haitianos-indocumentados/2417154).
C. Acts that violate international human rights law or acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. Sexual and gender-based violence

129. Sexual and gender-based violence in Haiti is part of a systemic structure of patriarchy and inequality. It is manifested through women’s limited access to education, economic opportunities and participation in the system of government and rooted in cultural norms and a history of male dominance.99

130. Although women and girls are the primary victims, boys and young men are also targeted, albeit to a lesser extent. The Panel obtained information that persons from the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex community have also been attacked.

131. Crimes related to sexual and gender-based violence remain largely underreported owing to stigma, fear of retaliation and limited access to essential services. The prevailing lack of rule of law and rampant impunity further exacerbate the issue (see para. 182 (j)). Accurate data on rape incidents are elusive owing to significant underreporting and varied data collection methods by different organizations. For example, while the national police unit to combat sexual crimes reported 15 cases in 2021, 16 in 2022 and 9 in 2023 as of June,100 local organizations report dozens of cases every month.101

132. The Panel met with victims, humanitarian actors and analysts to understand the dynamics of the situation. The preliminary findings include the following:

(a) Gangs use sexual and gender-based violence as an instrument of: (i) power, to terrorize, subjugate and punish the population, in particular women; (ii) control, to exercise dominion over a territory and its population; and (iii) extorsion, as in the case of kidnappings, to obtain ransom. Furthermore, some victims have been subjected to sexual slavery by gang members;

(b) To date, no distinct pattern or modus operandi specific to a particular gang concerning sexual violence has been identified;

(c) None of the victims interviewed by the Panel could or would identify their assailants precisely. However, the following observations were made:

(i) Based on gangs’ hierarchical organization -albeit loose- there is a certain structure, and leaders are clearly identifiable;

(ii) The use of sexual and gender-based violence is pervasive among most gangs in Haiti; it is not merely the result of isolated incidents by rogue members, but appears to be a consistent tactic;

(iii) While certain gangs deny using rape, testimonies suggest that many gangs engage in sexual violence;

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98 See annex 39 on other human rights violations.
99 One study conducted on sexual and gender-based violence in Cité Soleil revealed that the most frequently cited perpetrators were current or former partners, (44%). While the second-highest group of perpetrators were strangers, including gangs, bandits, and kidnappers, (33%). The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Gang control and security vacuums – Assessing gender-based violence in Cité Soleil, Haiti, 2023.
100 Data on file with the Panel.
101 Information obtained from a confidential source. In the second half of 2022, according to United Nations data, 220 cases of rape were reported. In the first half of 2023, that number increased to 303 (153 women, 149 female minors and 1 boy), representing an increase of 37.7 per cent.
(iv) Given the structure of main gangs in Haiti (see sect. III.A), the Panel concludes that gang leaders have knowledge of, and are complicit in, the perpetration of sexual violence by their gang members, thereby making them responsible for those acts.

133. Between March and May 2023, 102 49 women were victims of collective rapes perpetrated in the Dèyè Mi area in Brooklyn, Cité Soleil. 103 Sources indicated that most of the perpetrators were members of the Terre Noire gang. 104 Gang members committed 18 collective rapes, 15 individual rapes, including one against a male. In addition, 49 people were killed, 46 injured and 12 were victims of enforced disappearance. 105

134. During the reporting period, the Panel met with 15 victims of rape. For example, in March, a young mother was abducted by Terre Noire gang members and raped by three of them. 106 In another case, a young woman from the Brooklyn area described how she was sexually assaulted by four Terre Noire gang members and contracted HIV.

135. On 10 July 2023, six members of the Kokorat San Ras gang from Lacroix Périssè (l’Estère) assaulted a 17-year-old girl who had been a passenger in a bus bound for Gonaïves that the gang had hijacked. 107

136. The Panel also identified rapes committed by the gangs of Izo, Ti Lapli, Vitelhomme, Lanmo San Jou, Luckson Elan and Jeff Canaan. The Panel continues its investigations.

2. Recruitment of children

137. The Panel expresses deep concern over the widespread recruitment of children by armed gangs in Haiti. Many of these children and young people are in vulnerable situations, making them easy targets for gangs. Currently, numerous gangs have minors in their ranks, some as young as 10 years old (see annex 6).

138. All gangs have minors in their ranks, whom they exploit for various purposes, including labour, spying, hostage care, surveillance, operating checkpoints and participating in attacks. As minors prove their loyalty and capabilities, they gain more responsibility within the criminal organization. Girls are typically involved in activities such as house chores and spying.

139. On the basis of evidence collected by the Panel, 108 it is possible to conclude that the six grave violations against children’s rights 109 are being committed in Haiti: the killing and maiming of children; the recruitment or use of children as gang members; sexual violence against children; the abduction of children; attacks against schools or hospitals (see annex 36); and the denial of humanitarian access for children.

140. These severe breaches pose a substantial threat to the future of Haiti, and the Panel is actively investigating the matter.

141. Those gangs that recruit the most children include 5 Segond, Brooklyn, Kraze Barye, Grand Ravine and Terre Noire.

102 See also Panel’s first periodic update to the Committee.
103 United Nations data.
104 Information obtained from confidential sources, 2023.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 United Nations data.
108 United Nations data, and information obtained in meetings with NGOs, United Nations agencies and victims’ testimonies, 2023.
3. **Weaponization of hunger and violations of the right to food**

142. Gangs in Haiti have directly and indirectly threatened the nation’s food security. Indirectly, their escalation of violence has resulted in economic crises, increased prices and exacerbated poverty. Directly, activities like racketeering strangle the economy (*peyi lok*), and their levying of unofficial taxes have disrupted the economy tremendously. Farmers struggle to cultivate and market their crops owing to gang violence and their control over vital transportation routes, especially to Port-au-Prince. For example, on 6 July 2023, Luckson Elan, the leader of the Gran Grif gang located in the Artibonite, issued multiple threats on social media warning that anyone returning to their agricultural fields would be killed.110

143. Gangs have also weaponized hunger as a tactic to weaken rivals in their territories. Hunger in some Haitian areas hit unprecedented levels between September 2022 and February 2023, with around 19,000 people facing starvation conditions. In July 2022, conflicts between G-Pèp and G9 in Citè Soleil’s Brooklyn area led to numerous deaths and displacements. G9 deliberately blockaded access to the Brooklyn area, preventing movements of inhabitants and cutting off supply chains of basic commodities, including food and water. Sniper-style attacks further escalated the situation, resulting in malnutrition, disease outbreaks and disruptions to basic services. While no longer in complete lock down, there are still severe movement restrictions for the population and humanitarians in the area.

144. Although conditions had improved, as of June 2023 the situation remained critical, with 30 per cent of the population experiencing acute hunger. Nearly 2 million people are in an “emergency” phase, indicating that almost half of Haiti is facing severe food insecurity (see annex 37).

145. The Artibonite department, the country’s primary agricultural hub, suffers from escalating violence. A recent analysis by the World Food Programme (WFP) shows a notable decrease in cultivated land in 2022. Gang activities have led to abandoned fields in areas like Marchand-Dessalines and Petite Rivière-de-l’Artibonite, pushing the farming community to less productive regions.111

146. Gangs’ tactic of depriving the population of food, water and other essential services constitute gross violations of human rights.

4. **Indiscriminate attacks against the population**

147. Gangs resort to indiscriminate attacks, including sniper-style attacks and random executions, aiming to terrorize the population and ensure obedience, especially in areas dominated by rival gangs. During confrontations between G9 and G-Pèp coalitions in Citè Soleil’s Brooklyn neighbourhood from 6 to 17 July 2022, several sniper attacks in Brooklyn resulted in an average of six casualties per week from August to December 2022. G9 members also invaded the neighbourhood, attacking any individuals they encountered, including women and children.112

148. Recent clashes confirmed that indiscriminate attacks continue. For instance, between 27 February and 3 March 2023, under the lead of Barbeque (HTi.001), G9 gangs launched successive attacks in Bel-Air, Citè Soleil and other neighbouring areas against G-Pèp gangs (see paras. 51–55). As a result, 26 inhabitants were killed and 41 injured, 25 homes were burned down and more than 1,000 residents were

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During the clashes, 18 gang members also died and 12 were injured (see annex 42).

The Panel met with several victims of the attacks. In one account, from 1 March, a witness described how gang members from Belekou had begun firing at civilians without provocation. The witness reported observing an unarmed child and a young adult dead on the street.

In a separate event on 2 March 2023, a Solino resident shared with the Panel that G9 gang members had begun forcibly evicting people from the area and shooting indiscriminately. Many victims, he noted, had been inadvertently caught in the crossfire between warring gangs.

In July 2023, the Kraze Barye gang, led by Vitelhomme Innocent, continued to indiscriminately attack, kill and rape residents of Fort-Jacques, Tuitier and Dumornay. As at 10 August 2023, Kraze Barye’s attacks had resulted in the displacement of around 2,000 people, including 229 minors.

From 6 to 15 July 2023, members of the Gran Grif gang abducted approximately 10 individuals and reportedly killed 1 person on route RN1. In Liancourt, Artibonite department, they assaulted locals, resulting in nearly 10 persons being killed and 20 injured, as well as many more kidnapped. During these attacks, they also looted residences and businesses and set fire to vehicles. In a video broadcast on social media in July 2023, an alleged Gran Grif member bragged that they would not stop attacks against the population until they killed 2,000 people.

One of the consequences of those indiscriminate attacks is the increasing number of internally displaced persons. In June 2022, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had recorded 25,000 internally displaced persons; a year later, that number had risen to 194,624. The Panel witnessed the difficult living conditions of internally displaced persons, with very limited access to clean water, food, health care and sanitation services (see annex 38). The fact that the Government of Haiti neither allows internally displaced persons camps nor provides assistance constitutes in itself a human rights violation.

According to a conservative estimate by the Panel, at least 250,000 Haitian nationals were forcibly displaced internally or have left the country during the reporting period owing to gang violence and economic conditions in Haiti (see annex 31).

5. Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance

Given the multidimensional crisis, humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance (see annex 39), is crucial to the livelihoods of Haitians, and the Panel is concerned about the obstructions to its delivery and distribution as well as attacks against humanitarian organizations.

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113 United Nations data.
114 Information obtained from confidential sources, 2023.
116 Information obtained from a confidential source, 2023.
117 Video on file with the Panel, confirmed also by an independent source.
118 See https://dtm.iom.int/haiti (visited on 22 July 2023).
156. During the first quarter of 2023, humanitarian organizations documented close to 330 impediments to humanitarian assistance,\textsuperscript{119} including robberies and kidnappings,\textsuperscript{120} which constitute serious violations of international human rights law.

157. On 19 September 2022, Caritas and the Haitian Red Cross suffered attacks at their depots in Port-de-Paix.\textsuperscript{121}

**Attacks against United Nations agencies**

158. In September 2022, various facilities from several humanitarian organizations, including United Nations agencies, were attacked in Gonaïves and les Cayes.\textsuperscript{122} The attacks were committed within the context of demonstrations against State authorities fomented by regional political figures. Assailants stole material from warehouses and commercial offices and destroyed documents and whatever they could not take with them.

159. On 15 September 2022, a WFP warehouse in Gonaïves was targeted by protestors that raided supplies. The warehouse held 1,400 tons of supplies, of which 300 tons had been allocated for school meals, managed by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and were intended to feed 94,000 children until December 2022. The remaining 1,100 tons had been set aside to provide a month’s rations for 78,000 people during emergencies. Assailants looted all of the supplies.\textsuperscript{123}

160. On 21 September 2023, another WFP warehouse in les Cayes was looted. This facility housed 762 tons of supplies, intended to support 46,000 recipients with a month’s rations during the hurricane season and other emergencies.

161. Local radio stations broadcast messages encouraging the attacks on WFP facilities across various locations. Despite a formal complaint by WFP to the Minister for Culture and Communication regarding the incidents, no police action had been taken by the time of reporting.

162. The Panel obtained evidence and testimonies from a range of actors and witnesses on various attacks. Its findings will be shared with the Committee.

6. **Violations by the police**

163. The national police faces considerable challenges in fulfilling its responsibilities, including inadequate equipment and training, as well as a shortage of personnel (see section II.2). As at 15 August 2023, 36 officers had been killed and at least 31 injured since the beginning of the year owing to gang violence.

164. During the reporting period, several cases of human rights violations by police officers were reported to the Panel. In some cases, the police has been passive, especially in relation to the *Bwa Kale* movement (see paras. 56–60).

165. During the reporting period, the general police inspectorate has been carrying out investigations into misconduct, including human rights violations. As of June 2023, the inspectorate had logged 123 complaints (36 human rights allegations and 87 misconduct cases). In addition, 46 investigations had been closed (20 human rights violations, 26 misconduct cases).

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\textsuperscript{120} Information obtained from a confidential source, 2023.

\textsuperscript{121} See Panel’s first periodic update to the Committee.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.

rights-related and 26 concerning misconducts), leading to the expulsion of 26 officers from the police force.\textsuperscript{124}

166. The Panel received allegations of police officers being involved in extrajudicial killings. The general police inspectorate has, for instance, been investigating the abduction and subsequent death of a gang member by a police patrol in Port-au-Prince in June 2023.\textsuperscript{125}

167. The general police inspectorate has established of a commission of inquiry to investigate the involvement of former and active police officers affiliated with the “Phantom 509” gang, in particular for the incidents at the private residence of the Prime Minister and the Toussaint Louverture International Airport on 26 January 2023.

IV. Illicit financial flows

168. In Haiti, the constant diversion of public funds is one of the primary drivers of violence and a threat to peace, security and stability (see para. 182 (h)). It has a direct impact on the whole of society, given the very weak infrastructure, limited access to education and health care, extreme poverty and unemployment, and results in the threatening of community structures and fomenting of violence. It also undermines governance and the population’s trust in the State and has been constantly mentioned as a main driver of instability by interlocutors with whom the Panel met. In this regard, the diversion of Petrocaribe funds represents a critical case.

169. The diversion of public funds has throttled formal employment in a country where the informal economy accounts for about 55.1 per cent of the country’s GDP.\textsuperscript{126} The bulk of transactions are therefore cash-based, posing a challenge for the enforcement of financial crime regulations. In the past four consecutive years, the economy has contracted by 1.7 per cent in 2019, 3.3 per cent in 2020, 1.8 per cent in 2021 and 1.7 per cent in 2022,\textsuperscript{127} hampering the ability to respond to the current socioeconomic needs.

170. The Panel received information about several cases involving illicit financial flows relating to bulk cash regarding individuals leaving Haiti, mostly by air. For instance, between January and May 2023, the United States authorities intercepted a total of $413,581 in cash in several seizures, involving individuals coming from Haiti into the United States or vice versa. This practice demonstrates one of the channels through which illicit money meant for illicit activities, such as the purchase of arms and ammunition or for the drug trade, is transferred out of the country. Between 2018 and August 2023, according to the data made available to the Panel, $1,141,882 in bulk cash had been intercepted on its way in or out of Haiti.\textsuperscript{128}

1. Diversion of Petrocaribe funds

171. The 2005 Petrocaribe soft loan by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – in the form of oil instead of cash – amounting to over $4 billion was aimed at economic and social development, including the fight against poverty and support for the health and education systems. The funds were mostly misappropriated while Haiti had just experienced its worst humanitarian crisis – the 2010 earthquake, which left more than 250,000 people dead, more than 300,000 others injured and a further 1.5 million

\textsuperscript{124} United Nations data.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Information obtained from law enforcement and confidential sources, 2023.
homeless, in addition to destroying much of the country’s infrastructure.\textsuperscript{129} This was followed by hurricane Sandy\textsuperscript{130} and a cholera outbreak.

172. Petrocaribe funds were misappropriated, perpetuating poverty and social instability.\textsuperscript{131} The most egregious cases of diversion occurred during Mr. Martelly’s tenure as President, from 2011 to 2016, which coincided with Laurent Lamothe’s tenure as Minister for Planning and External Cooperation and Prime Minister, from 2012 to 2014.\textsuperscript{132} Mr. Lamothe, who was the chief authorizing officer for the disbursement of the funds,\textsuperscript{133} issued approvals totalling $668.8 million for 149 projects. Messrs. Martelly and Lamothe were forced to resign, at different times, owing to nationwide public anti-corruption demonstrations. In 2022 and 2023, Mr. Lamothe was sanctioned by two Member States, while Mr. Martelly was sanctioned by one.\textsuperscript{134}

173. Official Haitian investigation reports concluded that, of the total amount of $1,738,691,909 allocated for projects, about 92 per cent had been spent with questionable approvals and hardly any projects implemented (see annex 45 for the list of the projects).\textsuperscript{135} This had a negative impact on the country’s ability to address its economic and social challenges and, as of August 2023, Haiti was still allocating $10 million per month for the repayment of the loan, while the projects themselves barely benefitted the country.\textsuperscript{136}

174. The Panel contacted Mr. Lamothe, who responded by denying allegations about his involvement in the diversion of Petrocaribe funds. As part of his response, Mr. Lamothe stated that he had been cleared of such allegations, and that at no time had he been the authorizing officer for the fund. He further stated that “the fund was managed by BMPAD [the Office for the Monetization of Development Assistance Programmes] under the supervision of the Minister for Finance, in complete autonomy. The fund allocations to the projects were made under the guidance of the President, who heads the Council of Ministers.” The Panel stands by its findings.

2. Diversion of customs revenues

175. The Panel found that Romel Bell (see para. 85) had falsely declared his personal wealth by concealing information and not justifying amounts received in his bank accounts that were beyond his salaries (see paras. 82–86, and annex 26). He also evaded tax, diverted customs revenue and abetted criminal activities within the customs agency.

