The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) is Colombia’s last remaining insurgent group and one of the most powerful criminal organizations in Latin America. Its expansion and consolidation in Venezuela over the past decade have progressively transformed it into a binational structure.
SEE ALSO: ELN in Venezuela
Originally formed as a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group influenced by the Cuban Revolution, the ELN focused on extortion, kidnappings, and attacks on oil infrastructure in its early years. Although it distanced itself from drug trafficking for decades, several of its structures now control key cocaine enclaves in Colombia.
Its growing involvement in criminal economies such as drug trafficking and illegal mining has led to the criminalization of its fronts and a drift away from political work, contributing to the failure of multiple peace negotiation attempts. While in Colombia it operates as a rebel group and is pursued by security forces, in Venezuela it acts more like a paramilitary army with government backing.
History
The ELN emerged in the 1960s, as Colombia was recovering from a bloody period of political violence and a range of social and student movements were being shaped by the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution.
The most radical segments of these movements came together in July 1964 to form the nucleus of the guerrilla group. A small armed insurgency began training in San Vicente de Chucurí, a town in eastern Colombia in the department of Santander, less than 400 kilometers from the Venezuelan border.
On January 7, 1965, the group carried out its first major attack, the seizure of Simacota, a small municipality in Santander. There, it formally announced its creation under the leadership of Fabio Vásquez Castaño, a student leader who drew on the political and military training he received in Cuba to establish a guerrilla movement in Colombia.
From the outset, the ELN was a highly ideological organization, combining Marxist-Leninist doctrine with liberation theology, a Catholic religious movement inspired by struggles against inequality in Latin America. Some of the ELN’s early members had direct ties to the Catholic Church.
The group, however, suffered a series of military defeats following the Simacota attack that left it on the brink of annihilation. A military offensive in 1973, known as “Operation Anorí,” wiped out much of the group and weakened its command structure. This forced the guerrillas to retreat toward the Venezuelan border, specifically to the department of Arauca, to reorganize. It also pushed the group into its first peace talks with the Colombian government, which began in 1975.
After Operation Anorí, Manuel Pérez, a Spanish priest known by the alias “El Cura,” along with Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias “Gabino,” took control of the ELN and played a decisive role in its military and financial restructuring. Both oversaw the group’s expansion into the departments of Casanare and Boyacá, near the Venezuelan border, as well as Nariño and Putumayo in southern Colombia.
During the 1990s, the ELN’s violent reputation grew, even as it took part in failed peace negotiations in 1994 and 1998.
In 1999, the ELN kidnapped 190 people from a church in the city of Cali, in western Colombia, in what remains the largest kidnapping in the country’s history. The group also hijacked a commercial airplane, forcing it to land in a remote area in southern Bolívar department and holding its passengers hostage.
Mounting pressure from Colombian security forces, along with attacks by other non-state armed groups such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) and the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Amadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), compelled the ELN to abandon some territories and expand its presence in Venezuela. By the late 1990s, the group had found favor with then-Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, an outspoken ally of both the ELN and the FARC.
These shifts also led ELN commanders to rethink their financial, military, and political strategies across Colombia. Several ELN fronts moved into new criminal economies, including drug trafficking and illegal mining.
Although the ELN initially opposed direct involvement in drug trafficking, the transformation of Colombia’s armed conflict and the weakening of the guerrilla pushed it to seek new sources of financing. Some structures levied taxes on farmers, coca growers, and traffickers, while others became directly involved in drug production and international trafficking, particularly along the border between Colombia’s Norte de Santander department and Venezuela’s Zulia state.
The ELN took part in another round of failed peace talks with the Colombian government between 2005 and 2007, which collapsed due to disagreements between the parties and the deterioration of Colombia’s relationship with Venezuela, which was acting as a facilitator.
Seven years later, in 2014, the ELN resumed peace negotiations with the government of President Juan Manuel Santos, running parallel to the peace process with the FARC (2012–2016). Talks with the ELN continued briefly under Santos’ successor, Iván Duque, but collapsed in 2019 after the guerrillas attacked a police academy in Bogotá.
Following the demobilization of the FARC, the ELN moved to fill the territorial vacuums left by its former rival. The group expanded its involvement in criminal economies in both Colombia and Venezuela, aided by the permissive stance of Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s successor.
