Tren de Aragua

Tren de Aragua is Venezuela’s most powerful homegrown criminal group and the only Venezuelan gang that has successfully projected its power abroad. It has grown from its origins as a prison gang into a transnational threat with a wide criminal portfolio. But it is a dispersed organization with increasingly loose ties to its original namesake and leadership.

This transnational expansion came on the backs of Venezuelan migrants fleeing the country. From Tocorón prison in Aragua, the gang oversaw and profited from cells established in at least three other South American countries. However, in September 2023, 11,000 Venezuelan police and military personnel, backed by armored vehicles, stormed Tocorón to seemingly take control of what had been Tren de Aragua’s center of operations. Despite losing Tocorón, the gang’s leadership escaped, and its transnational cells continue to operate, albeit without coordinating with any central leadership.

Nonetheless, Tren de Aragua’s expansion to Colombia, Peru, and Chile has, in certain cases, upended local criminal landscapes and attracted significant attention from the authorities within these countries and across the region. In the United States, the gang has come under scrutiny amid President Donald Trump’s hardline anti-immigration policies. There are a number of myths about the Tren de Aragua gang, such as that its members use tattoos, which have proliferated. There is no solid evidence pointing to a structured expansion of the group in the country.

The Story Behind Tren de Aragua

Tren de Aragua was born in the Tocorón prison in the state of Aragua. The group’s name, which roughly translates to the Aragua Train, may have originated from a labor union working on a railway project through the state, which was never finished.

Héctor Rustherford Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero,” turned Tren de Aragua into what it is today during his imprisonment in Tocorón.

Under Niño Guerrero’s leadership, Tocorón became one of the country’s most notorious prisons, in large part due to the Venezuelan government’s unofficial policy of handing control of some prisons, including Tocorón, over to crime bosses known as pranes. This freedom and the gang’s criminal income allowed for the construction of a zoo, swimming pool, playground, restaurant, and nightclub within the prison.

With the gang’s control firmly cemented within the prison, Tren de Aragua began expanding its influence. It started with the nearby San Vicente neighborhood, where it established strict social control and even received resources and support from the government via its charitable wing known as “Fundación Somos El Barrio JK.”

Some criminal gangs already operating in Aragua established non-aggression pacts with the gang, among them Tren del Llano. However, after Tren del Llano’s leader was killed in 2016, Tren de Aragua took over its territories in Aragua and part of Guárico state, according to police sources who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of their safety.

In the years that followed, the gang expanded its network to other states in Venezuela through alliances with smaller gangs, eventually building a presence in at least five other states. During this process, it expanded its criminal portfolio in Venezuela to include extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking for sexual exploitation, migrant smuggling, contraband, illegal mining, retail drug trafficking, cybercrime, and theft.

Tren de Aragua’s expansion turned transnational around 2018, when the gang attempted to establish itself on the Venezuela-Colombia border between the Venezuelan state of Táchira and the Colombian department of Norte de Santander. There, it clashed with major Colombian criminal groups, including the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the Gaitanistas (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC). The groups fought for control of clandestine border crossings, known as trochas, which are home to a variety of criminal economies, including the smuggling of drugs, contraband, and migrants.

Tren de Aragua carved out a niche for itself in the Colombian border town of La Parada, where many Venezuelan migrants fleeing their country first arrive in Colombia. At this point, the Venezuelan exodus was in full swing, and Tren de Aragua saw an opportunity in the desperation of its compatriots. While larger Colombian groups focused on drug trafficking, Tren de Aragua began to exploit Venezuelan migrants systematically, charging them extortion fees, smuggling them into and throughout Colombia, and taking control of various nodes of the human trafficking for sexual exploitation market.

Between 2018 and 2023, Tren de Aragua built a transnational criminal network, setting up cells in Colombia, Peru, and Chile, with further reports of a sporadic presence in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil.

The group expanded following Venezuelan migration flows, initially staying under the radar by only targeting Venezuelan migrants as it increased its presence in border crossings and urban areas where Venezuelan migrants congregate.

As cells became more established, they moved into local criminal economies, employing eye-catching, targeted violence to force out local gangs and establish themselves as a serious threat. In addition to extortion and migrant smuggling, Tren de Aragua cells abroad control loan sharking (also referred to as gota a gota, or “drop by drop”), retail drug trafficking, kidnapping, small-scale international drug trafficking, human trafficking, and robberies. Each cell specializes in different activities, based on local conditions.

However, as the gang’s use of violence abroad has rung regional alarm bells, authorities across South America now have Tren de Aragua firmly in their crosshairs. Venezuela’s government finally retook control of Tocorón in September 2023, depriving the gang of its historic stronghold, while security forces in Chile, Peru, and Colombia have carried out “mega-operations” targeting the gang since 2022.

After taking office in early 2025, President Donald Trump and his administration launched a security campaign in which the Tren de Aragua played a central role. In February 2025, Trump designated several criminal groups—including the Tren de Aragua—as “foreign terrorist organizations.” A month later, the White House invoked the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, claiming the Tren de Aragua had “invaded” the United States under the direction of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro. Under the law, the United States has deported hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to El Salvador, claiming they have alleged ties to the criminal group—often without presenting concrete evidence.

The organization suffered its most severe blow since the loss of Tocorón when Niño Guerrero was killed in a joint operation between the United States and Venezuela in Bolívar state in June 2026.

Who Leads Tren de Aragua?