176. Between 2012, when he was deployed at the airport, and 2018, when he became the Director General of Customs, Mr. Bell’s annual gross salary including privileges

\textsuperscript{131} Information obtained in interviews with an international economist, a World Bank economist and two Haiti government officials, 2023.
\textsuperscript{132} Messrs Lamothe and Martelly have had a business relationship for over two decades, including co-owning companies (see, for instance, annex 46) in the United States. In a 2016 interview, Mr. Lamothe acknowledged the common business interest that he and Martelly had.
\textsuperscript{133} Information obtained from a confidential government report (2020) seen by the Panel.
\textsuperscript{134} See www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/consolidated-consolide.aspx?lang=eng&dataset-filter.
\textsuperscript{136} Information obtained from a government official, 2023.
was between 1,241,160 gourdes ($29,813)\(^{137}\) and 1,327,140 gourdes ($14,695).\(^{138}\) However, during that time he had accumulated wealth beyond his salary and benefits that he could not account for.\(^{139}\) For instance, on successive dates, Mr. Bell transferred money for which he did not confirm the source to a school in a foreign country, including tranches of $28,050.00, $21,750.00, $8,229.25 and $15,000. He also did not disclose several properties he owns, and interests in a company that he operated (see annex 26).

3. **Diversion of bilateral aid**

177. The Office for the Monetization of Development Assistance Programmes is tasked with the monetization, public procurement\(^{140}\) and import of petroleum products.

178. Patrick Noramé, former Director General of the Office, misappropriated over 124 million gourdes (around $2 million)\(^{141}\) in illegal sales of rice donated as aid to Haiti in 2016 by Japan International Cooperation Services. The revenue from the sale of the rice was to reduce the rice deficit on the market\(^{142}\) (see annex 47). In March 2023, the Prosecutor’s Office of Port-au-Prince issued an international arrest warrant against Mr. Noramé for money laundering and embezzlement of State funds.\(^{143}\) Japan informed the Panel that it had suspended any further bilateral assistance to Haiti in principle, except for emergency humanitarian assistance, until the Government of Haiti presented appropriate measures regarding the matter.

179. Diversion of public funds and embezzlement are not victimless crimes.\(^{144}\) They lead to widespread poverty and impact employment, healthcare and education. The right to food in a country where about half of the population (4.9 million people) are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity,\(^{145}\) is being impeded by diversion of public funds that would have contributed to save lives, create economic opportunities and provide alternatives to joining gangs as a mean of economic survival.

V. **Implementation of the measures adopted in paragraphs 3, 6 and 11 of resolution 2653 (2022)**

180. Since the adoption of resolution 2653 (2022) and his designation under the sanctions regime, Barbeque (HTi.001) has continued to engage in acts that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Haiti. The coalition of gangs that he leads, the “G9 Family and Allies”, launched several significant attacks in February and April

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\(^{139}\) Information obtained from the department of budget public accounts (Direction générale du budget et de la comptabilité publique), and documented in a confidential report seen by the Panel.

\(^{140}\) Information obtained from anti-corruption officials, a businessman and a law enforcement officer. See also executive summary of the report by the Unité de lutte contre la corruption into the management of a 2016 donation of rice by Japan to the Office for the Monetization of Development Assistance Programmes. See [https://haitieconomie.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Liste-des-enquetes-realisees-Transmise-aux-Parquets-4-aout-2021-PDF-1.pdf](https://haitieconomie.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Liste-des-enquetes-realisees-Transmise-aux-Parquets-4-aout-2021-PDF-1.pdf), pp. 8–10.

\(^{141}\) The average exchange rate in 2016 was $1=63.0213 gourdes. See, [https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/USD-HTG-spot-exchange-rates-history-2016.html](https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/USD-HTG-spot-exchange-rates-history-2016.html).

\(^{142}\) Information obtained in interviews with a Haitian food security analyst, a former government economist and an anti-corruption official, 2023.

\(^{143}\) Information obtained from a confidential source, 2023.


\(^{145}\) See [www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fr/c/459666/?iso3=HTI](http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fr/c/459666/?iso3=HTI).
2023 against neighbourhoods under the control of gangs from the rival coalition, G-Pèp, including in Bel-Air, Nazon, Solino and other areas in the West department. These attacks resulted in significant human rights violations, including civilians being killed and injured, as well as displacement (see paras. 147–154 and annex 42). These attacks further affected education and health services and the economic and social fabric of those neighbourhoods.

181. The offensives perpetrated by the G9 over the reporting period, and the fact that the various gangs that make up the alliance have held on to their ground, indicate that they have been able to successfully restock with ammunition on a regular basis, in violation of the measures adopted in paragraph 11 of resolution 2653 (2022). Furthermore, the Panel received information that G9 gangs had acquired new firearms and ammunition. In the Panel’s opinion, the targeted nature of the United Nations arms embargo has had a very limited impact on the trafficking of weapons and ammunition by Barbeque (HTi.001), the G9 alliance or on Haiti more broadly.

Recommendations

182. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Expand the scope of the targeted arms embargo from designated individuals and entities only to all non-State actors in Haiti, with exemptions for materiel acquired for the sole use of the United Nations, regional organizations, diplomatic representations or any potential international external support to the Haitian National Police;

(b) Complement paragraph 13 of resolution 2653 (2022) and call upon States, in particular those from the region, to submit written reports to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) following any seizures of materiel listed in paragraph 11 of resolution 2653 (2022), including but not limited to the location, date, means of transportation, destination, potential end-users, individuals involved and exact types and quantities of materiel seized, and to invite the Panel to conduct inspections of any such seizures;

(c) Call on Member States to strengthen the international protection of Haitian refugees and migrants in their territories according to international human rights law.

183. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti:

(a) Update the identifying information about Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque”) (HTi.001) on the list of individuals subject to measures imposed pursuant to paragraphs 3, 6 and 11 of resolution 2653 (2022);

(b) Encourage Member States to support the improvement of the capacity of Haitian customs and border control to combat transnational crime, such as drug and arms trafficking, including by funding UNODC programming in the country;

(c) Encourage Member States to support the capacity-building of the Haitian National Police, in particular with regard to investigations, operational capabilities to address gang violence, counter-trafficking of arms and drugs, and weapons and ammunition management, including through the security basket fund;

(d) Encourage Member States to support the building of integrity and capacity of the judicial system to address impunity related to those who are
threatening the peace and security of the country, including gangs and their backers, as well as those involved in the diversion of public funds;

(c) Encourage Member States to support the strengthening of the fiscal system in Haiti, including financial accountability and the management systems in the public sector, including by identifying, tracing and prosecuting illicit financial flows;

(f) Encourage Haiti to strengthen the independence and integrity of the judicial system, ensuring its accountability, to address impunity of gang members and those who back them while ensuring the protection of prosecutors dealing with sensitive cases;

(g) Encourage Haiti to develop accountability mechanisms to address sexual and gender-based violence, including through the establishment of a judicial task force.
### Annexes

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Annex 47: Diversion of funds by Patrick Noramé
Annex 1: Methodology and communications

Methodology and Opportunity to Reply

The Panel adopted a decision rule of consensus, meaning that all members of the Panel were required to agree on the text, findings and recommendations of the report. However, if any member of the Panel had a difference of opinion or reservation, the report could still be adopted by a majority vote of three out of four members.

The Panel reviewed social media and other open sources, but no information was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated by multiple independent sources. This was done to ensure that the information was reliable and met the highest achievable standard of proof.

The Panel provides individuals and entities recommended for sanctioning the opportunity to reply. This gives individuals the opportunity to present an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific evidence in their support.

The Panel's methodology for the opportunity to reply is as follows:

1. Providing an individual with an opportunity to reply should be the norm.

2. An individual may not be given the opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes, based on their own assessment, that there is a risk that by doing so it would:
   a) Result in the individual destroying evidence, tampering with a witness or moving assets if they receive advance notice of a possible recommendation for designation;
   b) Restrict the Panel's further access to places or vital sources;
   c) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
   d) Jeopardise humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field including the United Nations or any other local or international organizations; or
   e) For any reason that is clearly justified by the circumstances.

After an individual or entity is designated by the Sanctions Committee, it is possible to request a de-listing process through the mechanism established by the Sanctions Committee\(^{146}\).

\(^{146}\) See \url{https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/guidelines}

See \url{https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/materials/procedures-Delisting}
Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from January to August 2023

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Annex 2: Understanding the process of “gangsterization”

The overlap between politics, violence, power, and territory has been a dominant factor in defining the security and political landscape in Haiti. Since François Duvalier’s tenure, armed groups have been used to diffuse terror, disrupt political rallies, and repress supporters of the opposition. In response to those, a series of self-defence groups were created.

In 1995, President Aristide outlawed paramilitary groups and disbanded the Haitian armed forces and created the Haitian National Police. However, incomplete reintegration processes led former soldiers to integrate armed groups that continued to operate until 2004. In addition, over the years, the local self-defense groups or ‘Baz’ (base) fused with the state police to support Aristide’s political party, Fanmi Lavalas. Initially politically motivated, these bases increasingly became independent to form de facto leaderships in the slums of Port-au-Prince. Aristide’s forced departure in 2004 led to another period of chaos in Haiti, with his supporters taking up arms to demand his return. Amid the turbulent situation, political violence and economically motivated criminal actions multiplied in poor urban neighbourhoods.

The proliferation of gangs mainly across the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is embedded in multidimensional factors. The 2010 earthquake triggered a “destabilisation momentum” that provoked a geographical and social reconfiguration in the country. Bases became less ideologically and more opportunistic driven.

Further, since the withdrawal of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2017, followed by that of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) in 2019, gangs have grown and occupied the void left by UN troops and police units, taking advantage of the weakness of the State, including the underequipped HNP.

New developments which unfolded from 2018 contributed to new forms of violence, including an economic crisis, the Petrocaribe scandal, anti-government protests, the péyi lok (country-wide lockdown) and massacres (e.g La Saline) as well as the assassination of President Moïse. Gangs have capitalised on the governance crisis that has weakened the State capacity to tighten their control over the territory and infrastructure, while violence increases both in the political and social spaces.


148 After winning the 1957 elections, President François Duvalier organized his own militia, the Tonton Macoute, to exercise repressive dictatorial control over any threat against his regime.

149 With the 2010 earthquake, much of the nation’s infrastructure was destroyed. The delivery of basic services and commercial activities were disturbed. Households were relocated and new neighborhoods formed, and existing social networks of protection against crimes eroded. New bases (less ideological and more ‘predatory’) emerged, and old gangs broke apart and allied with other gangs, occupying territory formerly controlled by groups. Athena Kolbe: Revisiting Haiti’s Gangs and Organized Violence. HASOW Discussion Paper 4. June 2013. https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Revisiting-Haiti%2C2%44s-Gangs.pdf.
Annex 3: Maps comparing gang-controlled areas in Port au Prince in 2018 and 2023

Figure 1: Gang-controlled areas in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area in 2018

Source: UN data
Figure 2: Gang-controlled areas in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area as of August 2023

Source: UN data
Annex 4: Profiles of G-9 and G-Pèp coalitions

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<th>Locality</th>
<th>Workforce</th>
<th>Criminal activity</th>
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<td>Murder, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion.</td>
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<td>Jimmy Cherizier alias Barbeque</td>
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<td>Belekou</td>
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<td><strong>Ti Bois</strong></td>
<td>Ti Bois, Fontamara and part of Carrefour</td>
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<td>Murder, robbery, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, targeted assassinations, drug trafficking</td>
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<td>The G9 coalition has over 1000 individuals. They are mostly ex-police officers, ex-security agents and street children.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson Pierre alias Sonson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Simon Pelé</strong></td>
<td>Simon Pelé</td>
<td></td>
<td>Murder, arson, rape, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jouma Albert alias Zouma (incarcerated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nan Boston</strong></td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td></td>
<td>Murder, arson, rape, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathias Sainthil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baz Pilate</strong></td>
<td>1st and 2nd Avenues, Bolosse to Cite Eternel, 2nd and 3rd ruele Plus (in 3rd Circumscription). While Decayettes is not under control of Base Pilate, residents are in touch with members of the gang.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Murder, robbery, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks, ransoming, targeted assassinations, drug trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezekiel Alexandre alias Ze (in prison)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

150 This Annex is based on interviews conducted between February and August 2023 with people living in gang-controlled areas, gang and political analysts, representatives of foreign intelligence agency, HNP officials and analysts, government representatives and confidential reports.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G9 Allies</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gang / Leader</strong></td>
<td><strong>Locality</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Chyen Mechan  
Claudy Celestin alias Stevenson Pierre  
alias Chyen Mechan  
Claudy Célestin is a dismissed civil servant of the Ministry of the Interior | Santo 1 to Santo 19, Marin, and Shadda districts in the commune of Croix-de-Mission and Butte Boyer in the commune of Tabarre.  
Control parts of RN1 and RN8 | Around 100 members | Murder, robberies, extortion |
| Fort Dimanche  
Mesidye | Fort Dimanche | Around 20 | Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion |
| Gang de Tokyo  
Manno | Tokyo | Around 15 | Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion |
| Chancerelles  
Garry Lyron alias Coby | Chancerelles | Around 20 | Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion |
| Carrefour Drouillard  
Tyson | Carrefour Drouillard | Around 20 | Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion |
| Terre Noire  
Jonel Catel (incarcerated)  
Very influential and very close to Barbeque | Terre Noire | Around 50 | Robbery, ransoming, hijacking of goods and trucks, extorsion, rape of Brooklyn population |
### G-Pèp coalition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gang and leaders</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Workforce</th>
<th>Criminal activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brooklyn</strong></td>
<td>Brooklyn, Soleil 9, 17 and 19, Ti Zile, Wharf</td>
<td>Around 200 members</td>
<td>Extortion, destruction of property, hijacking of goods, violence against civilian populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Jean-Pierre alias Ti Gabriel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Haut Belair / Argentins** | Haut Bel-air, Fort National | Around 20 members + 30 members of 5 Segond, (reinforcement) | Kidnapping, extorsion, hijacking of goods and trucks, theft, rape, murder, violence against civilian populations |
| Kempes Sanon | Kempes is a dismissed police officer. | | |

### G-Pèp allies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gang and leaders</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Workforce</th>
<th>Criminal activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kraze Barye</strong></td>
<td>Tabarre commune and parts of Pétionville, Croix-des-Bouquets. Several cells operate in the area</td>
<td>Around 600 members</td>
<td>Murder, political crimes, drug trafficking, kidnapping, rape, robbery, spoliation of land, theft and sale of houses, hijacking of vehicles, extortion, burglaries, arms and ammunition trafficking, assassinations of police officers and destruction of sub-police stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitelhomme Innocent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **5 Segond**     | Bicentenaire, the area from Rue Champs de Mars up to Village-de-Dieu, and part of Martissant (from 2B, in front of the police sub-station up to Martissant 4, until the coast). The bay of Port-au-Prince (port Lafito, Cimenterie and les Moulins d’Haiti, including Source Matelas and Titanyen). | Around 300 members, made up of young people from the slums of the metropolitan area and disadvantaged neighborhoods of large provincial towns. Some of them were members of vigilance brigades and popular organizations close to La Fanmi Lavalas. Members are predominantly recruited from popular neighborhoods in exchange of motorcycle, food, handguns, cell phones or money to buy clothes. Many children are recruited, especially street children. | The gang is particularly well equipped. It has drones and surveillance cameras installed to control Village de Dieu area, and to identify victims for kidnapping and other crimes. Parts of the downtown area (Bicentenaire, rue Champs de Mars, Carrefour-Feuilles, NR2, Palace of Justice, Portail-Léogane, Théâtre National and Martissant) is also controlled via cameras/drones. Murder, drug trafficking, kidnapping, vehicle theft, rape, armed robbery, spoliation, hijacking of trucks and goods |
| Johnson André alias Izo | | | |
| Emmanuel Solomon AKA Manno | | | |

<p>| <strong>Grand Ravine</strong> | From 5th Avenue Boissee via Martissant (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23), habitation Le Clerc, Fort-St Clair, Route des Dalles, until Grand Ravine, RN2. | Around 300 members; young people from poor neighborhoods of the metropolitan area and large provincial towns. Some of them were members of vigilance brigades and popular organizations close to La Fanmi Lavalas. Dominican nationals also integrate the gang. | Murder, kidnapping, vehicle theft, rape, armed robbery, spoliation, hijacking of trucks and goods |
| Bougoy | | | |
| Killik | | | |
| Renel Destina alias Ti Lapli | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>400 Mawozo</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Wilson alias Lanno Sanjou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemine Joly alias Yonyon (extradicted to the United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downtown area of Croix-des-Bouquets, La Tremblay, Dargout, Cottard, Papuye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Also operates along the RN8 that connects Port-au-Prince with the border point of Jimani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its headcount has shrunk considerably from around 500 to about 80 members, according to some analysts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deportees, former leaders of popular organizations close to the opposition at the time, former henchmen working for smugglers on the Haitian-Dominican border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping, trafficking of drugs and weapons, spoliation, murder, rape, armed robbery, vehicle theft, hijacking of goods, murder of police officers, summary execution and criminal conspiracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Canaan</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Larose alias Jeff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannan, Onaville, Jerusalem, Corail, Rosenberg, Lilavois, Bon Repos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around 200 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping, land appropriation, rape, home burglary, hijacking of goods and vehicles, ransoming, murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very close ally of 5 Segond, often receiving its reinforcement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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151 Interview with two gang analysts and confirmed with individual living in controlled area. Mid-2022, about 124 elements were killed due to fights with Chyen Mechan to regain control of the northern and central sides of the Plaine de Cul-de-Sac, in Croix-des-Bouquets. The gang lost the Santo territory, in northern Croix-des-Bouquets commune. End 2022, they faced Vitelhomme who killed 70 elements, after 400 Mawozo members had stolen Vitelhomme’s money for the buying of weapons and ammunition. Besides, the HNP has killed over a hundred of elements in different operations. Several elements have also escaped to other cities.
Annex 5: Notices of wanted persons, G9 and G-Pèp leaders
POLICE NATIONALE D’HAITI
DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE

AVIS DE RECHERCHE

JEAN PIERRE GABRIEL
« CHEF GANG CITE SOLEIL »

INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES : ASSASSINAT, DETENTION ILLEGALE
D’ARME A FEU, ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS

En cas d’identification ou de localisation
Prière d’appeler aux numéros suivants : 3838-1111 & 31060573
Annex 6: Dynamics of gangs

Structure and membership

While organisational structure can vary, some of the largest gangs have hierarchical structures headed by a chief followed by second and third ‘deputies’ and zone/cell chiefs. Beyond the third chief, the structure, as well as the number of members in each group, is difficult to identify. The chief exerts an authoritarian role, with power of life and death over members and the community. He decides strategies and operations with his deputies; interacts with businessmen and politicians; speaks on behalf of the group; and negotiates for buying weapons and ammunition. The gang leader also serves as judge for members and the community. His decisions are irrevocable, and punishment (often being execution) is applied in cases of non-compliance.

