La Guajira, the oft-forgotten, arid northeast corner of Colombia is one of Colombia’s most contentious and provides a window into the complexity of the current battles underway between organized criminal groups the Andean nation. Murder rates in major cities topped the national average this year. The trend appears to be upward as several armed groups vie for control. The dynamics of the conflict in La Guajira derive principally from its position as a departure point for drug shipments, entry point for smuggling and a transit zone towards Venezuela. The secondary attraction for criminal elements is the royalties paid from the coal companies, local government budgets, and the potential for extortion.
During the period of paramilitary domination of the Caribbean Coast, criminal activity was controlled to a large extent by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), which achieved a hegemony over a large illegal portfolio, involving the export of drugs, the import of contraband gasoline from Venezuela, extortion and the routine sacking of municipal, departmental and even health service funds, thanks to their influence in the political sphere. This criminal booty was divided up mainly between Hernán Giraldo and Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, alias ‘Jorge 40,’ of the AUC’s Northern Bloc.
What has happened since the demobilization of the AUC in 2006 has been a fragmentation of the criminal structures set up by the AUC, resulting in a low-level conflict between smaller criminal bands to obtain part of the illicit booty that the paramilitaries controlled. In short, a situation of disorganized crime. This fragmentation has created two criminal classes. The more primitive one, made up of street gangs and groups based around demobilized paramilitaries, control local crime and make money from micro-extortion (local shops and residences, some companies), micro-trafficking (local distribution of drugs), loan sharking and carrying out tasks for the second criminal class, the more sophisticated drug trafficking groups called by the government the Bandas Criminales Emergentes (Emerging Criminal Groups – BACRIMS).
The disintegration of the paramilitary structure was not immediate and what emerged formed the nuclei of today’s BACRIMS. Firstly the ‘Twins'(Víctor and Miguel Ángel Mejía Múnera) set up the Nevados, based principally around the Sierra Nevada and Santa Marta, taking over a big chunk of the paramilitary structure dedicated to drug trafficking. Then Arnulfo Sánchez González, alias ‘Pablo,’ set up what is now called the BACRIM of Alta Guajira by the police. From 2008 Daniel Rendón Herrera, alias ‘Don Mario¸’ with his group the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, moved into the zone. After his capture in April 2009 his successors, the Usuga brothers, Juan and Darío, lead the group the police now call the Urabeños. Also eying the criminal prize that is La Guajira are the Paisas, a faction of the Oficina de Envigado, lead by Maximiliano Bonilla, alias ‘Valenciano,’ and the Rastrojos of Luis Enrique Calle Serna, alias ‘ Comba.’There was even an isolated but reliable report that the the Popular Revolutionary Anti-terrorist Army of Colombia (Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista Colombiano – ERPAC), of Pedro Guerrero alias ‘Cuchillo,’had sent a commission to our strategic area, looking at the possibility of diversifying away from their traditional drug smuggling routes across the eastern plains and into Venezuela.
So far none of these BACRIMS have sought to rebuild the paramilitary structure, nor develop the same political façade as the AUC. Their primary concern is the smuggling of cocaine and this is handled by 5 small cells of criminals, without the sort of armed wing or military training of their paramilitary predecessors. Instead, they contract the second tier of criminal groups to carry out a variety of tasks for them: intelligence, assassinations and transport duties. Often this lower tier of criminal groups is paid in coca base or cocaine. This is saturating the local market and feeding a spike in consumption along with the petty crime and violence associated with local drug distribution and addiction.
The other major players on the illegal stage are the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and their smaller cousins of the National Liberation Army (ELN). Both groups have traditionally had presence in La Guajira, mainly in the Sierra Nevada, but saw their strongholds attacked by both the security forces and the paramilitary AUC. The offensives by both armies, legal and illegal, had remarkable success, so much so that few armed and uniformed guerrillas operate in the department today, although both groups still have militia networks and collaborators.
Whereas in other parts of the country the guerrillas have been able to recover some lost ground and occupy space left by the demobilized AUC, the political and criminal conditions in La Guajira are such that neither the FARC nor the ELN have managed to regain a significant foothold. The FARC, in this area the Caribbean Bloc, are extremely keen to reoccupy territory, to secure the movement corridors through the Sierra Nevada and then onto the Montes de María, but have been unable to do so. The Caribbean Bloc is also starved of funds (at least from within Colombia), but does not have the projection to engage in widespread extortion, nor the ability to carry out high level kidnapping operations, instead relying on common criminals to sell them victims in many cases.
The presence of indigenous people and extensive reservations in La Guajira are a complicating factor in terms of the dynamics of the conflict. The scarce resources of the upper half of La Guajira, the lack of productive agricultural land and the historic predominance of smuggling, make the Wayuu vulnerable to the influence of criminal gangs. Their federal structure based around family units, the lack of central authority and decade-old family rivalries complicate the response of the community to criminal infiltration and allow gangs to exploit divisions within the Wayuu.
The army, with the reduction in guerrilla activity and the fluctuations in bilateral relations with Venezuela, has switched its attention to frontier security as its primary mission. Venezuela has also become a sanctuary for the both the FARC and ELN. The Caribbean Bloc, under the command of Luciano Marín Arango, alias ‘Ivan Marquez,’ is based in the Serranía del Perijá that forms the frontier between Colombia and Venezuela. The responsibility for the fight against the BACRIMS has correctly been given to the National Police, as the battle is not so much against armed structures, but mafia networks.
Notes
This report is based two weeks of field research in La Guajira in which two InSight investigators spoke to Colombia security officials, local political authorities and members of the civil society.
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