Medellinās former crime boss āValencianoā is set to be extradited to the U.S., while his former allies the UrabeƱos appear set on continuing his bloody war for control of the city.
Maximiliano Bonilla Orozco, alias āValenciano,ā has known little else besides a life of crime. After his father was killed at age 13, he was supposedly taken in by Diego Murillo, alias āDon Berna,ā the successor of Medellin drug lord Pablo Escobar. Bonilla trained in one of the cityās famous āoficinas,ā or assassinās networks, and later inherited Murilloās criminal empire.
Bonillaās arrest in Venezuela last weekĀ·appears to be the end of his rule in Medellin. The city is a valuable prize for the Colombian underworld thanks to its gambling, prostitution and opportunities for extortion. Medellin also offers strategic links to the Caribbean coast from Colombiaās interior, making it a convenient rendezvous point for arms and drug smugglers.
But Bonillaās influence in the city has been on the wane since at least 2010. After the U.S. issued an extradition order for Bonilla in April, he was forced to adopt a lower profile. Near the end of that year, he agreed to allow another criminal gang, the UrabeƱos, to establish cells in Medellin neighborhoods like Comuna 13, the cityās most violent barrio. The UrabeƱos are based along Colombiaās Caribbean coast, and needed Bonillaās collaboration in order to enter Medellin, a city with an intricate history of gang rivalries which does not easily welcome outsiders.
The risk now is that the UrabeƱos will try to step in and take over Bonillaās faction of the Medellin mafia, known as the Oficina de Envigado. Parts of this faction may not be so willing to adapt to new leadership, however, which could cause a new spike in Medellin violence.
Bonilla was hardly in a position to say no to the UrabeƱosā demands to establish a foothold in the city. Bonilla was fighting another former hitman, Erick Vargas, alias āSebastian,ā for control of Medellin territory. Vargas had more street gangs, or ācombos,ā on his payroll, but Bonilla had the advantage of controlling international drug trafficking routes from the Caribbean coast.
Bonilla had the contacts and the cash that comes from networking with other global criminal gangs, like Mexicoās Zetas. But Vargas had on-the-ground presence in Medellin. While Bonilla traveled to Costa Rica, reportedly for gastric bypass surgery, or managed his drug-running operations from coastal cities like Barranquilla, Vargas made a point of personally overseeing Medellinās gang wars.
This gave him home turf advantage against the UrabeƱos. But the UrabeƱos are made up of former paramilitaries or military and police officials. They are better trained and armed, and run a tightly disciplined organization, compared to the shifting network of small-time street gangs allied to Vargas.
According to Medellinās Omsbudsmanās Office, out of the nearly 9,000 youths thought to form part of street gangs, some 7,000 are in ācombosā loyal to Vargas. This is by no means a set number. The UrabeƱos will probably have no problem in buying the loyalty of stalwart Bonilla allies like the Mondongueros street gang, as well as other bands of drug dealers and assassins-for-hire in Medellinās barrios.
The leader of the Mondongueros, Carlos Esneider Quintero, alias āGomelo,ā is pegged as Bonillaās official successor. Esneider heads one of Medellinās oldest street gangs, formed in 1990 in the northwestern Castilla neighborhood. The Mondongueros have traditionally concentrated on fighting for neighboring Bello, a city that forms part of Medellinās metropolitan area. They may not take well to the UrabeƱosā presence in Medellin.
But the UrabeƱos might have an easier time trying to make good with Bonillaās former network rather than with Vargas. Unlike Bonilla, who tried twice to negotiate his surrender with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Vargas has shown little willingness to negotiate with anyone. In choosing to start a war with Bonillaās faction of the Oficina de Envigado back in 2008, Vargas proved he was unwilling to accept anyone as the leader of Medellinās underworld other than himself.
Unless Vargas begins feeling more pressure from international law enforcement agencies, making it too difficult for him to stay in Medellin ā as happened to Bonilla ā he is unlikely to show humility towards the UrabeƱos. In any case, it is likely Medellin can look ahead to another year of escalating homicides.