The second in charge in the gang structure plays an operational role, by directing daily activities, collecting spoils, and paying salaries. He also oversees logistics (weapons maintenance, storage, and deployment). The third adjoint communicates with teams on the ground. Cell leaders must ensure the surveillance and control of their respective areas on behalf of the gang leader. Gang members participate in operations and are primarily comprised of young people with no economic or social prospects.

Children are typically used as scouts and guards and may later participate in fighting. They maintain weapons and watch over kidnapped people. They are also responsible for buying food and clothes for the gangs in other neighborhoods.

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152 This section is based on interviews conducted between February and August 2023 with former gang members, people living in gang-controlled areas, gang analysts and confidential reports.

153 Currently, gang leaders are exclusively male.
According to one minor who was enrolled in the 5 Segond gang, he was paid 5000 HTG (about $33 USD) every Saturday and sometimes received other monetary rewards from other members\textsuperscript{154}. Another minor stated that he was paid thousands of dollars in his first month in the gang operation in Croix-des-Bouquets commune.

While most gang members are male, some are women. Women, including minors, perform household chores and surveillance. They are also spies and facilitators in negotiations and participate in criminal activities. Some engage in relationship with gang leaders including unwillingly. The Panel received videos circulated through social media on women exposing tattoos of gang members on their bodies\textsuperscript{155}, performing dances with the ‘rapper’ Izo and exposing themselves as gang members. Many of them have been identified by the Bwa Kale movement, as targets for lynching.

As for the payment of gang members, although some gangs conduct a weekly payroll, others do not have a regular payment method.

**Territorial control**

To expand their territorial control, gangs loot, destroy and progressively nibble away at territories to occupy the whole block of a given neighborhood. They set up cells and provide operational support, comprised of members, weapons and vehicles. To control entry and exit points of the newly occupied area and prevent the police from entering, they install barricades and protective walls called ‘VARs’ secured by armed members. At the same time, all social and economic actors in the area are obliged to pay taxes. At this point, communities and economic operators already know that there is a new leader in the area.

**Recruitment**

Dire socioeconomic conditions as well as the quest for respect are among the various factors that stimulate children and young people to join gangs. In addition, according to interviews with people living in gang-controlled areas, gang members sometimes force individuals in the communities to provide certain services, according to their technical capacities (e.g., a mechanic to fix a car) without compensation. Gangs also evaluate what benefit an individual can bring to the group, including communication skills or physical strength. In cases in which a person desires to voluntarily join the gang, his behaviour is evaluated, and they can be ordered to kill someone to prove their allegiance.

\textsuperscript{154} Confidential report, 2023 – in file with the Panel.

\textsuperscript{155} According to one gang analyst and one individual living in gang-controlled area, women are sometimes obliged to tattoo the name of the gang leader on their body.
Social foundations run by gang leaders also provide an entry point for recruitment. Children mostly come from families in distress and join the gangs in search of money and food. Several sources have indicated that some gangs force their enrolment by refusing to distribute food to their families through their social foundations if they do not join.

A new gang recruit is subjected to an “observation phase”. The first task is to buy food, then the individual is given some money to “buy friends”. The next step is to participate in confrontations with rivals, including the police, besides buying ammunitions, and loading guns. To get promoted, an “outstanding action” must be performed, such as killing someone. After two or three years in the gang, if the person is proven not to be an “spy”, the individual is accepted in the chief’s entourage.

Social media and violence

Social media is a crucial tool for gang leaders. Through videos shared on social networks, the Panel observed that gangs use these platforms to glorify wealth and ‘successful lifestyle’. On the other hand, they instil fear by displaying footage of torture including mutilations of bodies, burnt remains, and body parts including genitals, limbs, and heads.

Izo, 5 Segond’s leader, an amateur rapper and wanted HNP individual responsible for several brutal crimes in Haiti, recently received a YouTube Creator Award for having 100,000 subscribers on the platform. His YouTube channel was recently shut down, but he continues to be active on a range of social media platforms using multiple accounts and fake profiles156.

Photograph removed due to gruesome content
(On file with the Panel)

Photograph removed due to gruesome content
(On file with the Panel)

Still from video showing the dead mutilated body of the Croix-des-Bouquets Police Commissioner on 24 July 2022, killed and mutilated by members of 400 Mawozo.

Canaan gang member cutting a dead body of a rival with a saw
Still from video, February 2022

Izo exhibiting money and the YouTube Creator Award
YouTube video of 25 April 2023

Swimming pool at Izo’s house
Still from video shared on 31 July 2023

Lanmo Sanjou celebrating the 8 March 2022 holiday
Still from video shared on 17 April 2023

Barbeque in a hydromassage/piscine in Delmas area
Stills from video filmed on 30 July 2023

Relationship with the community157

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156 The Panel contacted YouTube to raise the issue and to request information on Izo’s YouTube channel. Google responded to the Panel on 6 June 2023 stating that ‘the information you are requesting, to the extent it exists, is subject to state and federal laws. In accordance with those laws, it is Google’s policy to only provide subscriber information pursuant to a properly served, valid third-party subpoena or other appropriate legal process’.

157 Information from confidential reports, interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang-controlled areas.
Some gang leaders have their own social foundations as a way of winning allegiance from the community in their areas of control, to present themselves as ‘benefactors’ and try to display a ‘positive image’. Some of these structures are: (i) the SABATHEM Foundation, created in 2006 in the Boston neighborhood by the then gang leader, Ti-Kouto, who died in prison; (ii) the Gabriel Foundation, created in 2012 by the G-Pèp chief, Ti-Gabriel; and (iii) the Siloé Foundation, created in 2015 in the Belekov neighborhood by the gang leader Iskar Andrice. There are also other foundations headed by gang leaders, such as the T-Zanmi headed by Claudy Celestin alias “Chyen Mechan” gang leader, as shown on the picture.

From 2010, foundations have become interlocutors for politicians in the context of elections, including for the organization of demonstrations or anti-protest movements. They have also been increasingly supported by influential businessmen or companies to protect their economic activities.

Moreover, funding and humanitarian assistance has been channelled through these organizations.\textsuperscript{158} While these foundations are officially registered, gang leaders head and take decisions regarding these structures through their representatives/staff that they recruit for activities and projects.

In addition, gangs sometimes use this aid to force men and women to join the gangs, such as the Nan Boston gang (G9), according to confidential sources.

Gang leaders also have/or control businesses in their area of influence (medical facilities, hotels, school, gas stations, and unofficial bureau de change). With the absence of the State in these areas, gangs control education and social activities. They also extort the population as well as businesspersons by collecting taxes in exchange for protection (see Section III.A.2).

\textsuperscript{158} Confidential report, 2023.

Request for financial support to celebrate the birthday of Claudy Celestin alias “Chyen Mechan”, on the letterhead of Fondation T-Zanmi, signed by him, as the PDG (President/Director General)

Photo shared with the Panel on 23 February 2023
Annex 7: Time Comparison of VARs barricades around Brooklyn, Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince

All pictures are from Google Maps. Identification of barricades ("VARs") done by the Panel.

15 July 2022  
25 December 2022
HNP operation to deblock a barricade at the Cabaret Road under attack of gang members

From a video posted on HNP Facebook page on 20 April 2023

Figure 3: VARs and checkpoints in Port au Prince as of May 2023
VARs and checkpoints in Cité Soleil neighborhood as of May 2023

Source: UN data
Annex 8: Areas of control and areas of influence of gangs in Port-au-Prince as of July 2023

Source: UN data
Annex 9: Gang-controlled areas in Artibonite department as of August 2023

Source: UN data
Annex 10: Gangs in the Artibonite department as of August 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gang and Leaders</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Main criminal activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baz Gran Grif (Savien gang)</strong></td>
<td>Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, Savien, Liancourt, Pont Sondé, Carrefour Paye, Moreau Drouet, Hatte, Patchwal</td>
<td>About 100 members</td>
<td>Murder, rape, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of trucks and goods, violence against civilian population, kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luckson Elan, alias General Luckson</td>
<td>Controls part of RN1, and the secondary road 11, from Pont Sondé to Mirebalais, on Morne Pierre Paul and Chandelle, Liancourt commune</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kokorat San Ras</strong></td>
<td>La Croix Périsse, Commune de l’Estère, Ti Bwadom, Gros Morne</td>
<td>Around 20 members</td>
<td>Murder, robbery, rape, kidnapping, hijacking of trucks and goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyer</td>
<td>Controls parts of the RN1 and of the RN5, linking the Bassin-Bleu and Gros-Morne communes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition des Révolutionnaires pour Sauver l’Artibonite (Jean Denis coalition)</strong></td>
<td>Jean Denis, Baraj</td>
<td>Around 70 members</td>
<td>Violence against gang members and civilian population from gang member areas, murder, destruction of property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Baptiste Mercedieu alias Ti-Mepri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raboteau</strong></td>
<td>Gonaïves</td>
<td>Around 50 members</td>
<td>Murder, extortion, street blocking, drug trafficking, destruction of property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilford Ferdinand alias Ti-Will</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ti Grif</strong></td>
<td>Palmiste, Moreau Dwèt</td>
<td>Around 20 members</td>
<td>Murder, rape, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of trucks and goods, violence against civilian populations, kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izolan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Descahos</strong></td>
<td>Gonaïves</td>
<td>Around 50 members</td>
<td>Robbery and drug trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulda Petitmé</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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159 This Annex is based on interviews conducted between February and July 2023 with people living in gang-controlled areas, gang analysts, HNP analysts, government representatives and confidential reports.
Annex 11: Notices of wanted persons for 5 Segond gang leaders

**AVIS DE RECHERCHE**

**NOM** : ANDRE  
**PRENOM** : JOHNSON  
**ALIAS** : IZO

**INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :**

- ASSASSINAT
- ENLEVEMENT CONTRE RANCON
- DETENTION ILLEGALE D’ARMES A FEU
- VOL DE VEHICULES
- DETOURNEMENT DE CAMIONS DE MARCHANDISES
- ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS.

**N.B.**  
*Dangereux et armé*

*En cas de localisation*  
*Prière d’appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838-1111 / 2817-0545 / 3106-0573*
POLICE NATIONALE D’HAITI
DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE

AVIS DE RECHERCHE

NOM : SALOMON
PRENOM : EMMANUEL
ALIAS : MANNO

INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :
- ASSASSINAT
- ENLEVEMENT CONTRE RANCON
- DETENTION ILLEGALE D’ARMES A FEU
- VOL DE VÉHICULES
- DETOURNEMENT DE CAMIONS DE MARCHANDISES
- ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS.

N.B. Dangereux et armé

En cas de localisation
WANTED
BY THE FBI

EMANUEL SALOMON

Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking; Hostage Taking

DESCRIPTION

Aliases: "Mano", "Manmo"

Place of Birth: Haiti

Eyes: Brown

Weight: 160 pounds

Race: Black

Hair: Black

Height: 5'7" to 5'10"

Sex: Male

Nationality: Haitian

REMARKS

Salomon has ties to or may visit the Dominican Republic and Mexico.

CAUTION

Emanuel Salomon, as second in command of the gang Village De Dieu, allegedly participated in kidnappings of United States citizens for ransom in 2021. In January 2021, Salomon and associates allegedly kidnapped a United States citizen at gunpoint and held the victim for ransom for 11 days. The victim was allegedly held at gunpoint, beaten, and threatened by the gang, and was released only after a ransom was paid.

Emanuel Salomon was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking and Hostage Taking by a criminal complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C. on November 2, 2022.

SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS

If you have any information concerning this person, please contact your local FBI office or the nearest American Embassy or Consulate.

Field Office: Miami
Annex 12: ‘Peace pledge’ signed between G9 and G-Pèp gangs in July 2023

Promès pou lapè
Nou promèt Bondye lajmou nou en
We promise our loving God
pou nou travay ak tout fôs nou, pou nou koupe vyolans l
To work hard to end violence!
pou nou pote lapè pou tout moun l
To bring peace to all people!
pou nou pote sekrirte pou tout moun l
To bring security to all people!

nou promèt devan Bondye pou nou mete men anssam ak tout moun ki vie pou nou fè lapè.
We promise before God to join hands with all people who are dedicated to making peace!

Nap mande Bondye ede nou gen volonte pou nou padone moun ki fè nou mal e pou moun
padone nou sa nou fè yo ki mal.

We ask God to help us to be willing to forgive and to be forgiven!

Nou promèt espesyalman pou nou fè tout efô pou nou bay sekrirte pou tout timoun ak tout
grammou!

We especially pledge to make every effort to provide security for all
our children and all our elderly!

kounia Se pou nou mete men nou anssam ak tout moun pou nou fè lapè ak sekrirte !

May we now join hands together with all people to achieve peace and security!

Se pou bondye beni nou e proteje nou tout!
May God bless us and protect all of us!

Gabriel
Iska
Mathias
Barbec

Pè Tom

iyè/2023
Annex 13: Izo, 5 Segond’s leader, leads spiritual ceremony for funeral vigil of Ti-Makak, on 23 April 2023

Several sources highlighted the importance of gang leaders to ensure a magico-religious ability. Rituals are made before attacks and on other key occasions. Some gang leaders and members believe that Voodoo practices make them untouchable.

Picture shared with the Panel on 28 April 2023
Annex 14: Distribution of Bwa Kale and self-defense groups as of 27 July 2023

Source: UN data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand’Anse</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nippes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 15: Bwa Kale movement against alleged gang members

Photographs showing dead, mutilated, burnt and decapitated bodies

Removed due to gruesome content

(On file with the Panel)

Pictures and stills from videos shared with the Panel between April and July 2023
Annex 16: Barricades set up by residents in Port-au-Prince closing the road

Photo taken by the Panel, 2023
Annex 17: Acts of piracy/marine capability and hijacking of vehicles by S Segond

Izo, who has expansionist ambitions, exerts considerable influence – along with his allies – from the southern (RN2) to the northern (RN1) entrances to Port-au-Prince and up to the Artibonite department. He controls parts of the bay of Port-au-Prince and is understood to be planning to take over Cabaret commune, where the beach resorts and the seaport of Montrouis are located, which, according to several sources, would further facilitate the movement of drugs. Furthermore, he recently tried to finance the setting up of a gang in Grand Rivié, a locality in Jacmel, which is well-known for drug-related activities.
Annex 18: Notices for wanted persons for Grand Ravine’s leaders

POLICE NATIONALE D’HAITI
DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE

AVIS DE RECHERCHE

NOM : DESTINA
PRENOM : RENEL
ALIAS : Tilapli

INFRACTIONS REPROCHES :

- ASSASSINAT
- ENLEVEMENT CONTRE RANCON
- DETENTION ILLEGALE D’ARMES A FEU
- VOL DE VEHICULES
- DETOURNEMENT DE CAMIONS DE MARCHANDISES
- ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS.

N.B. Dangereux et armé

En cas de localisation
WANTED
BY THE FBI

RENEL DESTINA
Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking; Hostage Taking

DESCRIPTION

Alias: "Ti Lapl"
Date(s) of Birth Used: June 11, 1982
Hair: Black
Height: 5'7" to 5'10"
Sex: Male
Nationality: Haitian

Place of Birth: Haiti
Eyes: Brown
Weight: 150 pounds
Race: Black

REMARKS

Destina has ties to or may travel to the Dominican Republic.

CAUTION

Renel Destina, as leader of the gang Gran Ravine, allegedly participated in kidnappings of United States citizens for ransom in 2021. In February 2021, Destina and associates allegedly kidnapped a United States citizen at gunpoint and held the victim for ransom for 14 days. The victim was allegedly held at gunpoint, beaten, and threatened by the gang, and was released only after a ransom was paid.

Renel Destina was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking and Hostage Taking by an indictment filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS

If you have any information concerning this person, please contact your local FBI office or the nearest American Embassy or Consulate.

Field Office: Miami
AVIS DE RECHERCHE

BOUGÔY AINSI CONNU
« GANG GRAND RAVINE »

INFRACTIONS RÉPROCHÉES : ASSASSINAT, TENTATIVE D’ASSASSINAT, ENLÈVEMENT, VOL DE VÉHICULE, DETOURNEMENT DE CAMIONS DE MARCHANDISES.