The ELN consolidated its presence along the Colombia–Venezuela border, controlling major clandestine crossings used for smuggling and migrant trafficking. It also deepened its role in illegal mining, with the acquiescence of military and political sectors loyal to Maduro, in Venezuela’s Bolívar state.
As Venezuela became increasingly central to the Colombian insurgency, senior commanders decided to relocate across the border.
The ELN began operating as a binational guerrilla force. In Colombia, it remains focused on territorial control, locked in constant clashes with law enforcement, and undergoing a criminalization of its fronts, which, while still maintaining an ideological struggle, are increasingly tied to the control of illicit economies. In Venezuela, the ELN’s ideological affinities and strategic alliances with the government have pushed it to function as a paramilitary group, coordinating operations with security forces, interfering in elections, and helping the government control key areas.
In 2022, a strengthened ELN resumed peace talks with Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, with Venezuela serving as a guarantor. The negotiations have seen major ups and downs, but in May 2024 the parties agreed on the first item on the peace agenda, marking the most significant advance of any peace talks with the ELN.
The process, however, faced serious obstacles. Among them were the insurgent leadership’s refusal to abandon kidnapping as a source of financing and its continued use of violence against civilians. As a result, negotiations with the ELN under Petro’s government became mired in rhetoric and failed to produce tangible changes on the ground.
Internal divisions within the armed group further complicated matters. In May 2024, the Comuneros del Sur, a substructure of the Southwestern War Front, broke away from the ELN to form a dissident faction that announced its intention to pursue a separate peace process with the Colombian government.
Peace efforts ultimately collapsed when the insurgency launched a military offensive in the Catatumbo region in January 2025, aiming to expel the 33rd Front of FARC dissidents and seize control of another strategic area along the binational border with Venezuela.
Leadership
The ELN has a confederated structure in which its war fronts retain a degree of operational and financial autonomy. Political decisions are handled by a leadership body known as the Central Command (Comando Central – COCE), made up of five commanders responsible for the group’s most important decisions.
Below the COCE sits the National Directorate (Dirección Nacional – DINAL), a body composed of 23 representatives elected by the ELN’s eight war fronts. Each front is, in turn, led by a commander, a political chief, and a military chief. According to official figures from 2025, the ELN has approximately 6,300 members, including combatants and support networks or militia members, around 20% of whom are based in Venezuela.
Eliécer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” serves as the guerrilla group’s commander-in-chief. He is joined on the COCE by Israel Ramírez Pineda, alias “Pablo Beltrán,” the political commander and chief negotiator; Rafael Sierra, alias “Ramiro Vargas,” in charge of international affairs; Jaime Galvis Rivera, alias “Ariel,” the financial commander; and Aníbal Giraldo, alias “Pablito,” who oversees military strategy.
Geography
The ELN operates in at least 184 municipalities across 19 departments in Colombia and in eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, according to intelligence reports.
The Northeastern War Front “Manuel Pérez Martínez” (Frente de Guerra Nororiental – FGNO) exerts influence in the Colombian departments of Norte de Santander and Cesar, and in Venezuela’s Zulia state. It is currently led by Leonel Salazar Roa, alias “Gonzalo Satélite.”
The Northern War Front (Frente de Guerra Norte – FGN) operates in the Colombian departments of La Guajira, Cesar, Magdalena, and Atlántico, as well as in the Venezuelan states of Zulia and Táchira. It is currently led by a commander known by the alias “El Poeta.”
The Eastern War Front “Manuel Vásquez Castaño” (Frente de Guerra Oriental – FGO) has influence in the Colombian departments of Arauca, Boyacá, Vichada, Guainía, and Casanare, and in the Venezuelan states of Apure, Táchira, and Amazonas. Alias “Pablito” commanded the front until 2016 and remains one of its most influential figures.
The Jesús Darío Ramírez Castro War Front (Frente de Guerra Jesús Darío Ramírez Castro – FGJDR) operates in the department of Antioquia and southern Bolívar. The front was led by Gustavo Wilfredo Vásquez Castrillón, alias “Pirry,” until his death in early 2022.