With the killing of Guerrero Flores in June 2026, the leadership is in question. Among those in contention is Yohan José Romero, alias “Johan Petrica.” Petrica has been accused of leading a powerful illegal gold mining gang in Las Claritas, in the south of Bolívar state, known as the Las Claritas Sindicato, the place where Guerrero was killed.

In addition to Petricia, the US State Department offered a $3 million reward for information regarding Giovanny San Vicente, alias “Giovanny” or “El Viejo,” in July 2024, and named him as one of the group’s three leaders.

There is also Larry Amaury Álvarez, alias “Larry Changa.” Álvarez escaped Tocorón in 2015 and migrated to Chile in 2018, where he led the expansion of the Tren de Aragua’s faction there. In 2022, as the Chilean police began to investigate him, he fled to Colombia, from where he continued leading the faction’s operations in Chile and planned the group’s expansion in Colombia. Álvarez was arrested in July 2024 in the Colombian department of Quindío. Two years later, Colombian President Gustavo Petro approved his extradition to Chile.

Reports from security forces in Peru, Chile, and Colombia suggest that despite the geographic spread of the gang, it originally maintained a hierarchical structure. Judicial documents show how several Tren de Aragua lieutenants were dispatched to cells across the region, some of whom even appeared to rotate between cells in multiple countries. However, it is unclear how much coordination there is between the organization’s international factions since the takeover of Tocorón and the death of Niño Guerrero.

Where Does Tren de Aragua Have a Presence?

Tren de Aragua’s operational hub was based in Tocorón prison in Aragua state, where remnants of the group remain, albeit weakened. The gang had expanded into several Venezuelan states, especially Carabobo, Sucre, Guárico, and Lara, but lost strength after the fall of Tocorón. It maintained operations in Bolívar state through Yohan José Romero, alias “Johan Petrica,” and the Sindicato de Las Claritas, but it is unclear if he will be able to maintain control as he faces increasing pressure from Venezuelan and US authorities.

Outside Venezuela, the Tren de Aragua has established permanent cells in Colombia, Peru, and Chile, with reports of activity in Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

These activities are often concentrated in border areas with clandestine border crossings regularly used by Venezuelan migrants, such as the Venezuela-Colombia border between Táchira and Norte de Santander, the Peru-Chile border, and the Bolivia-Chile border. The gang has also established cells in urban zones with large Venezuelan migrant populations, including Bogotá, Colombia; Lima, Peru; and Santiago, Chile.

Who Are Tren de Aragua’s Allies and Enemies?

Tren de Aragua has maintained numerous links with organized crime and prison-based groups, both in Venezuela and in other countries, with which it has established non-aggression pacts and even alliances to share criminal income. One such prison gang was located in the Trujillo Judicial Confinement Center, dominated by Álvaro Enrique Montilla Briceño, alias “El Loro.” This prison was taken over by security forces just over a month after officials stormed Tocorón.

In addition, Tren de Aragua allegedly recruited and financed a small criminal gang in Lara state, called the “El Santanita” gang, to commit kidnappings and extortion.

A 2021 report from Brazil stated that Tren de Aragua members had been jailed in the northern state of Roraima, near Venezuela, and were working with Brazil’s largest criminal group, the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC). These claims were repeated by a 2022 academic investigation, although the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear.

Tren de Aragua has clashed with multiple groups, including the ELN, for control of border crossings between Venezuela and Colombia.  Local officials and security forces across the region have highlighted the gang’s willingness to use targeted violence to force out local gangs.

The gang’s relationship with Venezuelan security forces and government officials has been complex. On the one hand, multiple sources interviewed by InSight Crime have pointed out that the group has corrupted local and regional officials. Its growth was also driven by the state’s unofficial devolution of power to the pranes and the impunity it enjoyed within Tocorón. Even following the government invasion of Tocorón, its relationship with officials remains murky. It lost its stronghold but appears to have received advanced warning, and no high-ranking gang members were captured.

The Donald Trump administration’s move to arrest Nicolás Maduro may have changed that equation, and the killing of Guerrero is the clearest illustration of the threat this poses to the gang.

What Does the Future Look Like for Tren de Aragua?

The Tren de Aragua was the first Venezuelan criminal group to expand across South America, leading many to consider it a threat to regional security.

However, the gang’s international profile has made it a major target for the United States government, and with the relationship between the US and Venezuelan security forces deepening, this could make for difficult times ahead for the Tren de Aragua. Even prior to this, expansion appeared to have slowed. The loss of its stronghold in Tocorón prison—along with the arrest of several high-ranking leaders in Colombia and the killing of Guerrero—seems to have partially disrupted its transnational operations.

Security forces across the region have also invested significant resources in pursuing and prosecuting the gang’s cells. Authorities in Colombia, Chile, and Peru have arrested hundreds of Tren de Aragua members since 2022. These blows have led to further fragmentation within the group, which now operates more like a loose network of dispersed franchises than a cohesive organization.

The mass migration that enabled the Tren de Aragua’s expansion has also shifted. Between 2018 and 2022, there was little criminal infrastructure in South America equipped to handle the sheer number of Venezuelan migrants moving across the continent—allowing the Tren de Aragua to step in and claim much of the profits.

The shift in migration routes toward the United States—moving through Colombia and Central America—has reduced Tren de Aragua’s income from migrants within its traditional territory. And because migrant smuggling and human trafficking along the northern route are already controlled by powerful criminal groups, the Tren de Aragua has been unable to break into that criminal market.

Reports of new cells continue to emerge across South America, though authorities believe many are copycats seeking to capitalize on the Tren de Aragua’s notoriety. Whether the gang can survive the fragmentation of its structure across the region remains to be seen.