En cas d’identification ou de localisation
Prière d’appeler aux numéros suivants : 3838-1111 & 31060573
Annex 19: Wanted Notice against leader of Kraze Barye
POLICE NATIONALE D’HAITI
DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE

AVIS DE RECHERCHE

NOM : INNOCENT
PRENOM : VITEL’HOMME

CHEF DE GANG : KRAZE BARYÈ (TABARRE 70 / TORCEL)

INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES : ASSASSINAT, TENTATIVE D’ASSASSINAT,
ENLÈVEMENT, VOL DE VÉHICULES

En cas d’identification ou de localisation
Prière d’appeler aux numéros suivants : 3838-1111 & 31060573
WANTED BY THE FBI

VITEL'HOMME INNOCENT

Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking; Hostage Taking

DESCRIPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date(s) of Birth Used: March 27, 1966</th>
<th>Place of Birth: Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hair: Black</td>
<td>Eyes: Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height: 5'7&quot; to 5'10&quot;</td>
<td>Weight: 180 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex: Male</td>
<td>Race: Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality: Haitian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REWARD

The United States Department of State’s Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program is offering a reward of up to $1 million United States dollars for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Vittel’Homme Innocent.

MARKS

Vittel’Homme Innocent has ties to or may travel to the Dominican Republic.

CAUTION

Vittel’Homme Innocent, as leader of the gang Kraze Banye, allegedly worked together with the gang 400 Mawozo, in the October 2021, kidnapping of 17 Christian Missionaries in Haiti, including five children, one as young as 8 months old. The hostages were allegedly held at gunpoint and most remained captive for 61 days. The gangs demanded ransom payment for each of the victims.

Vittel’Homme Innocent was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking and Hostage Taking by an indictment filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS

If you have any information concerning this person, please contact your local FBI office or the nearest American Embassy or Consulate.

Field Office: Miami
Annex 20: Notice for wanted person for the leader of 400 Mawozo

POLICE NATIONALE D’HAITI
DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE

AVIS DE RECHERCHE

NOM : JOSEPH
PRENOM : WILSON
ALIAS : LANMÔ SAN JOU

CHEF DE GANG : 400 MAWOZO

INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES : ASSASSINAT, TENTATIVE D’ASSASSINAT, ENLEVEMENT, VOL DE VÉHICULES, DÉTOURNEMENT DE CAMIONS DE MARCHANDISES.

En cas d’identification ou de localisation
Prière d’appeler aux numéros suivants : 3838-1111 & 31060573
WANTED BY THE FBI

LANMO SANJOU

Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking; Hostage Taking

DESCRIPTION

| Alias(es): Lanmo San Jou, Lamo Sanjou, Joseph Wilson | Place of Birth: Haiti |
| Date(s) of Birth Used: February 28, 1993 | Eyes: Brown |
| Hair: Black | Weight: 130 pounds |
| Height: 5'7" to 5'10" | Race: Black |
| Sex: Male |

SANJOU has significant scars across his body. SANJOU has the following tattoos: right calf - skull, left calf - snake, right forearm - knife, right shoulder - spider web, left arm - sleeved and cursive writing, and on his chest are stars and cursive writing.

REWARD

The United States Department of State's Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program is offering a reward of up to $1 million United States dollars for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Lanmo Sanjou.

REMARKS

SANJOU has medical issues with his kidneys. He has ties to or may travel to the Dominican Republic.

CAUTION

Lanmo Sanjou, as leader of the gang 400 Mawozo, allegedly participated in the October 2021, kidnapping of 17 Christian Missionaries in Haiti, including five children, one as young as 8 months old. The hostages were allegedly held at gunpoint and most remained captive for 61 days. The gang demanded ransom payment for each of the victims.

Lanmo Sanjou was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking and Hostage Taking by an indictment filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS

If you have any information concerning this person, please contact your local FBI office or the nearest American Embassy or Consulate.

Field Office: Miami
Annex 21: Acts of torture and body mutilation against victims of kidnapping by Artibonite gangs

Photograph removed due to gruesome content
(On file with the Panel)

Photograph removed due to gruesome content
(On file with the Panel)

Stills from video showing kidnapping victim being burnt by Kokorat San Ras gang

Still from a video shared with the Panel on 17 April 2023

Photograph removed due to gruesome content
(On file with the Panel)

Victim of kidnapping having genitals burned by Gran Grif gang members

Stills from a video shared with the Panel on 17 April 2023
Annex 22: Kidnapping dynamics

Notwithstanding the active efforts of the HNP kidnap response unit (Cellule Contre Enlèvement – CCE) to deal with the large number of cases reported, its capacity is stretched to the limit, with only a few trained investigators and negotiators. Furthermore, the increase of “no-go zones” in Port-au-Prince from 2016 onwards, presented significant challenges to police operations aiming at recovering hostages in these areas. The CCE unit concentrates its focus on conducting investigations and providing strategic assistance with negotiations.

The spike in kidnapping is in part attributable to new alliances in Port-au-Prince which have enabled gangs to operate outside of their own zones, rendering HNP operations more complicated. In several cases, victims were kidnapped in one gang’s area and then taken to the territory controlled by another, notably to Village de Dieu, 5 Segond’s stronghold. Tracking of mobile devices enabled investigators to identify negotiations taking place in one gang-controlled zone, while the victims were being held in a location controlled by another gang.

In certain instances, gangs transfer kidnap victims into the custody of another gang under an arrangement whereby they pay a ‘commission’ for holding the victim and negotiating the ransom. Additionally, criminal groups looking to gain from this ‘market’, can ‘sell’ kidnap victims to other gangs. Some lower-level gang members also stage opportunistic ‘express kidnappings’ and hold the victim for a short duration (ranging from a few hours to about 48 hours) while they negotiate the ransom payment, concealing the act from their leadership. The ransom amounts in these cases are typically much lower.

Kidnappers often operate in two vehicles, to “ambush” the victim’s car. They also use tap-taps (collective taxis), trucks, motorbikes, and other means. They frequently use stolen vehicles with tinted windows, including with official plates to move around more freely and approach victims. In these opportunities, they use firearms that are easier to handle and conceal, including handguns. They sometimes wear police uniforms.

Gangs also break into residences, work structures, religious premises, buses and conduct collective kidnappings. The Panel interviewed a woman who had a family relative kidnapped at her residency by 5 Segond. Gangs also place antennas across the communities to monitor their targets. They often use children or recruit people to work on motorcycle stations as sentinels.

Kidnappings used to be either politically motivated or random, with captivities lasting less time (3-4 days) and lower ransoms were requested ($3,000 to $4,000 USD). As gangs became “more professional”, kidnappings evolved into a profitable market, targeting entrepreneurs and prominent figures. The duration of captivity increased considerably to a minimum of three weeks and gangs started asking for higher ransoms. In general, hostages are well treated, if there is no resistance. However, torture is sometimes used as a pressure tactic for obtaining the ransom, particularly in with Grand Grif and Kokorat San Ras gangs in the Artibonite department, considered amongst the cruellest of the gangs.

160 The Panel interviewed a victim of kidnapping, police officers, victims’ relatives, individuals advising families of victims, gang analysts, international security officers, diplomatic representatives and national government representatives working on gang-related issues as well as civil society organizations with knowledge of kidnapping dynamics.
Ransoms paid vary greatly depending on the profile of victims, the gang(s) involved and the skills of the negotiator. “High value” targets are typically from affluent families or foreign nationals, as these attract substantial ransom payments, often demanded in USD. The highest ransom demanded by a gang so far was of $6 million USD\textsuperscript{161}, and the lowest just a few thousands HTG ($15 to $20 USD). More modest income families can pay ransoms from $2 to $3,000 USD, while middle class families from $6,000 to $10,000 USD; and wealthier families up to $500,000 USD\textsuperscript{162}. Recently, gangs have also started targeting companies disposing of security agents to demand weapons and vehicles in addition to the ransom.

As for the negotiations, kidnappers ask the victim to call someone to be their point of contact. Often, when negotiators are too hasty in agreeing payment of the initial ransom, within 48 hours, a second ransom demand is made.

While most of the ransom paid is destined to purchase weapons and ammunitions, part of the amount is fed to money laundering schemes. Gangs such as Grand Ravine process kidnapping money in different ways. Either they deposit money in banks, via accounts held by small traders, or they use “mules” to send money to the United States. Information received by the Panel indicate that some gangs have informants working in banks who can provide them with details about the account balance of their victims. Besides, gang leaders invest in local facilities and businesses.

Since the emergence of Bwa Kale, the number of kidnappings has dropped from 211 in March 2023 to 122 in April 2023, however cases are on the rise again, with 153 and 169 victims, in May and June respectively (see Figure 1 below). In July 2023, 23 cases of kidnappings were recorded in the Artibonite department, including two collective kidnappings\textsuperscript{163} perpetrated by Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif gangs.

**Figure 4: Individuals kidnapped in Haiti from January 2022 to June 2023**

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.png}
\caption{Source: UN data}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{161} Interview with HNP investigator, 2023.

\textsuperscript{162} Interview with international security officer working on several kidnapping cases.

\textsuperscript{163} CARDH report, 3 August 2023.
Bwa Kale and the related increase in vigilantism in several neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, together with HNP operations in the outskirts of Village de Dieu, have prevented 5 Segond and Grand Ravine from freely operating their kidnapping business, as they did in the first quarter of 2023. In response, 5 Segond has used the strategy of reinforcing its northern cells, as well as Canaan gang, to perpetrate kidnappings in Delmas, Lilavois, and Bon Repos areas. Two sources\textsuperscript{164} suggested that continuous violence by Kraze Barye in the Tabarre area was partially intended to distract the HNP and reduce pressure on Village de Dieu and Martissant neighborhoods, thereby benefiting its allies, 5 Segond and Grand Ravine.

In the meantime, Vitelhomme has been conducting targeted kidnappings against prominent figures, such as the regional director of APN port of Cap-Haïtien (North department), the director of a private television station on “Route des Freres”, and the director of the “Radio Commerciale d’Haiti” as well as a famous journalist and the former president of the Provisional Electoral Commission (CEP), among others.

\textsuperscript{164} CARDH report and interview with HNP officer, 2023.
Annex 23: Forms of extorsion by gangs

Seven different sources described to the Panel how gangs control access to economic hubs such as seaports by imposing taxes on trucks. Government officials aware of G9 activities in La Saline area, where the International Port of Port-au-Prince referred to as the APN port is located, explained to the Panel how the coalition erects checkpoints on the road leading from the port in order to tax trucks coming from the port.

With regards to the Varreux terminal, the main petroleum terminal in the country, on 20 July 2023, the Association of Petroleum Professionals (APPE) sought the government’s intervention to forestall the disruption of the access to the terminal by gang members who were taxing 15 gallons per truck entering the terminal, and 200,000 Gourdes for those departing the terminal.

Extortion also applies in the transport industry. For instance, on the Canaan route (RN1), a gang entered into a tacit agreement with the association of bus drivers using the route to pay a total sum of about 300 million HTG per year (under 2 million USD). Some of the gangs use the proceeds gained from these illegal activities to invest in gas stations, hotels, money transfer shops, motorcycles which they rent out, among other ventures, as a way of expanding their income. The Panel is currently investigating such cases.

Gangs also derive revenue by extorting families for the “supply” of social amenities such as water and electricity. The Panel received several accounts of how this happens. The population is forced to pay these monthly fees whether it receives electricity or not. The same charge may also apply to water charges and any other items the gang may want to “tax” to the population.

The gangs position themselves as the main interlocutors for the distribution of aid in their areas. They insist that the aid to be channeled through their foundations as a tool for controlling the population. Some gangs reportedly use their foundations to extort money from some humanitarian organizations seeking to access the areas they control and to sell the aid commodities for profit.

As users of the road system, humanitarian workers face extortion from gangs. For instance, gangs operating between Tabarre and Carrefour demanded 50,000 HTG at Martissant and an additional 25,000 HTG at Fontamara, summing up to 75,000 HTG for any vehicle, including aid workers. To bypass the illegal toll, a NGO, used the WFP barge for support.

The Panel continues to investigate extortion by gangs, including in seaport areas.

165 APN stands for Autorité Portuaire Nationale. APN is the government authority that manages all of Haiti’s seaports. See, https://apn.gouv.ht/.
166 Source: two members of a transport association, a cargo truck driver in La Saline, 2023.
167 OCHA, Humanitarian Response Overview, Situation Report - June 2023
Objet: Demande d'aide financière

Les Responsables Madame et Monsieur

Nous les Responsables du quartier (400 MAWOZO) vous félicitez pour votre détermination d’accompagner dignement. Dans laquelle il se trouve et à l’avantage de soumettre à votre attention une lettre de demande suite à quoi, nous vous sollicite de votre administration un support financier. Pour ne pas dire TAXE. NB que le moment est fixé pour la journée assurant. Tout en souhaitant de vous rencontrer à fin de discuter la faisabilité et l’exécution de cette lettre.

Nous vous remercions par avance et nous vous saluons patriotiquement.

Pour les responsables
Dé: Canaan

À: [nom]

Tel: [nombre]

Objet: Demande de finance

Cher Mdm/Msr. en l’honneur de vous felicite je vous salue Dans le nom de votre sauveur

Vu à la situation que confronte la dite Zone au cours de ce dernier moments, nous vous sollicitons un frais de 25 000 US$ pour l’objectif de ra mieux la sécurite de votre buisness.

Nous eswperions que notre demande retienne toutes votre attention.

Dans l’attente, Nous vous prions Mrs./mdm D’agréer l’ expression de nos sentiments Distingué

Fait a CANAAN le 05/01/23

Signature

NB: 48:00hr de temps pour vous Decide
Annex 24: Weaknesses of Customs controls at Haiti’s seaports

The Haitian population relies on imports for the vast majority of commodities. For instance, the APN seaport handles most of the cargo coming into Port-au-Prince. This makes the port one of the most lucrative economic hubs, for both licit and illicit goods.

In the three ports it visited, the Panel observed acute lack of technical capacity and resources for customs control ranging from basic equipment such as hand gloves and metal detectors to computerized systems and scanners. The customs officials informed the Panel that these limitations have hampered their ability to detect and intercept smuggled goods including firearms, ammunition, and contraband. Customs officers rely on basic vessel profiling methods based on the port of origin and the last 10 ports of call to identify if it had transited through ports classified as “high risk”. In addition, officers also depend on information shared by friendly foreign intelligence services on suspicious ships or containers entering the Haitian seaports. The search of suspected cargo is done manually and may take from a few days to weeks to accomplish.

In addition, customs activities are oftentimes impeded by the threats and attacks from gangs, certain economic actors and corrupt senior officials involved in circumventing customs regulations and other habitual malpractices. These are vents through which taxes are evaded and illicit goods such as weapons and ammunition enter the country. In some cases, containers are released before customs inspection and verification procedures are performed at the location/home of consignees. In addition to representing a risk to the country’s safety and security, this entrenched malpractice results in some of the main importers evading taxes and is in violation of Haiti’s customs regulations 168.

APN port has witnessed several challenges including attacks by gangs, as the port is in La Saline amidst an area controlled by the two rival coalitions G-Pèp and G9. On 16 June 2022, one of the gangs attacked APN port, killing one guard. Gang violence and attacks against the facility and threats against customs officers, have instilled fear not to search or intercept cargo belonging to people affiliated to gangs. As a result, suspicious cargo is sometimes released unsupervised. Similar challenges are faced by officers at the Cap-Haitien seaport.

The issue of second-hand goods

The import of personal effects (called locally pèpè) is subjected to a favorable tax rate which is being abused since most items imported as pèpè are in fact second-hand commodities brought in for resale in Haiti. The import and trade of these commodities provide an important source of livelihoods for many people but are sometimes used to smuggle contraband goods, including arms, ammunition as well as bulk cash (see Annex 29). Whether packed in bulk or in containers, pèpè are very difficult to search effectively due to the large volumes. The Panel observed first-hand some of the challenges experienced by customs in Cap-Haitien in processing personal effects and identified a number of weaknesses in customs controls that would abet illicit trafficking, including of firearms and ammunition.

Port workers sorting and loading pèpè cargo at the port of Cap-Haitian

Pictures taken by the Panel in 2023
Annex 25: Map of airports, seaports, and road infrastructure in Haiti

Annex 26: Diversion of funds by Romel Bell

As the head of Customs at the Port au Prince international airport between 2012 and 2018, his annual gross salary including privileges was between 1,241,160HTG ($29,813) and 1,327,140HTG ($14,695). Bell had accumulated wealth beyond his salary and benefits throughout his career he could not account for. For instance, on successive dates, Bell transferred amounts of money, of which he did not confirm the source, to a school in a foreign country. He also did not disclose several properties he owns, and interests in a company that he operated.

During the 2020-2021 tax year, Mr. Bell and his spouse committed significant tax evasion, on the one hand, by concealing the commercial profits derived from the company known as A & L Distribution S.A and on the other hand, by paying to the tax authorities income tax amounts that were not commensurate to their annual income from salaries, business profits and rental expenses. Among several other suspicious transactions were bank account transactions relating to amounts that exceeded Bell’s salaries that showed the balances of 5,636,280.00 HTG, as of March 24, 2022, and another had $124,535.00 USD on March 14, 2022. The accounts belonged to a joint business between Bell and his spouse.

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169 Confidential report on file with the Panel.
172 Direction Générale du Budget et de la Comptabilité Publique (DGBCP) and documented in a confidential report seen by the Panel.
A court order dated 3 April 2023, prohibiting Romel Bell and others from leaving the territory of Haiti due to cases of corruption and money laundering.
Annex 27: Customs performance and financial management measures

The customs revenue collection improved in the previous financial year ending June 2023 due to tightening of the implementation of Customs regulations.

On May 4, 2023, the government passed an Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) decree. This sanctions money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Haiti. The decree aligns better with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) international standards than the previous AML/CFT law. This follows another major step, in which, on 21 December 21, 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the country’s first Staff-Monitored Program (SMP). This aims at helping the government restore macroeconomic stability and lower inflation, while also enhancing accountability by encouraging stronger public finance management, revenue administration, transparency, and anti-corruption measures.