The Western War Front “Omar Gómez” (Frente de Guerra Occidental – FGO) has influence in the departments of Chocó and Risaralda. It was led by Ogli Ángel Padilla Romero, alias “Fabián,” until his death in 2021, and is currently commanded by Emilce Oviedo Sierra, alias “Martha” or “La Abuela.”
Some fronts lack a clearly defined commander, including the Southwestern War Front “Carlos Alberto Troches Zuleta” (Frente de Guerra Suroccidental – FGSO), which operates in the departments of Nariño and Cauca, and the Central War Front (Frente de Guerra Central – FGC), with influence in Tolima, Risaralda, and Antioquia.
The National Urban War Front (Frente de Guerra Urbano Nacional – FGUN) is believed to maintain cells in Colombia’s main cities, including Medellín, Barranquilla, Bogotá, and Cali. However, its activities have been less visible than those of other fronts. The alleged commander of the FGUN is Jaime Galvis Rivera, alias “Ariel” or “Lorenzo Alcantruz.”
In Venezuela, the states with the ELN’s strongest presence are Zulia, Táchira, Apure, and Amazonas. In these areas, the guerrillas have established themselves in border municipalities that allow them to control criminal economies and ensure mobility between Colombia and Venezuela.
The ELN has also expanded into central and eastern Venezuelan states such as Bolívar, Anzoátegui, and Guárico.
Allies and Enemies
The ELN has faced a wide range of adversaries, including paramilitary groups, armed insurgencies, and Venezuelan criminal gangs.
One of the ELN’s main enemies in Colombia is the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), also known as the Gulf Clan. In Antioquia and Chocó, the two groups have been locked in a territorial dispute since 2018 over control of key areas for drug trafficking and illegal mining, with the AGC successfully pushing into zones that were traditionally under ELN control.
Along the Pacific coast, in Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño, the ELN competes with several dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia aligned with the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) for control of coca production, drug trafficking routes, mining revenues, and other key criminal economies. To counter the EMC — which has more fighters and broader territorial reach — the ELN forged an alliance with the Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia), another FARC dissident faction, in southwestern Colombia.
Along the Colombia–Venezuela border, particularly in the Arauca–Apure corridor, the ELN previously clashed with the 10th Front of FARC dissidents aligned with the EMC. By 2019, reports indicated that both groups had reached non-aggression agreements in the departments of Arauca, Boyacá, and Casanare. However, in 2022, the 10th Front and the ELN’s Domingo Laín Front began fighting in Arauca and Apure, in a conflict that also involved Venezuelan security forces and elements of another FARC dissident faction, the Second Marquetalia.
Since 2018, the Second Marquetalia had maintained agreements with the ELN in Venezuela’s Apure and Amazonas states aimed at defining territorial boundaries and dividing criminal revenues. That alliance, however, appears to have fractured after the ELN ambushed and killed José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” the dissident faction’s second-in-command, in August 2025.
In Norte de Santander and Cesar — two Colombian departments along the border with Venezuela — the ELN displaced the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL) and became one of the most powerful armed actors in the area. In that same region, the guerrillas reached a non-aggression pact with the 33rd Front of FARC dissidents, which collapsed in January 2026 and triggered a severe humanitarian crisis. In the aftermath, the ELN emerged as the dominant force in the region.
In Venezuela, meanwhile, the ELN’s most significant alliances are with segments of the country’s authorities, allowing the group to operate with relative freedom. This relationship is most evident in states along the Colombian border, where the guerrillas maintain ties with members of the security forces and political authorities.
Prospects
The ELN’s gradual dominance along the Colombia–Venezuela border has given it access to significant criminal revenues, consolidating its position as one of the region’s leading criminal groups and one of the most serious security threats. Strategic control of the border has also allowed the ELN to amass resources that it can funnel to other fronts across Colombia, ensuring the continuity of its operations and expanding its territorial influence.
Beyond its rear base in Venezuela, the group’s binational nature is rooted in its close ties to political sectors and security forces forged during the regime of Nicolás Maduro, which could be disrupted following Maduro’s arrest and transfer to the United States in January 2025 to stand trial in a federal court on drug trafficking-related charges.
The ELN has once again derailed the prospects for a peace agreement with the Colombian government. With its presence firmly entrenched in Venezuela, increased income from illicit economies, and a consolidated binational structure, disarming the organization stands out as one of the central challenges facing future governments in Colombia.
