The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) is the last active insurgency in Colombia, and the main criminal actor in the Colombia-Venezuela border. From there, the group has expanded into Venezuelan territory.
In the past few years, the ELN has become a binational guerrilla, operating in both Colombia and Venezuela, and one of South America’s most important criminal groups. It is involved in several criminal economies, including illegal mining, drug trafficking, and extortion.
History
The ELN was formed in the 1960s, a time when Colombia was emerging from a period known as La Violencia (The Violence). During this time, religious and student movements, some inspired by the Cuban Revolution, gained strength.
The most radical segments of these movements became the heart of the guerrilla group starting in July 1964, when the small armed insurgency began training in San Vicente de Chucurí, in the department of Santander, in northeastern Colombia. Six months later, on January 7, 1965, the rebels, led by Fabio Vásquez Castaño, invaded Simacota, a small municipality in Santander, officially announcing their presence.
After several years of clandestine operations, the Colombian army carried out an offensive against the ELN in the department of Antioquia, which almost decimated its leadership and forced them to retreat to the department of Arauca, in eastern Colombia, on the border with Venezuela.
There, the Domingo Laín Front, one of the ELN’s most emblematic units, would become a key piece in the future of the guerrillas. In the 1980s, the ELN began to use Venezuela as a refuge from operations against them by Colombian authorities, a process which turned the border state of Apure into the guerrillas’ international rearguard. Initially, Venezuelan governments were hostile to the ELN’s presence, particularly after they killed eight Venezuelan soldiers in Apure in 1995.
In 1998, the Venezuelan government authorized Colombia to enter its territory and pursue guerrillas who had taken refuge there after an attack.
However, the arrival of Hugo Chávez to the presidency in 1999 meant a shift towards a friendly attitude towards the ELN and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), which is now demobilized.
That, along with increasing pressure from Colombian security forces, attacks by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), a federation of paramilitary groups whose aim was to eradicate the guerrillas, and an ambivalent relationship with the FARC, led the ELN to move more frequently inside Venezuela.
In 2016, the FARC signed a peace agreement with the Colombian government and left strategic territories on the Colombia-Venezuela border, creating a vacuum of power that the ELN began fighting for control of against other criminal actors.
Controlling sections of the border allowed them to manage smuggling and drug corridors between the two countries, and guaranteed a route to move troops between Colombia and Venezuela. This gave the ELN the ability to both flee Colombian authorities’ operations quickly and prepare attacks from Venezuela.
Today, the ELN uses Venezuelan states like Apure as hideouts from where its fighters and leaders can run illegal businesses such as drug trafficking and gasoline smuggling. In addition, the guerrillas exercise strong social control in areas of Apure, acting as a de facto power, resolving disputes between citizens, and maintaining a type of criminal governance.
But the ELN’s presence in Venezuela goes beyond the areas closest to Colombia. InSight Crime has been able to confirm that the guerrillas are present in at least 40 municipalities across eight of the country’s 24 states, some as far away as Anzoátegui, in the east of the country beside the Caribbean Sea.
This presence has allowed the group to set up clandestine radio stations, control the distribution of food, especially through the state-provided food boxes known as the Local Supply and Production Committees (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción – CLAP), move into illegal mining and control cocaine production zones.
In addition to diversifying its economic operations, the ELN has significantly increased its membership in Venezuela. It is estimated that of its 6,000 fighters, around 1,000 are present in Venezuelan territory.
Leadership
The ELN has a federated structure, in which the guerrilla fronts act with relative independence from the influence of the Central Command (Comando Central – COCE), the main guerrilla representation structure. This structure gives a high degree of autonomy and power to the commanders of the eight war fronts in Colombia and Venezuela.
The most important ELN leaders at present are Eliécer Erlinto Chamarro, alias “Antonio García“, the current head of the guerrilla.
Another important ELN leader, Israel Ramírez Pineda, alias “Pablo Beltrán,” second-in-command and representative to the peace talks with the Colombian government in Cuba, has traveled to Venezuela on numerous occasions to discuss the future of the peace talks with Antonio García and Gustavo Anibal Giraldo, alias “Pablito.”
Pablito, the de fact leader of the Eastern War Front, is presumed to be based in Apure, Venezuela. Today he is one of the most powerful commanders within the ELN. Since 2018, Interpol has had a red notice against Pablito, who they accuse of multiple crimes.
Another guerrilla leader of whom little is known, Jaime Galvis Rivera, alias “Ariel,” is also reportedly hiding in Venezuela.
Geography
The ELN’s presence in Venezuela has continued to grow in recent years. Information compiled by InSight Crime confirms that the Colombian guerrillas are present in eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, where they are present in more than 40 municipalities.
The states where the ELN has the greatest presence are Zulia, Tachira, Apure, and Amazonas. In all four, the guerrillas have settled in border municipalities that allow them to control criminal economies and guarantee mobility between Colombia and Venezuela. There, they operate through the Northern, Eastern, and Northeastern War Fronts.
The ELN has also extended its presence to states in central and eastern Venezuela, such as Bolívar, Anzoátegui, and Guárico.
Allies and Enemies
The ELN’s most important alliances in Venezuela are with Venezuelan state elements, which allow it to act with certain freedom in the country. This is particularly the case in the states bordering Colombia, where the guerrillas interact with agents of the security forces and local governments. However, these relationships, being mediated for mutual benefit, may not be as stable.
Details of the possible alliance between the ELN and the Venezuelan government were revealed by then ELN commander and peace talks leader Pablo Beltrán, who explained that the two groups had some common enemies.
Meanwhile, an unexpected ELN ally is the Second Marquetalia, a group of former FARC combatants who abandoned the peace process and returned to arms in 2019. Since 2021, top commanders of both groups began meeting in Venezuela to discuss criminal expansion across Latin America.
On the other hand, the ELN’s main enemies have been other segments of FARC dissidents in Apure and Arauca, such as the 10th Front, associated with the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), another FARC dissident faction. The EMC declared war on the ELN in early 2022.
Prospects
The ELN is currently at a crossroads between peace and the continuation of the war.
The Colombian government and the guerrillas announced the return to peace talks in October 2022, after an ELN attack in Bogotá in 2019 ended the previous cycle. In this new push for peace talks, President Nicolás Maduro agreed to be a guarantor of the talks, in what appears to be an admission that, without Venezuela’s role, the ELN would never lay down its arms.
However, it is unclear what real incentives the ELN has in Venezuela to disarm. There the guerrillas control parts of illegal mining, contraband and drug trafficking, which give them enough money to continue criminality.
Added to this is the importance of the ELN for the Venezuelan government. As this guerrilla group exhibited its discipline and military capacity in its expansion across Venezuelan soil, it demonstrated its potential as an armed actor that guarantees the regime governance in strategic territories, populations and illicit economies.