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Annex 28: Seizures conducted on their way to Haiti or at Haitian ports of entry during the reporting period

Table: Seizures conducted at Haiti’s ports of entry or on their way to Haiti between the adoption of resolution 2356 on 22 October 2022 and 1st July 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location/authorities</th>
<th>Firearms</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Other materiel</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 October 2022</td>
<td>Miami Airport, USA</td>
<td>9mm handgun</td>
<td>12,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm</td>
<td>1 magazine</td>
<td>The pistol was discovered in a parcel being shipped to Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 2022</td>
<td>Elias Pina, Dominican Republic</td>
<td>12,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm, 10,160 rounds of 5.56x45mm</td>
<td>Two Haitian women were arrested while attempting to cross the border into Haiti in a private vehicle.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 2022</td>
<td>Cap Haitien, Haiti</td>
<td>989 rounds of 9x19mm</td>
<td>Seizure from a container coming from the US. One individual was arrested in Haiti.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 January 2023</td>
<td>Miami port, USA</td>
<td>One revolver</td>
<td>41 rounds</td>
<td></td>
<td>The revolver was concealed in a sofa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 April 2023</td>
<td>Cap Haitien, Haiti</td>
<td>One 9mm handgun</td>
<td>Eight 9mm rounds, 4 boxes of 12-gauge rounds (100 rounds)</td>
<td>2 knives</td>
<td>Found in a container transported by the Sara Express coming from the Miami River (Antillean Marine Shipping).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June 2023</td>
<td>CPS container park, Port au Prince, Haiti</td>
<td>PA-15 5.56mm rifle</td>
<td>340 rounds of 5.56x45mm, 115 rounds of 9mm</td>
<td>5 magazines, 1 helmet</td>
<td>Container coming from Miami. Some materiel concealed in a popcorn machine. The rifle was purchased for the first time in the US in 2017. Two individuals arrested in Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023 (unknown date)</td>
<td>Miami, USA</td>
<td>2 pistols</td>
<td>1 magazine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023 (unknown date)</td>
<td>Miami, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td>23 vests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 handguns, 1 semi-automatic rifle</td>
<td>23,753 rounds of various calibers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data provided by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as well as Haitian, Dominican and US law enforcement agencies, 2023
Annex 29: Arms and ammunition trafficking from the United States

This annex is based on on-site observations by the Panel, the analysis of trafficking cases, of seizures data shared by the United States and Haitian authorities, a review of legal documents, and interviews with United States-based arms specialists, as well as representatives of United States and Haitian law enforcement agencies and Customs officials. The Panel travelled to Miami and met with representatives of law enforcement and border control agencies.

Given the weak control of border in Haiti and the very limited capacity of Customs, most trafficking is undetected, and seizures do not reflect the levels of trafficking. The analysis of seizures made in Haiti of materiel coming from the United States – particularly by vessel, allow for identifying trends and modus operandi (see Annex 30 for selected cases of trafficking).

**Tracing requests by the Panel of firearms**

The Panel sent a tracing request to the United States authorities for 60 illicit firearms that were seized in the past 18 months either on their way to or already in Haiti, including a 12.7x99mm sniper rifle, four 7.62x51mm rifles and light machine guns, eighteen 5.56mm semi-automatic rifles, six 7.62x39mm semi-automatic rifles, and twenty-eight handguns of various calibers (9mm, .40 S&W, .45).

**Tracing data published by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)**

The ATF provides online results of tracing requests made by law enforcement agencies for firearms recovered in several Caribbean countries. At the time of submission of this report, the most recent data available is for firearms recovered in 2021. While the statuses of firearms and the reason for their tracing is not indicated, the data provides some insights into trends. From the 125 arms recovered in Haiti in 2021 and traced by the ATF, 85% had been manufactured in or imported from the United States. 69% of these firearms were pistols, 19% rifles, and 10% shotguns.

**Data on outbound interdictions of firearms, ammunition and related materiel to Haiti provided by United States CBP**

Between January 2020 and July 2023, CBP interdicted 59 firearms including 44 pistols, 12 rifles, 1 machine gun, 1 shotgun and 1 revolver as well as 15,938 rounds of ammunition. CBP also intercepted 31 receivers, including non-serialized and home-made ones indicating their likely use for privately made firearms (PMFs). Twenty-one outbound interdictions were conducted, including 8 by air and 13 by sea. Nineteen were conducted in Miami and 1 in Atlanta.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Revolvers</th>
<th>Pistols</th>
<th>Shotguns</th>
<th>Rifles</th>
<th>Machine guns</th>
<th>Receivers</th>
<th>Magazines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>1348</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>672</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>1074</td>
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<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>625</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>11 515</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12 140</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

175 See [Firearms Trace Data: The Caribbean - 2021 | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (atf.gov)](https://www.atf.gov/)

94/156
In addition, United States authorities also told the Panel that 24 body armour vests had been interdicted on their way to Haiti since 2020, including 23 in 2023.

**Modus operandi of trafficking by sea from the United States**

The majority of trafficking cases analyzed by the Panel to date allow for a better understanding of the actors involved in trafficking weapons and the various steps in the chain of custody. They also highlight how traffickers violate United States regulations and exploit loopholes and reflect challenges to address this trafficking.

Most cases analysed by the Panel involve networks mostly based on familial links including spouses, brothers, girlfriends, brother in laws (See Annex 30).

1) **Purchase of weapons and ammunition in the United States for onward trafficking to Haiti**

*Straw-buying*

In several cases involving the trafficking of a batch of weapons, a main orchestrator in the United States would rely on a range of straw-buyers; i.e. individuals pretending to purchase firearms for themselves while actually purchasing them on someone else’s behalf. This is illegal in the United States and penalties for straw-buying have recently been increased; however, it is challenging to detect. The purchase of multiple firearms in a certain time period would trigger more controls and potential red flags. To avoid this, the orchestrator typically recruits individuals of Haitian descent with no criminal record to buy firearms for them. In certain cases, traffickers have been known to rent a storage unit in the United States while they consolidate their shipments.

*Private party sales*

Other cases of trafficking to Haiti include purchases through private party sales; i.e. an individual or group of individuals selling their own ‘private’ collection (i.e. not officially for commercial reasons) including at private gun shows, for example. Such sales do not require a firearm license from the ATF, do not leave any trace, and do not trigger the same alarms that multiple purchases within a certain time period through a retailer might, for instance. In the event of a long ‘time to crime’ – i.e. when more than a year has passed between the first retail sale of a firearm in the United States and its use in a crime – it is extremely difficult to build the chain of custody. For instance, during a recent seizure at a seaport, Haitian authorities recovered firearms with a time to crime exceeding 6000 days\(^{176}\).

*Privately made firearms (PMFs)*

According to a recent report produced by CARICOM and the Small Arms Survey, a community of amateur gunsmiths are continuously trying to advance techniques to create PMFs without using controlled components and thereby circumvent restrictions on firearms production posing a significant threat to arms control efforts in the United States and the Caribbean. Seizures conducted in both countries indicate that ghost guns or components used to assemble them have successfully made it to Haiti\(^{177}\); however, the extent of the phenomenon is difficult to quantify, largely due to the fact that Haitian law enforcement capacity to identify firearms and PMFs is limited.

\(^{176}\) Interview with a representative of law enforcement agency, July 2023.

According to CBP data, 31 receivers were intercepted on their way to Haiti since January 2020, including some to assemble PMFs\textsuperscript{178}.

AR-15 pattern rifle with a 80 percent lower receiver produced by EP armory\textsuperscript{179}

Source: Photograph taken by the Panel, Port au Prince, April 2023

2) Transport to Haiti

Freight-forwarding and exportation without licence

Many cases of trafficking from Miami include the use of unofficial freight-forwarders whose roles it is to receive parcels sent from various locations in the United States, consolidate packages and organize their onward shipment in containers or in bulk to Haiti. Unofficial freight-forwarders are not registered, and their activities are difficult to regulate and control, resulting in circumvention of Customs regulations. While investigations indicate that some freight forwarders are knowingly involved in arms trafficking, others may not know – or not want to know – about the content of any parcels they receive. The use of freight forwarding services complicates the identification of chains of custody in the event of a discovery of weapons or ammunition.

Unofficial freight forwarders are often of Haitian origin and organize their shipments in a sly manner, with handwritten approximative records of what was shipped to whom and by whom. To organize the delivery of goods in Haiti, they often use number codes on parcels. Each number would correspond to a ‘consignee’; i.e. the person collecting the goods at the other end. The consignee who collects the parcels at the port, may not be the final end user and may just be an additional step in the chain of custody.

In two cases, couples organised trafficking with the husband living in the United Stats and sending the materiel to his wife in Haiti. It was also reported to the Panel that it is not unusual for the arms shipper to fly to Haiti to receive the parcels at ports themselves.

\textsuperscript{178} Data provided to the Panel by CBP and Fabre et al., 2023.

\textsuperscript{179} Welcome to E P Armory - The One Stop Tactical Shop
The export of weapons and ammunition from the United States without authorization is a criminal offense and several individuals have been indicted and charged in the past few years.

Concealment

Second-hand goods generally mislabelled as ‘personal effects’ to benefit from advantageous Customs taxes and discourage Customs officers from spending time on a shipment serve as an excellent opportunity for concealment. Trafficking cases reviewed by the Panel include goods hidden inside second-hand televisions, furniture, paint buckets, and food items, as well as second-hand vehicles transported from the United States packed with goods (see for instance case 1 of Annex 30). Illicit materiel was found in boxes, bags, barrels and drums inside containers or coming among break-bulk.

Miami River break-bulk vessels

Miami River shipyards operating break-bulk vessels are unique in the United States. While they have been used by criminals to import drugs or to export arms and ammunition to Haiti (see for instance cases 4 and 5 in Annex 30), they also represent an important rare source of economic activity and income generation for Haitians. Break-bulk shipping is key to facilitating the significant second-hand goods trade in Haiti, as well as for families receiving support from relatives based in the United States.

The Miami River counts approximately seven shipyards operating less than ten break-bulk vessels to Haiti. While they do not own the land, shipyards and the vessels they house are operated by companies generally run by individuals of Haitian descent. Vessels travel from Miami to different locations including Cap Haitien, Miragoane, Saint Marc, Port-de-Paix and Port-au-Prince. Antillean Marine Shipping, a container shipping line, also operates from the Miami River and serves the Dominican Republic and Haiti, including Port au Prince and Cap Haitien. Cases of trafficking using containers transported by this company were also reported (see Annex 28).

Goods waiting to be loaded on a ship, Miami River.

Image taken by the Panel, April 2023.

The Panel visited several shipyards in April 2023 to observe the types of goods being transported and the challenges and risks related to this type of shipping. The Panel also visited a shipping vessel and spoke to its captain to better understand the process. Vessels are fully packed with goods of all sizes, including old mattresses, toilets, food items, furniture, bicycles, and ballots of second-hand clothes packed into all kinds of containers. A vessel would typically take a few days to a few weeks to be filled, takes 3 to 5 days to cross to Haiti and several days to unload upon arrival. Ships generally come back to Miami empty.

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180 Interviews with representatives of CBP and HSI, April 2023.
181 Interview with the captain of a bulk ship, Miami River, April 2023.
Some shipyards transport all types of goods while others are specialized in the transportation of second-hand vehicles. Historically, second-hand vehicles used to be packed full of goods themselves; however, following the discovery of concealed arms and ammunition in several such vehicles, this practice has now been banned. A bulk ship ready to depart to Haiti

Parcels of all shapes and sizes are piled up to a maximum, offering ample opportunity to conceal illicit goods, including arms and ammunition. With goods packed into every available space, there is no room to walk around inside, and it is almost impossible to conduct an effective search without unloading everything. Border control and law enforcement agencies have been increasing controls associated with these vessels and regularly conduct searches but there is a danger illicit goods are being missed.

______________

182 The rule has also been adopted by the Haitian Customs administration in 2021. Interview with a Customs officer, Haiti, 2023.
Each vessel may transport goods belonging to hundreds of different individuals. Parcels bear numbers which are attributed to consignees and handwritten lists are kept by the vessel operator. Once a seizure is made, it is difficult to trace the parcel to the actual original shipper and consignee (see above section on freight forwarders). A range of individuals and freight-forwarders drop packages at shipyards for their onward transportation to Haiti and operators rarely record their full names or take a copy of their identification documents.

Exporters do not need to file export information with the United States authorities if the commodity they are exporting does not require a special license, or its value does not exceed 2500 USD. Most of the commodities exported on Miami River bulk ships are therefore not registered. This prevents Customs and law enforcement officers from identifying red flags. In addition, cargo manifests are generally vague and incomplete and sent out to the authorities once the ship has already sailed.

Trafficking of illicit goods

Seizures of drugs at times have been made on bulk ships returning to the US from Haiti. In 2020 for instance, 19kgs of cocaine was discovered by CBP hidden behind a cabin wall.

Several seizures of arms and ammunition have also been made over the past three years on board ships on their way to Haiti. In certain instances, staff from the shipyards and/or vessel crew are suspected of having been involved, while in others, parcels were loaded onto the vessel without the operators knowing.

According to law enforcement sources, the number of ships making the crossing between Miami and Haiti has reduced over the past few years and so the level trafficking due to increasing controls and tighter regulations around the operation of these vessels. For instance, as part of efforts to prevent criminal organizations from using break-bulk ships for their business, third

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184 See [Drilling finds cocaine in vessel on Miami River | U.S. Customs and Border Protection (cbp.gov)](https://cbp.gov)
parties (entities other than the ship’s owner, operator, or agent) are now banned from paying bonds. These insurance bonds are also now much higher than before to cover for potential fines, which makes business more costly.

Furthermore, the amount of time and effort required to load and unload a break-bulk vessel makes this method of shipping not very profitable. When the Panel visited shipyards along the Miami River, one landowner complained about the fact that one shipping company had not paid its rent for months and was heavily in debt. Debt is a clear vulnerability and risk factor that can lead those affected to engage in illicit activities.

However, despite increased controls and seizures, these vessels are still used to transport arms and ammunition to Haiti.

3) Arrival in Haiti

Customs control in Haiti

Customs controls are very limited in Haiti, the country does not have scanners for instance and searches of containers or ship are by hand, resulting in very labour-intensive work (see Annex 24). In addition, exemptions from Customs duties (‘franchise douaniere’) are abused by a range of actors, including individuals exploiting their company or organisation’s tax exemption for their personal benefit, individuals bringing in commercial goods under the guise of ‘personal effects’ to benefit from tax reductions (see Annex 24)\(^{185}\). Goods coming in under ‘franchise’ not only benefit from tax exemptions but are also subjected to less scrutiny from Customs officers as they present little or no potential source of revenue for the administration or kick-back for corrupt officials themselves\(^{186}\). They represent an attractive opportunity to smuggle illicit goods.

\(^{185}\) Interviews with several Haitian Customs officers, 2023.

\(^{186}\) Ibid.
Annex 30: Selected arms trafficking cases from the United States to Haiti

The following cases are based on information provided in court documents, confidential documents provided by Member States, as well as interviews with Haitian and foreign law enforcement agencies from February to July 2023.

While many other small cases took place since January 2022, the Panel is focusing here on major cases. The majority of these seizures took place in July 2022.

The following recent cases provide detailed insight into arms trafficking from the United States to Haiti. They illustrate the modus operandi, type of actors involved, end users – including both gangs and civilians - and some of the challenges associated with the implementation of United States, Haitian, regional and international arms control efforts, including the UN targeted arms embargo. The cases also provide insight into the negative impact of corruption in Haiti, dysfunctional Customs controls and a broken judicial system on the capacity to counter arms and ammunition trafficking in the country.

Case 1: Peniel Olibris

In January 2023, Peniel Olibris, a Haitian national, was convicted in the United States for having illicitly exported firearms without a license. Investigations indicate that Olibris and his accomplice had purchased 77 firearms, including 9mm pistols, in Colorado between February and June 2020. Olibris sent firearms to Haiti concealed in the 13 vehicles he had sent to the country by ship from Fort Lauderdale between September 2019 and May 2020. Loading second-hand cars to be exported to Haiti with goods was a concealment method regularly used until it was forbidden to load anything into vehicles being transported to Haiti.

Several firearms purchased by Olibris were then registered in Haiti by individuals applying for a firearm license who had bought them from his brother. Time to crime was extremely short indicating how easy and fast trafficking between these two countries can be. For instance, one firearm was purchased on 19 October 2019 in Colorado, likely concealed inside a vehicle and shipped to Haiti on 4 December, and then registered by a civilian in Port-au-Prince on 10 December 2019. This case is just one illustration of how the majority of firearms for which Haitian civilians obtain licenses are illicitly trafficked (see Annex 33).

188 ‘Time to crime’ refers to the period of time between the first retail sale of firearms and a law enforcement recovery of the firearm during a use, or suspected use, in a crime’. United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 2011. ATF – Firearm Tracing Guide. Tracing Firearms to Reduce Violent Crimes.
Case 2: Miss Lili One – Seizure in Port-de-Paix

On 1 July 2022, Haitian Customs officers discovered 120,000 rounds of ammunition – including 114,000 rounds of 5.56mm, 2000 of 9x19mm, 4000 of 7.62x39mm - in a container transported from the United States by the vessel Lili One at the Port-de-Paix wharf (North-West department). The Panel documented some of the ammunition in April 2023 held by the authorities in Port-de-Paix, as well as in Port-au-Prince; all ammunition seen by the Panel was .223/ 5.56x45mm ammunition.

During the Customs raid, an individual was arrested in flagranti while attempting to recuperate the merchandise for onward transfer to a second individual who would then distribute it. According to sources with direct knowledge of the case, the ammunition was destined to influential individuals in Port-au-Prince and was supposed to have been transported in official vehicles.

A search of the second individual’s home address by the HNP resulted in the discovery of two 9mm handguns, one revolver and 382 rounds of ammunition. On the same day, sources close to the investigation explained that the Police did not obtain the relevant documentation from the Port-de-Paix General Prosecutor to enable them to search the Miss Lili One, which resulted in firearms concealed on board being removed that night and transferred by small boats to Ile de la Tortue.

