Venezuela’s Airstrike on the ELN Tests 2 Decades of Chavista Tolerance

Facing mounting pressure from the United States, the government of Delcy Rodríguez bombed a camp belonging to the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), which has used Venezuelan territory as a criminal sanctuary for years. This is the Venezuelan government’s first major attack against the ELN and marks a rupture in the longstanding relationship between Chavista administrations and Colombian insurgent groups.

The camp in Buena Vista del Meta, in Apure state near the Colombian border, was struck by drones on October 30. According to the New York Times, the operation was carried out with US assistance.

At least 19 people, including Venezuelans, Colombians, and Mexicans, were killed at the camp, which appeared to house a drug processing laboratory, according to photographs and videos shared on social media.

So far, the Venezuelan government hasn’t issued a statement about the attack. Minister of the Interior, Justice, and Peace Diosdado Cabello said on November 2 that authorities were taking precautions in response to recent episodes of violence in Colombia.

The United States has also remained silent on the strike, but Secretary of State Marco Rubio said during a visit to Colombia in September that Washington had discussed possible operations against the ELN in Venezuela with the Rodríguez administration.

“Imagine a criminal gang operating from territory across the border, entering your country, committing crimes, murders, and attacks, and then returning to hide in another country. That is not sustainable. We have to address this situation,” Rubio told reporters after meeting with Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella.

A Break With the Past?

The Venezuelan government’s close ties with Colombian guerrilla groups date back to the presidency of Hugo Chávez in the 2000s, when he opened the country’s doors to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), the country’s largest guerrilla army until the signing of the 2016 peace agreement.

The ELN quickly filled the criminal vacuum left by the FARC and has steadily gained control over much of the porous 2,219-kilometer border between Venezuela and Colombia. The group also expanded into several states deep inside Venezuela, reaching as far as the country’s eastern border with Guyana.

SEE ALSO: Colombian-Venezuelan Guerrillas: How Colombia’s War Migrated to Venezuela

This expansion was facilitated by alliances with numerous Venezuelan officials and military personnel, allowing the ELN to establish systems of criminal governance and recruit thousands of Venezuelans into its ranks. These alliances also enabled the group to control key cocaine trafficking and illegal mining areas, criminal economies from which both the government and the ELN have profited for years.

In Apure state, the ELN established one of its main operational hubs. The state borders the Colombian department of Arauca, a historic stronghold of the guerrilla group. From the plains of Apure, the ELN has consolidated cocaine processing and trafficking operations supplying multiple countries.

But the protection the group has long enjoyed was thrown into question following the capture of then-President Nicolás Maduro by US forces in January and the political shift under Rodríguez, who became interim president amid pressure from Washington.

How Difficult Would It Be to Defeat the ELN in Venezuela?

The attack in Venezuela comes as the group faces growing military pressure in Colombia. And if its strategic position along the border may be under threat for the first time, the ELN is unlikely to surrender its territorial control without a fight.

Although the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana – FANB) reported seizing some ELN armbands and the destruction of alleged clandestine camps during Maduro’s final years in power, they never carried out a decisive operation against the group.

Throughout this year, security forces have largely stayed out of territorial disputes between the ELN and FARC dissident groups over mining areas in southern Venezuela, intervening only with limited military deployments aimed at preventing further outbreaks of violence.

SEE ALSO: Camaraderie and Drug Trafficking: Colombian Guerrillas in Venezuela

In fact, Venezuelan security forces would be at a disadvantage in a sustained confrontation with the ELN. Under Chavismo, they have lost professional capabilities and tactical training, while corruption has spread throughout their ranks. ELN fighters,on the other hand, are well-trained and disciplined. This allowed them to successfully confront the FARC dissidents’ 10th Front in 2021, something the Venezuelan army had failed to accomplish.

Delcy Rodríguez and Support From the United States and Colombia

Against this backdrop, Washington’s role, both in influencing Venezuela’s security decisions and through its new alliance with Colombia, could prove decisive in operations against the guerrilla group in both countries.

In Colombia, De la Espriella has pursued a hard-line campaign against insurgent groups and become one of the United States’ main allies in the fight against organized crime in the region. He has even offered Colombia as an operational base for the Shield of the Americas.

One of the president’s first security operations was an airstrike against the ELN in the border region of Catatumbo, where the group has been fighting for control of the coca-growing region with the FARC dissidents’ 33rd Front since 2025. The situation has deteriorated following attacks in the department of Norte de Santander in late October, prompting a partial militarization of the border.

SEE ALSO: Cocaine, the Cartel of the Suns, and Venezuela Without Maduro

The ELN was among the first Latin American criminal groups to be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States, receiving the designation in 1997. With Washington now influencing security operations in both countries, the prospects of a coordinated campaign that could weaken the criminal group have increased.

However, US cooperation with Venezuelan security forces has remained limited throughout the year. The main joint operation was a June attack that killed Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero,” the leader of Tren de Aragua. Although the United States hailed the operation as a victory, it did not extend to other criminal groups involved in illegal mining in Bolívar state, despite Washington’s interests in gold production in the region.

What happens next will depend on whether US political pressure translates into the deployment of Venezuelan security forces on the ground.