Two days after having been arrested by the Police, the second individual and the owner of the ship were released by the Prosecutor against all odds; the whereabouts of the second individual is unknown. The Prosecutor was later arrested for suspicion of corruption and illicit firearms trafficking. He explained during his deposition that he had been asked to release the suspects by two officials from the Ministry of Justice. Investigations are ongoing.

While this case demonstrates how certain corrupt officials enable illicit arms trafficking and protect arms traffickers, it also illustrates just how hard certain Customs and HNP officers are working to conduct sensitive, and often dangerous investigations and arrest suspects.

Case 3: Trafficking under the tax exemption of the Eglise Episcopale d’Haïti – Seizure in Port-au-Prince

On 13 and 14 July 2022, Customs officers at CPS terminal 2 at APN in Port-au-Prince discovered firearms and ammunition, as well 50,000 USD in counterfeit notes in a container coming from the United States. The container had been shipped by a company based in Miami on board the container ship, the K Breezer (IMO 9389423).
Materiel seized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calibers</th>
<th>Firearms</th>
<th>Rounds of Ammunition</th>
<th>Chargers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.56x45mm</td>
<td>11 AR-15 pattern rifles</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>Six AK-pattern rifles</td>
<td>12,599</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62x51 mm</td>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9x19mm</td>
<td>3 pistols</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.40 S&amp;W</td>
<td>1 pistol</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Gauge</td>
<td>1 shotgun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14,645</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Panel was granted access to some of the firearms interdicted and has sent a tracing request to the United States authorities for all 22 firearms in order to build an understanding of the chain of custody since the point of purchase of the items.

PNH official Facebook page, 15 July 2022
The weapons were discovered in a container using the customs tax exemption (‘franchise douanière’) of the Eglise Episcopale d’Haiti (Episcopal Church of Haiti – EEH). Investigators believe that the network behind this shipment had already used the exemption to import weapons into the country in the past. The agent who cleared the container with the Customs authorities had already had 15 containers processed for the EEH in the previous seven months.

The investigation resulted in the arrest of several suspects and warrants for the arrest of many more, including individuals involved in the receipt of the items, EEH staff, customs clearing agents, and an individual working for the tax exemption unit of the Ministry of Finance. At the centre of the case is the former head of operations (chef d’opérations) at the EEH, a Zimbabwean national who the police has been trying to arrest. While the individual was fired from the EEH in 2018 – likely after he attacked his wife with acid – he was still doing work for the EEH, notably in relation to customs clearance.

Investigations indicate that the trafficking network has links to Village de Dieu and Kraze Barye, indicating potential end-users for the arms and ammunition. Investigations are ongoing.

**Case 4: Seizure by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) - Miami River**

On 12 July 2022, a significant seizure of arms and ammunition was made by HSI at a shipyard on the Miami River. Officers recovered 23 firearms, including a .50 caliber sniper rifle, a number of .308 rifles, and a belt-fed machine gun, as well as 5.56mm rifles, 13 pistols and around 4000 rounds of ammunition. Investigations are ongoing.
HSI announces crackdown on firearms, ammunition smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean | ICE

Case 5: El Shaddai – Seizure in Port-de-Paix

On 21 July 2022, 7 firearms – including 6 pistols of various calibers and one revolver - and 434 rounds of ammunition – including 9mm, .40 S&W and hollow-point ammunition - were discovered onboard the El Shaddai, one of the smallest break-bulk vessels operating from the Miami River. Another seizure of firearms had already been made from the same vessel in November 2021. The whereabouts of the ship is now unknown.

HNP official Facebook page, 22 July 2022
Annex 31: Weapons and ammunition trafficking from the Dominican Republic

This section is based on information provided to the Panel during its fact-finding missions to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Panel travelled to the Dominican Republic to meet with state authorities involved in the fight against arms trafficking, including Customs, the military and Police. The Panel also travelled to Dajabon and Ouanaminthe, the towns on either side of the Dominican-Haitian border. In Haiti, the Panel met with Police and Customs officers and were provided with informative and insightful reports. In both countries, the Panel received excellent support.

The land border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is 392 kilometres long, with four official border points – Ouanaminthe/Dajabon, Belladere/Elias Pina, Malpasse, and Anse a Pitre/Perdenales - (see Annex 25) and dozens of unofficial ones. The Dominican Republic is a primary source of commercial activity for Haitians and border towns are very busy with thousands crossing back and forth across the border every day (see Annex 38).

In Haiti, the border crossing points are the focus of much contention by economic and political actors who exert de facto control (see Section III.B.21 through bribes, nepotism (eg. influencing the appointment of senior government officials to key positions in Customs and the Police), and the occasional use of force, including deploying armed men to pressurize border control agencies192. Currently for instance, a group of armed men from Croix-de-Fer is being used by certain economic actors to intimidate Customs and Police officers in Belladere193. Belladere is the main border crossing for the importation of goods; meanwhile, the Malpasse crossing has registered a decline in the volume of cross-border transactions recently due to increased gang activity194, resulting in a surge of illicit goods diverted through Belladere instead.

The Dominican Republic itself also suffers from illicit trafficking of firearms and ammunition by local criminal groups. Over the past three years, the Dominican Customs department have seized an increasing number of weapons and ammunition. For instance, Customs intercepted 174,988 rounds of ammunition in 2020, 300,728 in 2021 and 598,179 in 2022195.

The Dominican illicit market represents a source of weapons and ammunition for armed actors in Haiti, including gangs. Materiel has been seized at border crossings, including Pedernales and Dajabon in the Dominican Republic, and Belladere, Malpasse and in Ouanaminthe in Haiti196. The Panel has been analyzing several recent seizures of arms on their way to Haiti or in Haiti coming from the Dominican Republic.

Cases indicate that a range of actors are involved in trafficking from the Dominican Republic to Haiti, including both Haitians and Dominican nationals. The lucrative business of selling arms and ammunition in Haiti have encouraged ant trafficking. In several cases, officials, including police officers and relatives of local officials, have used their positions to smuggle materiel across the border.

Trafficing cases

In December 2021, the Dominican authorities seized 33 firearms – including pistols and semi-automatic rifles – and 700 rounds of ammunition, as well as magazines, at Haina Port from a container coming from Miami. A Cuban national was arrested in the Dominican Republic in May 2023 in relation to this trafficking case and extradited to the United States. Representatives of law enforcement agencies told the Panel that they believe that the materiel was heading to Haiti. The Cuban national used ‘straw buyers’ to buy the weapons under their names in the United States, which were then unlawfully sold to him and exported to the Dominican Republic as ‘household items’ in a shipping container197. Law enforcement officials believe other shipments of firearms were also sent by this individual undetected to the Dominican Republic before potentially being transferred onwards to Haiti.

192 Interviews with Customs officers, Haiti, 2023.
193 Interviews with Customs officers, Haiti, 2023.
197 Charles, Jacqueline. 2023. ‘He used false buyers to buy weapons. Dominican authorities say they were going to Haiti’. Miami Herald.
In April 2022, a Dominican national was arrested in the border town of Elias Pina in possession of 5,055 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition which he was allegedly transporting to Haiti\textsuperscript{198}.

On 12 April 2022, an Haitian national working for the Office National d’Assurance Vieillesse (ONA) and with the parliamentary police was arrested in Belladere. During his interrogation, he explained that, for the past two years, he had been purchasing firearms and ammunition close to the Haitian-Dominican border that he then sold on to gangs, including Grand Ravine and 5 Segond\textsuperscript{199}. The materiel included 5.56mm rifles as well as 7.62x39mm and 5.56mm ammunition.

On 8 November 2022, two Haitian women were arrested by the Dominican authorities in Elias Pina while trying to smuggle important quantities of assault rifle ammunition into Haiti in their vehicle, including 12,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm and 10,160 of 5.56 mmm.

\textsuperscript{198} https://listindiario.com/la-republica/2022/12/31/755807/golpes-al-contrabando-de-armas-en-las-adiuanas.html

\textsuperscript{199} Interview with law enforcement representative, 2023.
On 11 November 2022, an HNP inspector working with the presidential security unit, was arrested by the Police in Haiti on his way back from the Dominican Republic and Belladere with 4000 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition, 41 rounds of 9mm, one 9mm handgun and three magazines. The ammunition was manufactured in the United States.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{200} CESFronT detiene ciudadana que transportaba 22,160 municiones con la intención de introducirlas a Haití de manera irregular - Ministerio de Defensa de República Dominicana (mide.gob.do)

\textsuperscript{201} Source HNP official Facebook page and a confidential report shared by a Member State, 2023.
Annex 32: Gangs arsenals

While all gangs in Haiti are de facto involved in illicit arms and ammunition trafficking given their use of firearms, the Panel is currently investigating several specific cases and will share its findings with the Committee in due time.

Over the past three years, gangs have been procuring a wide range of 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm rifles. During the reporting period the Panel has exclusively documented semi-automatic rifles, however, testimonies from individuals living in CiteSOLEIL indicate the presence of automatic rifles. Although the very vast majority of gang arsenals are composed of small arms, the Panel has received information indicating that several gangs have a (very limited) number of light weapons in their possession and also has the evidence that they are actively trying to procure some (see Section III.B.2.1).

While gangs typically used a broad range of 'craft' or artisanal firearms – locally called ‘zam creole’ - in the past, seizures of such weapons from gangs in the metropolitan area are increasingly rare, further highlighting how gangs have developed their arsenals and now rely almost exclusively on manufactured weapons. Nevertheless, these 'zam creole' are still being seized from individuals and gang members living outside of Port au Prince with less financial means.

The high volumes of materiel in circulation and high prices of firearms in Haiti will present additional challenges to any future Community Violence Reduction (CVR) or other Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programming with a disarmament or arms control component, in the West and the Artibonite departments particularly.

202 For definitions of small arms and light weapons see the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 1999 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Disarm%20A54258.pdf
203 See for instance HNP official Facebook page, 31 October 2022.
5 Segond

Stills from video showing Izo shared on 5 May 2023

Stills from video filmed on 9 May 2023
Manno (white T-shirt and black mask) and his group (including a minor, with white mask and pistol)
Still from video filmed on 9 May 2023

Still from Izo’s musical video, February 2023

Still from a video shared on 11 April 2023
Gang de Canaan

Still from a video shared with the Panel on 24 May

Still from a video diffused on 14 March

Still from a video shared with the Panel on 17 July 2023 showing a light machine gun given by Izo, 5 Segond, to Jeff
400 Mawozo

Arms trafficking by a gang: the example of 400 Mawozo

Review of videos and police reports indicate that the gang possesses pistols, revolvers, 12 gauge shotguns, 5.56mm semi-automatic rifles and 7.62x39mm semi-automatic rifles. One governmental source indicated that 400 Mawozo have around 70 rifles and 45 handguns, however, this could not be confirmed by the Panel\(^{204}\). The gang also purchased a 12.7x99mm anti-materiel rifle in the United States in 2021 (see below), however, it is unclear whether the weapon is in their custody and whether they have the ammunition for it.

Arms trafficking from the Dominican Republic

The territory controlled by 400 Mawozo includes areas with direct access into the Dominican Republic, most notably via the RN 8 which passes through the border town of Malpasse (see Map in Annex 8). The gang is actively involved in trafficking arms and ammunition and several members known to be responsible for arms and ammunition trafficking have been arrested by the Police, including in Malpasse on 26 April 2022 and Nippes in the southwest of the country on 14 May 2022\(^{205}\).

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\(^{204}\) Confidential report, 2023.
\(^{205}\) See HNP Facebook page, 27 April 2022 and 18 May 2022.
During the reporting period, two Haitian nationals were arrested by the Dominican authorities with 22,160 rounds of 7.62x39mm and 5.56x45mm ammunition while they were attempting to enter Haiti in November 2022 (see Annex 31). A security source with direct knowledge of the case told the Panel that the ammunition was destined to 400 Mawozo.

While 400 Mawozo has easy access to the illicit market in the Dominican Republic and relies on a range of different actors to obtain materiel, several leadership figures also used their own network to secure weapons and ammunition directly from the United States.

**Arms trafficking from the United States**

In May 2022, three Haitian nationals and one United States citizen were charged with firearms trafficking in support of 400 Mawozo in Haiti\(^\text{206}\). The individuals included the former leader of 400 Mawozo, Joly Germaine, alias “Yonyon”, who was conducting trafficking operations while incarcerated in Haiti\(^\text{207}\), and Eliande Tunis, a member of 400 Mawozo and allegedly the girlfriend of one or possibly multiple senior figures in the gang, who was responsible for managing the purchasing and shipping of weapons, as well as two straw-buyers, based in the US. The indictment also refers to an ‘Individual 2’ living in Haiti and identifies this person as ‘the leader of 400 Mawozo’. Based on this and other information provided in the indictment, the Panel judges this likely to refer to Lanmo San Jou (see Annex 20).

Between 28 September and 17 October 2021, the following 16 firearms were purchased by the three primary co-conspirators who either exported or attempted to export them to Haiti. Firearms were purchased in four different cities in Florida, United States.

**Table 1: Firearms purchased**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Make</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>On or About</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>VSKA w/ Red Dot Sight</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>9/28/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>VSKA</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>9/29/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>VSKA</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>10/1/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>VSKA</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>10/1/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>VSKA w/ Red Dot Sight</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>10/5/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Riley Defense Inc</td>
<td>Rak 47</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>10/5/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Barrett Manufacturing</td>
<td>82A1</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10/6/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>VSKA</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>10/6/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>WASR-10</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>10/6/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Palmetto Arms</td>
<td>PA15</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>10/6/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Springfield Armory</td>
<td>M1A</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>10/6/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>SAR-9</td>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>9mm</td>
<td>10/1/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ruger</td>
<td>Five Seven</td>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>5.7x28mm</td>
<td>10/14/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>Centurion 12 Gauge</td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td></td>
<td>10/16/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>VSKA</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>10/17/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Century Arms</td>
<td>VSKA</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>7.62x39mm</td>
<td>10/17/2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USA v. Joly Germaine, also known as Yonyon, Eliande Tunis, Jocelyn Dor and Walder ST Louis. Indictment. 30 November 2021

According to the indictment, Eliande Tunis was in regular contact with Yonyon who was instructed by Lanmo San Jou regarding the types of firearms that 400 Mawozo needed. The table above includes types of firearms and calibers that are not easily available from the Haitian or Dominican illicit markets, including 12.7x99mm (.50 cal) anti-materiel rifle and the Ruger 5.7x28mm pistol. Furthermore, most firearms purchased were 7.62x39mm, which is far less common in Haiti and the wider US/Caribbean region than 5.56x45mm. Accessories such as red dot sights were also purchased.

\(^{206}\) Most of the information on this case is from: USA v. Eliande Tunis, Jocelyn Dor, and Walder ST Louis. Affidavit in support of an application for an arrest warrant. 31 October 2021; USA v. Joly Germaine, also known as Yonyon, Eliande Tunis, Jocelyn Dor and Walder ST Louis. Indictment. 30 November 2021.

\(^{207}\) Joly Germaine was extradited to the US on 3 May 2022. HNP official Facebook page, 3 May 2022.
Three shipments of weapons and ammunition concealed in barrels, clothing and food products were sent by containers to Haiti on 9, 11 and 19 October 2021. Two shipments arrived a few days before the mass kidnapping by 400 Mawozo of 17 individuals, including 16 United States citizens on 16 October 2022.

**Financing**

This single case indicates that 400 Mawozo is able to mobilize significant amounts of money to acquire firearms and ammunition.

Calculations by the Panel result in a conservative estimate of 28,000 USD paid to retailers for the shopping list of weapons in Table 1. This estimate does not include ammunition transferred to Haiti by the network, as there is no information available about the quantities or calibers of any ammunition purchased.

The indictment includes a count of ‘money laundering’. According to the document, Tunis was the main focal point for receiving money from 400 Mawozo and transferring it to the straw-buyers.

**Table 2: Wire transactions in relation to the case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>ON OR ABOUT</th>
<th>APPROXIMATE AMOUNT</th>
<th>DEFENDANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>September 28, 2021</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>DOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>September 29, 2021</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
<td>DOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>October 4, 2021</td>
<td>$950</td>
<td>TUNIS &amp; DOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>October 4, 2021</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td>TUNIS &amp; DOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>October 5, 2021</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>TUNIS &amp; DOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>October 6, 2021</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
<td>TUNIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>October 6, 2021</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td>TUNIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>October 11, 2021</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
<td>TUNIS &amp; ST. LOUIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Laundering of Monetary Instruments, Aiding and Abetting, Causing an Act to be Done, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(a)(3)(A), 2)*

Source: USA v. Joly Germaine, also known as Yonyon, Eliande Tunis, Jocelyn Dor and Walder ST Louis. Indictment. 30 November 2021

The total amount wired equates to 39,000 USD for firearms, the straw-buyers’ fees, and shipping. However, this does not take into account any other potential methods of payment; for instance, Tunis is also recorded as having deposited a check for 30,000 USD into her account on 4 October 2021.
Annex 33: Diversions within Haiti and weapons and ammunition management capacity

1. Diversion of police weapons and ammunition

In the 11 years between 2012 and 2023, close to 2500 police firearms were declared lost or stolen. This figure stood at 1600 in 2019, indicating that close to a thousand weapons (36%) were diverted over just the past four years. A significant number of police officers have left the HNP and moved abroad recently, many of whom have not returned their service firearms. On 13 March 2023, HNP leadership issued a circular requesting that police officers of all grades leaving the country, as well as those who have resigned from their posts, return any materiel belonging to the State.

During the reporting period, the Panel documented several handguns retrieved from criminals and gang members operating in Port-au-Prince and Port-de-Paix that originated from HNP stockpiles. Diverted police firearms were also used in a range of significant security incidents, including for instance the assassination of President Moise where a handgun and a Galil 5.56 rifle registered at the Presidential Palace were recovered. While the precise chain of custody for this particular rifle is not clear, diversions of Galil rifles from the Presidential Palace have taken place on a significant scale and been used by individuals engaged in the destabilization of the country.

As further evidence of this, with the support of the HNP and the Brazilian authorities, the Panel identified several Taurus 9mm handguns which were recovered from gang members since the adoption of resolution 2653 in the Tabarre area of Port-au-Prince in February 2023, as well as during an attempted kidnapping in Bon Repos in January 2023, and from an illicit gun seller in Port de Paix in December 2022.

2. Weapons and ammunition management

Since its establishment in 1995, the HNP, mostly supported by the UN, has developed a range of processes and mechanisms by which to manage their weapons and ammunition, including with regards to accounting, physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), and disposal. With the departure of MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH, the corresponding reduction in international support has had a severe impact on the sustainability of these efforts. The current security crisis and the continuous state of emergency in which the Police operates further undermine weapons and ammunition management capacity.

Needs expressed by the arms control unit of the HNP currently include the refurbishment of their recordkeeping database, the completion of the process of securing the main police weapons and ammunition bunker, training armors, and fitting out and equipping new police storage facilities at headquarters, as well as the police commissariats across the country. Internal regulations and clear oversight mechanisms and centralization of seizures is also critically needed (see below).

2.1 Legal framework and arms control strategy

The arms control legal framework in Haiti is obsolete with its foundations dating back to 1922, complemented by a series of subsequent decrees, the most important of which was issued on 23 May 1989. For instance, the framework does not reflect Haiti’s international obligations related to the country’s ratification of regional and international instruments, including with regards to marking, tracing, brokering, or the management of seizures. A revision of the legislation was performed by the Haitian authorities with support from UNLIREC and a draft law is currently being finalized.

2023 was marked by the signing by the Government of Haiti of the National Action Plan (NAP) to implement the Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030. However, it remains to be seen whether the conditions in Haiti will allow for an effective implementation of the NAP moving forward.

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209 See HNP Official Facebook Page, 5 April 2023.
2.2 Marking and recordkeeping

Accounting for weapons and ammunition and tracking their movements along the chains of supply and distribution from reception to use and disposal, is a prerequisite for any effective management of materiel, preventing diversions and for strategic procurement planning. This relies on the ability to identify each weapon individually and to record, preserve and update data using a database.

The HNP previously developed a database at headquarter level to support the management of firearms and ammunition. However, this database has been unoperational for several years now, thereby severely complicating the proper management of materiel. BINUH is currently supporting the refurbishment of this crucial tool.

In the previous procurement exercise by the Police in 2012, handguns were actually marked to indicate that they belonged to the Police – an excellent best practice which helps deter diversions from national stockpiles and facilitates tracing. However, the recent batch of handguns acquired is not marked, which is a concern. It is crucial and relatively easy to request manufacturers to mark firearms in any future trade deals.

2.3 Disposal

Disposal of arms and ammunition can be implemented either through a) destruction, b) domestic transfer to another security agency, or c) sale or donation to another State. Destruction is recognized as the best disposal method for contributing to the prevention of violence. In the past, the HNP has conducted a range of destruction activities with the support of international partners. Some firearms are still waiting to be destroyed and the HNP requires support in this regard.

2.4 Civilian licensing

Finally, national legislation allows for the possession of certain types of firearms (mostly handguns and hunting rifles) for civilians and private security companies. Both are very loosely controlled with regulations not being implemented and diversions going unreported. The Police and its national licensing office (SPAF) do not currently have the capacity or mechanisms for proper registration or monitoring of civilian firearm ownership. BINUH is currently supporting the SPAF with the refurbishment of its server. In the absence of any effective formal security provision and an increasing sense of insecurity, weapons ownership is considered by many Haitians as the only way of ensuring their own protection. Illicit trafficking for the civilian market remains significant since the vast majority of firearms registered by the SPAF entered the country illicitly.

2.5 Management of seizures of weapons and ammunition

Police units seize arms and ammunition on a regular basis, either during police operations or following interceptions by Customs.

Table 1: seizures of weapons conducted in Haiti during the reporting period (October 2022 – June 2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Pistols</th>
<th>Revolvers</th>
<th>Rifles</th>
<th>Shotguns</th>
<th>Craft weapons</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2022</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2022</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2022</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2023</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2023</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2023</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2023</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2023</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2023</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HNP/UNPOL 2023
The current lack of any effective process for managing seizures of arms and ammunition in Haiti is of concern. Interviews with multiple senior police officers indicate that several HNP directorates seize and confiscate materiel on a regular basis; however, given the absence of centralization for seized materiel, and the lack of any regulatory framework, procedures and resources, materiel is often left unmonitored which results in diversions. As further evidence of this, the Panel was given access to a range of firearms seized recently by different units of the HNP; however, there was a noticeable absence of ammunition among these seizures.
Annex 34: Map of cumulative drug routes involving Haiti (2020-2022)

Source: UNODC. 2023. Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking
Annex 35: Migration, Deportees/Returnees, Refugees and IDPs

There is no Haitian official data on the exact number of Haitian nationals migrating. However, different organizations and States provide with numbers concerning Haitians in different situations.

IOM

IOM has been collecting data on Haitian migrants repatriated to Haiti. From January 2023 to 15 July 2023, 84,886 persons were repatriated out of which 93.9% from the Dominican Republic.

UNHCR

Haitian refugees and asylum seekers

UNHCR, Refugee Data Finder, 3 June 2023
Data as of December 2022
Dominican Republic

In 2022 the Dominican Republic deported 120,900 foreigners, mostly Haitian nationals.\(^{210}\) From January to July 2023 the Dominican Republic deported 114,128 Haitians.\(^{211}\) Conversely, the Haitian organization Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés (GARR)\(^{212}\) which has presence at different border entries, has published the following data.

![RAPPORT SEMESTRIEL JANVIER - JUIN 2023](image)

Trends of encounters of Haitian nationals by the United States

USA encounter data\(^{213}\) includes U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Title 8 Apprehensions, Office of Field Operations (OFO) Title 8 Inadmissibles, and Title 42 Expulsions for fiscal years (FY) 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. Demographics for USBP and OFO include:

a. Accompanied Minors (AM)
b. Individuals in a Family Unit (FMUA)
c. Single Adults
d. Unaccompanied Children (UC) / Single Minors


\(^{211}\) Confidential source, 2023.


From 1 October 2022 to 18 July 2023 the United States Coast Guard have interdicted or encountered 5,089 Haitian migrants.214

As of April 28, 2023, Haitian migrants interdicted at sea who attempt to migrate into the United States by irregular means, are ineligible for the Haitian parole processes announced in January 2023.\(^{215}\)

**Mexico**

The number of Haitians entering Mexico and requesting refugee recognition has skyrocketed in the last years.\(^{216}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023 (June)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,909</td>
<td>50,942</td>
<td>17,132</td>
<td>29,532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2022, only 19% of Haitians were granted refugee status or complementary protection for humanitarian reasons, leaving the majority of Haitian nationals in Mexico in an irregular situation.

It is interesting to note, however, that over a period of ten years, a total of 109,649 Haitians applied for refugee recognition, but only 18,732 applications received a decision (recognizing the refugee status, given a complementary protection or rejecting the application). Following the submission of their application, most applications do not continue the process. Out of the 18,732 cases only 2,995 were recognized as refugees, and 2,171 were given complementary protection (humanitarian protection). This indicates that overall, merely 15.98% of all Haitian applicants that continue with the process were recognized as refugees.

The lack of a comprehensive system of protection for migrants and refugee seekers in Mexico place them in a high-risk situation due to the control that criminal organizations exercise in several areas of the Mexican territory where kidnappings and killings of migrants have been reported.\(^{217}\)

**Turks and Caicos**

Haitians are the predominant immigrant group in Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI), numbering over 10,000, which represents near a third of TCI's overall population and in the Providenciales Island, Haitians represent 80% of the inhabitants. Half of the Haitians in TCI face poverty or are on the brink of it due to high unemployment, inconsistent jobs, and meager salaries. Their living conditions are dire, with limited access to essential services, continuous deportation fears, and only 20% having permanent residency. A survey by the Institute of Migration revealed that 44% of Haitian participants resided in wooden houses with tin roofs, a mere 18% had access to municipal water, and nearly 10% lived as squatters, always fearing eviction.\(^{218}\)

On 23 July 2023 a vessel with 204 migrants was intercepted heading towards the Providenciales Island. As of that date there have been 23 vessels intercepted\(^{219}\) with over 2600 migrants being detained.\(^{220}\)

**Bahamas**


The Bahamas’ closeness to the US significantly influences irregular migration to the island. In 2022, estimates suggest that 20,000-50,000 undocumented Haitians resided in the Bahamas, making up nearly 12% of the nation’s population. Data on migration indicates that the majority of those entering the Bahamas are children aged 14 or younger, presumably accompanied by family members or parents.221

Annex 36: Shipyards and migrants

On 19 April 2023, the Panel visited several irregular shipyards during its visit to Port-de-Paix.

All photographs taken by the Panel.

Example of shipyard

Finished boat filled with people sailing to unknown destination
IDPs

According to IOM, as of September 2022 there were 24,212 IDP identified and 194,624 by June 2023.

Panel’s own chart based on data from IOM. The dates are the ones reported by IOM on which they collected the information.

Types of IDP sites reported by the IOM


Note: IOM collects information mainly in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince.

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During the reporting period IDPs have extended beyond the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince.


Below is an example of how gang violence results in the displacement of persons. On 7 April 2023, the Canaan gang attacked Onaville in Thomazeau, West department, aiming to control the area, which led to 1,226 IDPs seeking refuge at different sites in Port-au-Prince.

Annex 37: Panel’s visit to Mexico, March 2023

All photographs were taken by the Panel.

Haitian nationals at Tapachula, Chiapas, Mexico, 7 March 2023

Illegal crossing point between Mexico and Guatemala at the Suchiate river, 8 March 2023.
Makeshift Haitian migrants camp, Reynosa, Tamaulipas, 21 March 2023.

“Senda de Vida” Shelter, Reynosa, Tamaulipas, 21 March 2023
Map provided by the National Guard of Mexico in 2023. Translation by the Panel

The Dominican Republic and Haiti share a deeply intertwined past, present and future. The situation of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic is complex and multifaceted. Haitian migrants have long sought better opportunities and an improved life in the Dominican Republic, but their journey is often met with complex challenges.

During the Panel’s visit in March 2023, the authorities mentioned the importance of Haitian migrants for the construction and the agricultural sectors. However, they raise concerns about the high number of Haitians fleeing violence and seeking opportunities in the Dominican Republic. They described the significant impact of this situation, particularly on the public health sector.

Haitian migrants often find themselves in dire socio-economic circumstances. Moreover, they live with persistent uncertainty regarding their legal status and documentation, leaving them vulnerable to deportation.

Deported individuals often arrive in Haiti with no money and no means of survival, representing a challenge for border communities.

All pictures taken by the Panel.

At the border in Elías Piña, Dominican Republic, 12 June 2023
Haitians going through Dominican Republic immigration office in Elias Piña
Dominican Republic, 12 June 2023
Haitian registration facilities for persons deported from the Dominican Republic
Belladere, Haiti, 12 June 2023
Annex 39: Other Human Rights violations

In line with resolution 2653 (2022), the Panel has adopted a comprehensive approach to investigate human rights violations in Haiti.

While gangs are the primary perpetrators of human rights violations, public officials, politicians, and economic figures also contribute by either supporting gangs or weakening state institutions. The Panel is committed to investigating all parties involved.

Haiti is grappling with escalating gang violence in Port au Prince metropolitan area, and the Artibonite department where the strengthening of gangs is of significant concern. Besides the areas specifically covered in the report including SGBV, the recruitment of children, the weaponization of hunger, indiscriminate attacks against the population, obstruction of humanitarian access and assistance, attacks against UN agencies, lynchings and violations by police officers, the Panel is also concerned about the following areas:

a) Violations against journalists and human rights defenders: The Panel notes the increasing attacks on journalists (six kidnapped and three killed so far this year) and human rights advocates. 224

b) Homicides: Intentional homicides surged by 67.6%, with 2,095 cases compared to 1,250 in the latter half of 2022. Of the 2,095 homicides, 89.6% were men (including 43 minors), and 10.4% were women, with 200 adult females and 17 female minors. 225 This equates to an average of 11.6 homicides daily for the first half of 2023, a significant increase from the previous 6.8 daily. 226

c) Human rights conditions of inmates: The Panel visited a prison in Haiti and observed first-hand the challenges faced by inmates. As of June 2023, the Haitian prison system remains in dire condition. It houses 11,836 inmates, comprising 335 women and 266 minors (252 boys and 14 girls), operating at a 332.3% capacity. Out of these, 1,827 inmates (15.4% of the total) have been convicted, including 38 women and 11 minors (10 boys and 1 girl). Meanwhile, 10,009 inmates (84.6%) are awaiting trial, with this group including 252 women and 245 minors (of which 8 are girls). On average, each inmate has a space of 0.3m². 227 While in 2019, there were four prisons certified in accordance to international standards, today there are none. Out of the 28 people who died during the month of July, 10 due to HIV of which 8 in les Cayes prison which has a 777% cell occupation. 228

The Cabaret Women Prison in Titayen (West department) faced significant challenges, especially with six attacks during the first half of 2023. As a result, its entire population of 84 female inmates was relocated to the Centre de Rééducation pour Mineurs en Conflit avec la Loi (CERMICOL) on 20 May 2023. Although CERMICOL has a capacity of 93 beds, by 30 June, it was accommodating 203 inmates, including 89 juvenile boys and 114 women. 229

Furthermore, the Croix des Bouquets Prison in the West Department was assaulted twice by the 400-strong Mawozo Gang, once in April and again in May. 230

Compounding these issues, the penitentiary system is plagued by chronic shortages of food, clean water, and medical supplies, heightening the risk of severe outbreaks. In the first half of 2023 alone, 52 inmates died, with 18 of those deaths attributed to malnutrition. 231

225 UNPOL data, 2023.
228 UNPOL data, 2023.
229 UNPOL data, 2023.
231 UNPOL data, 2023.
Finally, the violence’s accumulative effect in the last years has had a great impact on Haiti’s development. See for example Haiti’s Multidimensional Poverty Index.232

Note: the lower MPI values represent a better performance regarding multidimensional poverty.


Annex 40: Violations of the right to education and children’s rights

In Haiti, children, teachers, and schools have become targets and victims of gang violence, leading to widespread disruptions and infringements on the right to education and children’s rights. During clashes between gangs, innocent students and teachers have become victims of stray bullets. Additionally, there have been kidnappings of parents and students near schools, leading to the closure of numerous educational institutions. This situation places them at greater risk of recruitment by gangs and makes them highly vulnerable to sexual and physical abuse. The Panel had the opportunity to meet with children at an IDP site and talked to their parents, who confirmed their ordeals.

In June 2022, 60% of schools assessed by UNICEF in the areas of Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Ganthier, Port-au-Prince, Pétion-Ville, and Tabarre had been vandalised, destroyed, or occupied by gangs or they have been used as shelters by IDPs, thus impeding the right to education of children and adolescents. Out of 976 schools, 239 suffered significant operational disruptions, with 54 of them being entirely closed down.

On 6 October 2022, large groups of individuals entered UNICEF warehouses located in Les Cayes where they looted inter alia, school materials, for the then upcoming scholar year, for 320,000 children.

In February 2023, UNICEF indicated that between October 2022 and February 2023, the number of targeted schools augmented nine-fold, reaching 72 compared to eight in the same period last year. This surge includes 13 schools targeted by armed groups, one school set ablaze, one student killed, and at least two staff members kidnapped, as reported by UNICEF partners.

Violent incidents so far this year in Cité Soleil and Martissant, as well as Artibonite, have led to forced displacement and school closures, disrupting education for around 54,469 students in the Artibonite department. Additionally, heavy rains caused widespread destruction across Haiti, impacting over 19,000 school-aged children in the West, Nippes, South-East, Grande Anse, and Artibonite departments.

In a 2023 UNICEF evaluation of the Artibonite region covering 1,996 schools, it was found that 259 schools were semi-operational, and 152 were entirely shut down. Additionally, gangs occupied 11 schools, and 97 were used by IDP.

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233 For instance, on May 24, 2023, gunmen from Grand Ravine attacked the area of Carrefour-feuilles. During the attack, a schoolboy lost his life.

234 UN data, meetings with local organizations and international agencies, IDPs and victims, 2023.


239 UN Document in file with the Panel.
The UNICEF-MNFP study found that 239 schools were partially or completely non-operational. Out of these, 76 schools were occupied, hindering their operations. Gangs were using 54 schools as their bases, while 9 schools were used by IDPs and 13 by other people.\textsuperscript{241}

In another area of concern, as of August 2023 there have been close to 300 kidnapped cases of children and women, which is nearly the total number registered for all of 2022, and three times more than 2021.\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{240} UNICEF - Ministère de l’Education Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (MENFP), Résultat de l’Evaluation de l’impact de la violence armée sur les écoles à Port au Prince. In file with the Panel.

\textsuperscript{241} UNICEF - Ministère de l’Education Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (MENFP), Résultat de l’Evaluation de l’impact de la violence armée sur les écoles à Port au Prince. In file with the Panel.

\textsuperscript{242} UNICEF, Kidnappings of children and women spiking at alarming rates in Haiti, 7 August 2023.
Annex 41: Food Insecurity in Haiti

Close to 5 million individuals in Haiti, which is nearly half its population, faced severe acute food insecurity, categorized as Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3 or higher, from March to June 2023. The IPC is used to determine the severity and extent of acute and chronic food insecurity and acute malnutrition situations in countries.

An assessment in March 2023 revealed a slight increase from the 4.7 million projected in September 2022, underscoring the persistent grave food insecurity in Haiti. Of the 4.9 million affected, 1.8 million are in the Emergency phase (IPC Phase 4), an improvement from 1.7 million in the 2022 analysis. Those in the Crisis phase (IPC Phase 3) have also seen a minor increase from 3.04 million to 3.08 million.

Haiti's structural vulnerability is a significant factor, making thousands of households especially susceptible to weather events, price hikes, and crop failures, leading to acute food insecurity.

In addition, due to funding challenges, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been forced to cut the number of people receiving emergency food assistance in Haiti by 25% (1000 individuals) in July 2023 compared to June 2023.

---

243 [Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for March - June 2023 | IPC - Integrated Food Security Phase Classification](ipcinfo.org)

Annex 42: Incidents in the Solino area between 27 February and 3 March 2023

On 27 February 2023, the G9 gangs attacked the Bel-Air neighborhoods, shooting at residences while targeting VARs occupied by les Argentins. The next day, members of 5 Segond headed to Bel-Air in 15 vehicles to support les Argentins and fired in all directions to create panic, which was followed by heavy gunfire between those gangs. In the meantime, in Cité Soleil area, the Brooklyn gang attacked G9 positions in Drouillard and Carrefour Lamort, while they were trying to reach les Argentins to reinforce them. However, they were blocked by Terre Noire, and exchange of fire ensued between them. Taking advantage of the situation, members of the Belekou gang shot at residences in the Brooklyn area.

On 2 March, six G9 gangs (Delmas 6, Wharf Jérémie, Krache Dife, La Saline, Belekou and Tokyo) clashed with les Argentins, supported by 5 Segond in the neighborhoods of Bel-Air, Solino, Delmas, Nazon and Christ Roi. The G9 gangs continued their advance in the Solino district by burning down houses belonging to families close to les Argentins.

Table 1: Civilian and gang members casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victims</th>
<th>Alleged perpetrator</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Five civilians killed in Bel-Air</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>27 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three civilians abducted including a female and her child</td>
<td>Les Argentins</td>
<td>27 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A police officer killed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Les Argentins gang members killed</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>27 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three members killed of the Delmas 6 gang</td>
<td>Les Argentins</td>
<td>27 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve members of the Village de Dieu and Les Argentins wounded</td>
<td>HNP</td>
<td>27 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteen civilians injured</td>
<td>Village de Dieu and Les Argentins</td>
<td>28 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven civilians injured (5 men and 2 women)</td>
<td>Terre Noire</td>
<td>28 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five civilians were injured (2 children, 2 men and a woman)</td>
<td>Gang of Belekou,</td>
<td>28 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three civilians killed (2 men and 1 woman)</td>
<td>Terre Noire</td>
<td>28 February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three civilians killed in Bel-Air</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Brooklyn gang members killed</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Terre Noire gang members killed</td>
<td>Brooklyn gang</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six men civilians killed</td>
<td>Unidentified (stray bullets)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight people (2 children and 6 men) were wounded.</td>
<td>Belekou and Pierre 6 gangs</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three civilians killed</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of 371 temporary shelters for 1,101 IDP’s at the Usine à Glace site, known as “Camp Zamor” located in Delmas 2</td>
<td>Following shootings by Les Argentines</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six civilians killed (two women and four men)</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>2 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two civilians killed in Delmas 24</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>2 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A young woman killed by stray bullets during gang clashes in Solino neighborhood</td>
<td>Unidentified (stray bullets)</td>
<td>2 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three civilians killed in Solino</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>2 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three houses were burnt down in Solino</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>2 March 2023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

245 Confidential source.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Gangs</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ten houses were burnt down in Delmas 24</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>2 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 houses were burnt down in Bel-Air</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>2 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About thousand people were forced to flee their residences due to gang violence</td>
<td>G9 gang and G-Pèp</td>
<td>2-3 March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Village de Dieu gang member killed</td>
<td>G9 gang</td>
<td>3 March 2023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 43: IDP site Delmas 31, Port-au-Prince

There were approximately 1400 persons living on the site. Their living conditions were appalling with very little help from local and international humanitarian organizations.

Most of the IDPs came from Tabarre, Croix des Bouquets, Canaan, Jerusalem, Corail and Seguy areas.

All pictures taken by the Panel on 3 July 2023
Annex 44: Impact of violence on health services

National public and private health sector

About 48% of hospitals in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area are under gang influence or control, leading to forced closures due to attacks on patients, staff, or facilities. Health care professionals explained to the Panel that Haiti is suffering one of its worst health care crises in its history.246 As reported by the Haitian Medical Association, a minimum of 20 doctors were kidnapped in 2022, with an additional 11 doctors in the first quarter of 2023. 247

Due to the activities of the Gran Grif gang, the Albert Schweitzer hospital in Deschapelles, Artibonite, serving over 700,000 people, was forced to close on 15 February 2023. Also in February 2023, the Higgins Brothers Surgicenter for Hope in Fonds Parisien, located in an area controlled by 400 Mawozo reported multiple incidents of surgeons, doctors, and nurses being shot, robbed, and kidnapped while on their way to work in the past two years. 248

From January 2021 to May 2023, the GHESKIO medical centers situated in gang-controlled areas suffered from various violence-related issues. For instance, 38% (221) of their employees had to relocate because of violence. The centers also experienced a loss of skilled workers, with 42% (245) of their employees quitting, including many who emigrated. During this timeframe, 15 staff members were also abducted. 249

Between 18 and 19 June 2023, members of the Canaan gang broke in Dr. Zilda Arns Hospital in Bon Repos. They ransacked the facility and stole vehicles, a generator, solar panels, and various medical supplies and equipment. Additionally, they kidnapped six (6) security personnel present at the location.

International NGOs

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has been forced to suspend its activities several times since the beginning of 2023. In January 2023, gang members forcibly took an individual from a rival group from an MSF hospital in Carrefour, west of the capital, and executed him outside of the facility. On 9 March 2023, MSF closed its hospital in Cité Soleil, except for emergencies, as clashes between rival gangs intensified in the area, making it impossible for them to operate. On 19 April 2023, MSF stopped its operations at this hospital. On 6 July 2023 in Tabarre neighbourhood, Port-au-Prince, around 20 armed men entered the MSF hospital, forcibly removing a patient being treated for gunshot wounds from the operating room. 250

Attacks against health facilities and personnel constitute not only a violation against humanitarians but also an infringement to the right to life, health and well-being of persons that require those services.

246 Meetings and exchanges with health care specialists 23, 24 June and 7 July 2023.
250 Gheisko, Report on the impact of Violence on the provision of healthcare at GHESKIO Centers, June 2023. In file with the Panel.

Some of the most important health care providers in Haiti joined their voices in a statement calling for the cessation of armed incursions in medical facilities.
STOP aux intrusions armées au sein des Institutions Médicales en Haïti !

Les Institutions Médicales telles que, l’Association Médicale Haïtienne, l’Association des Hôpitaux Privés d’Haïti ; l’Hôpital Adventiste de Diquini ; Les Centres Gheskio ; Médecins Sans Frontières et les Hôpitaux Saint Luc et Saint Damien, signataires de cette prise de position lancent un appel « Stop aux intrusions armées au sein des institutions médicales en Haïti ! ». Elles expriment leur inquiétude face à l’insécurité et exigent LE RESPECT des porteurs d’armes envers toutes les institutions médicales, les ambulances et le personnel de santé.

Dans les conditions actuelles du secteur médical qui sont particulièrement difficiles, il est essentiel d’avoir un minimum de sécurité pour pouvoir soigner les patients qui se présentent.

Le 6 juillet, l’hôpital de Tabarre géré par Médecins Sans Frontières a subi une intrusion violente de vingt hommes armés pour en extraire un patient. Le 25 juin dernier, l’Hôpital Dr Zilda ARNES, Hôpital Communautaire à Bon Repos a été entièrement pillé et du personnel kidnappé par des hommes armés.

Ces deux cas ne sont que des illustrations de la gravité de la situation et les derniers en date d’une longue série durant ces deux dernières années.

Nombreux hôpitaux ont été attaqués ou empêchés de fonctionner à cause de l’insécurité. C’est inadmissible dans un pays comme Haïti où l’accès aux soins est déjà très limité.

Les signataires exigent de la part de tous les porteurs d’armes, quels qu’ils soient, le respect de la neutralité et de l’inviolabilité des institutions médicales en Haïti.

Port au Prince, le 11/08/2023 :

Signataires :

Association Médicale Haïtienne

Association des hôpitaux privés d’Haïti

Hôpital Adventiste de Diquini

Les Centres Gheskio
Annexe : Quelques exemples récents et connus des incidents (liste non exhaustive)

- Le jeudi 27 juillet, le directeur de l’épidémiologie des laboratoires et de la recherche a été enlevé au niveau de Delmas 31.
- Le samedi 22 juillet 2023, le directeur de la direction de la santé de la famille a été enlevé au niveau de Tabarre.
- Dans la nuit du 6 au 7 juillet 2023, une vingtaine d’hommes armés se sont introduits à l’hôpital Traumatologie de MSF à Tabarre pour sortir un patient blessé par balle alors qu’il était encore au bloc.
- Le 19 juin 2023, l’hôpital communautaire de Bon repos, Zilda Arns a été attaqué par des individus armés qui ont tout pillé et même kidnappé 6 agents de sécurité.
- Le 14 février 2023, deux cadres de Gheskio ont été enlevés alors qu’ils quittaient leur lieu de travail tandis que quelques jours auparavant, un autre médecin de la même institution avait été enlevé.
- Le 3 juillet 2022, un médecin a été enlevé alors qu’il quittait son service au niveau de l’hôpital St Luc à Tabarre.
- Le 17 mai 2022, le directeur médical de l’Hôpital Universitaire d’Etat d’Haiti a été enlevé par des hommes armés dans les parages de l’hôpital.
- Juin 2021, MSF a été contraint de quitter le centre d’urgence de Martissant à la suite des violents affrontements entre groupes armés de la zone mettant en danger ses personnels et les patients.
One of the most important Health Centers in Haiti are the Gheisko Centers.

The following charts were prepared by Gheisko. \(^{251}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. # of GHESKIO employees including CHWs *</th>
<th>TOTAL Average number from 2021-2023: 585</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023 (as of 5/2023)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>512</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>683</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) # Kidnapped with dates

- 15/585=2.6%
- 1 (12/4/21)
- 11
  - 5 (8/2/22)
  - 6 (8/15/22)
- 3
  - 1 (2/9/23)
  - 2 (2/14/23)

5 episodes of kidnapping of a total of 15 employees. All were released without ransom.

2) # Aggressed on the way to and back from work

- 363/585=62%
- 38
- 79
- 246

All experienced directly/indirectly the impact of insecurity

3) Number forced to abandon their Home

- 221/585=38%
- 11
- 24
- 186

Staff were aggressed mostly in 2023.

4) Number who resigned

- 245/585=42%
- 84
- 113
- 48

The % of resignation increased with US humanitarian parole program

II. # of raped victims in time

- 360
- 130
- 147
- 83

Increased % of sexual assaults with armed aggressor(s).

III. # of patients unable to come to receive healthcare

- 27,611 patients unable to attend both centers in the past 2 years (2021 and 2022)
- 6,096 patients unable to receive care at both centers compared to 2020
- 21,515 patients unable to receive care at both centers compared to 2020
- 13,947 patients unable to receive care at both centers compared to 2020

Increased number of patients unable to come to GHESKIO centers. Contingency plan activated: we had to set up 10 Comprehensive Community Centers to ensure continuity of services.

IV. # of children unable to

- Average number from 2021 to 2023
- 15/310 (5%)
- 28/351 (8%)
- 301/351 (86%)

86% unable to come to GHESKIO school in 2023;

---

\(^{251}\) See Report on the impact of violence on the provision of healthcare at GHESKIO Centers, June 2023. In file with the Panel.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attendance of Children with Malnutrition</th>
<th>Change in Attendence</th>
<th>Change in Enrollment</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V. Children</td>
<td>115/337 (34%)</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>1547</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increased cases of acute malnutrition in 2022; less cases in 2023 because of insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Decrease in patients</td>
<td>2,949 patients-visit missed at both centers in the past two years (2021 and 2022)</td>
<td>14,079 patients-visit missed compared to 2020</td>
<td>34,204 patients-visit missed compared to 2020</td>
<td>Decreased number of patients due to insecurity. We had to set up elsewhere 10 community Centers to offer continuity of care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decreased number of patients due to insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Training courses</td>
<td>10/30 (30%) training sessions postponed over the past three (3) Years</td>
<td>1/10 (10%) session postponed</td>
<td>2/10 (20%) training sessions postponed</td>
<td>7/10 (70%) training sessions postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Disturbance in the provision of equipment and supply</td>
<td>International technicians unable to come to recertify our labs since 2021</td>
<td>International technicians unable to come to repair our Hematology machine since 2022</td>
<td>International technicians unable to come to replace the Chiller (the main part) of the BSL3 Lab system since 12/2021</td>
<td>Operations at the GHESKIO lab affected due to disturbance in equipment and lab supplies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Decreased Number of patients visiting GHESKIO Centers**

*January 2018 to May 2023*
Number of Sexual Violence at GHESKIO

N=5,872

Figure 2: Victime de violence sexuelle par tranche d'âge, Les Centres GHESKIO, N= 5872

Source: Clinique violence sexuelle, GHESKIO
Number of raped Victims Received at GHESKIO
Increased proportion of raped victims by armed aggressors during sexual assault
2002 – May 2023
N = 5872
Annex 45: Disbursement of Petrocaribe funds

Table showing how Petrocaribe funds were allocated per the 11 administrative departments of Haiti, with the bulk of the projects being in Port-au-Prince

Une plus grande diversification :

Comme constaté, il y a une plus grande diversification des projets sous l’air Martelly-Lamothe. Tous les secteurs de la vie nationale sont donc touchés. Les infrastructures routières qui représentaient 65% des projets du gouvernement Bellerive, tombent à 31%. Cette forte baisse est constatée au profit de la gestion publique (11.9%), la rénovation urbaine (10.8%) et le social (9.4%).

RÉpartition des projets par zone géographique :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>PROJETS</th>
<th>REVISES</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29 768 200.85</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23 746 554.97</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Anse</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17 765 019.51</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>243 399 944.73</td>
<td>36.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nippes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16 311 036.69</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29 134 698.47</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord est</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 879 410.23</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord Ouest</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8 025 752.61</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>217 142 872.26</td>
<td>32.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45 524 339.25</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud Est</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35 117 912.87</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>149</strong></td>
<td><strong>668 815 742.44</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tous les départements sont représentés. Cependant la plus grande partie est toujours attribuée au département de l’Ouest, avec une enveloppe de 217.1 millions de dollars (32.5%), suivi des projets nationaux (36.4%).
Table showing the breakdown of the budget allocation per sector. As noted, it was during Martelly-Lamothe’s government that the real work of reconstructing Haiti started, with the release of Petrocaribe funds following the earthquake of 2010, Hurricane Sandy and a cholera outbreak.

Le gouvernement Lamothe fait également le suivi des contrats signés par le gouvernement Préval-Bellerive.

De plus, le gouvernement Martelly-Lamothe fait le suivi de nombreux contrats hérités de l'Administration Préval-Bellerive.

Il faut cependant noter que c'est durant son administration que les travaux liés à la reconstruction ont réellement commencé.

Décaissement

Le taux de décaissement des projets de ces six résolutions est de 100%.

Analyse des résolutions :

Répartition des projets par secteur d’activité :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTEURS</th>
<th>Nbre de projets</th>
<th>Montants</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricole</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24 399 660.33</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>485 440.98</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eau &amp; Assainissement</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10 942 635.31</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Économie</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23 924 697.57</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edifice Public</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42 004 179.60</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Éducation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6 636 817.28</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Énergie</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18 730 000.00</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environnement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 901 846.49</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gestion publique</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>79 873 946.91</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38 801 928.58</td>
<td>5.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infraérie</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12 231 690.60</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructures routières</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>209 267 272.00</td>
<td>31.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 342 314.13</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 000 000.00</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renovation urbaine</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72 030 670.03</td>
<td>10.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santé</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32 141 346.07</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sécurité</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14 590 111.13</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62 727 907.84</td>
<td>9.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9 260 055.43</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourisme</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 523 222.20</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>149</strong></td>
<td><strong>668 815 742.44</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 41: Lamothe and Martelly business relations

The Panel established that the two have a long business relationship going back to 2004. A company registration certificate obtained by the Panel depicts the two as joint officers and directors of a company known as MIABEACH HOLDING COMPANY. Lamothe and Martelly are registered as part of the directors. The Panel is aware of at least six other companies in which Martelly, and Lamothe are partners.
Annex 47: Diversion of funds by Patrick Noramé

Anti-corruption investigations found that in less than one month after he was appointed to head BMPAD, his bank accounts deposits increased gradually. This was so, regardless of the reality that Noramé’s legitimate monthly salary since April 2016 was 920,650 HTG. Within a span of 13 months after becoming BMPAD head, his account had accumulated $63,000 USD, and another account had 13,85,728 HTG that Noramé could not account for. In addition, was the loss of about 350,000 gallons of fuel valued at about $300,000 USD. There were also several tender irregularities that were established.

At the conclusion of the work of the Government’s anti-corruption commission of inquiry, it was found among other things that Patrick Noramé was answerable for:

- Diversion of four hundred and five (405) bags were subtracted for a total amount of 405,000.00 HTG.
- The loss by Haitian State of a total amount of 124,355,146.00 HTG on the sale of Japanese rice.
- An amount of 850,000.00 HTG he embezzled directly as part of the sale of rice with the complicity of the former head of public procurement at BMPAD.

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