Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan

The Gaitanistas, also known as the Gulf Clan, Urabeños, and Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), emerged from the ashes of Colombia’s paramilitary movement to become the dominant criminal force in Colombia, with national reach. 

The Gaitanistas are primarily involved in transnational drug trafficking. The group controls territories where it regulates or directs the coca paste production market and guards shipments along trafficking routes. Once the coca paste has reached cocaine processing laboratories, the AGC can also store the final product before shipping it to coastal and border regions.

However, the group is also involved in other illicit economies, such as illegal gold mining and extortion, from which it extracts significant profits.

In this profile:

• What is the story of the Gaitanistas?
• Who are the leaders of the Gaitanistas?
• Where do the Gaitanistas operate?
• Who are the Gaitanistas’ friends and foes?
• What is the outlook for the Gaitanistas?

What is the story of the Gaitanistas?

The Gaitanistas, or Urabeños, take their name from Urabá, a northwestern region of Colombia near the Panamanian border highly prized by drug traffickers. Urabá offers access to the Caribbean and Pacific coasts from the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. 

The AGC’s origins go back to notorious paramilitary warlord Vicente Castaño, who broke away from the demobilization process of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) in 2006. He then rearmed a paramilitary unit with two of his lieutenants: the former commander of the AUC’s Calima Bloc, Ever Veloza Garcia, alias “HH,” and Daniel Rendón Herrera, alias “Don Mario,” the former finance chief of one of the wealthiest paramilitary factions, the Centauros Bloc.

When Castaño was killed in March 2007, Don Mario inherited the network, and set to work recruiting former paramilitary fighters in Urabá. Don Mario quickly assembled a fighting force of around 80 men and then monopolized this important drug route, taxing traffickers for every kilogram of cocaine that passed through his territory. By 2008, Don Mario was one of the richest and most-wanted traffickers in Colombia. He began to expand his empire, moving into southern Córdoba province, the Bajo Cauca region in northern Antioquia, and into Medellín.

Don Mario was captured on a farm in rural Urabá in April 2009. Following his capture, the AGC fell under the control of Juan de Dios Úsuga, alias “Giovanni,” and Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” two brothers who had begun their underworld careers with the now demobilized guerrillas of the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL) before passing into the ranks of the AUC.

The Úsuga brothers gathered other former EPL guerrillas turned paramilitaries, who formed the disciplined and capable military core of the AGC, the “Estado Mayor,” or board of directors. They launched a new expansion plan by sending trusted lieutenants from Urabá to take control of strategic drug trafficking real estate, preferably through alliances and agreements, but otherwise through violence.

In January 2012, Giovanni, the mastermind of the AGC strategy, was killed during a police raid on a ranch in the department of Chocó, leaving Otoniel as the maximum leader. Despite this setback, the AGC expansion continued.

The AGC’s influence spread across much of the country, and soon the group controlled drug production zones, trafficking corridors, and international dispatch points throughout north Colombia, along both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts and along the land border with Venezuela.

To facilitate this expansion, the Gaitanistas also developed a new model of organized crime: franchising. While the group directly controlled some of its substructures, the Gaitanistas also absorbed local criminal organizations into its network, which operated as semi-autonomous members of the AGC “franchise.”

In 2015, the government launched a major offensive against the AGC known as “Operation Agamemnon.” The first phase of the operation had no significant results, but the second phase of the operation, which began in 2017, managed to impact the AGC’s command nodes. In May, security forces killed Otoniel’s second-in-command, Roberto Vargas Gutiérrez, alias “Gavilán,” and then in November, they killed military boss Luis Orlando Padierma, alias “Inglaterra.”

With pressure mounting, and following two years of tentative approaches, Otoniel offered to turn himself in and demobilize the AGC in September 2017, even appearing in a public video appealing to the Colombian government. That offer was refused and Agamemnon continued to weaken Otoniel’s control, who saw his closest advisors captured and killed, and his family targeted.

After years of being on the run, Otoniel was captured in October 2021. In May 2022, he was extradited to the United States and charged in New York for conspiring to manufacture cocaine and distribute it to the US. He was found guilty and sentenced to 45 years in prison.

After Otoniel’s capture, Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo,” took over leadership of the AGC. In August 2022, the Gulf Clan expressed its willingness to take part in peace talks as part of Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” plan, which seeks to negotiate with various illegal groups in the country. But the process has faced significant obstacles, including the absence of a legal framework to carry out peace processes with criminal groups with no political orientation, like the AGC.

In December 2022, President Petro announced a ceasefire with several criminal groups in the country, including the AGC. But the ceasefire came to an end in March 2023, after Petro reported that the AGC was behind a miners’ strike in the northern part of the Antioquia department.

In August 2024, conversations between the government and the AGC began again. In September 2025, the first round of talks concluded in Doha, Qatar, addressing issues such as the removal of minors from the group’s ranks, the replacement of illicit economies, and the implementation of pilot confidence-building plans, among others.

In December 2025, the creation of three Temporary Location Zones (ZUT) was announced in the departments of Chocó and Córdoba, where members of the AGC were to begin relocating on March 1, 2026. The arrest warrants for several of the group’s main leaders were also suspended, including those wanted for extradition.

Then in early February 2026, the AGC briefly suspended talks after Petro said in a meeting with US President Donald Trump that he would capture the AGC’s main leader within two months.

One month later, in March 2026, the Colombian government reactivated the arrest warrants against the AGC leaders after the group failed to move to the ZUTs. The group again requested a suspension in May, which was rejected by the Attorney General’s Office.

Who are the leaders of the Gaitanistas?

The current leader of the AGC is Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo.” He was born in Urabá, the region which is also the birthplace of the AGC, and holds the organization in firm hands after the arrest of Otoniel. Chiquito Malo was a paramilitary fighter with the AUC until it demobilized in 2004. Afterward, he was the commander of the AGC’s Central Urabá Structure, which occupies territory that is key for drug trafficking to Central America and the United States.

At the end of January 2026, the AGC’s second-in-command, José Gonzalo Sánchez, alias “Gonzalito,” drowned while traveling along a river in the department of Córdoba. Following this, Orosman Ostén Blanco, alias “Rodrigo Flechas,” alias “Julián,” and alias “Joaquín,” assumed the role of deputy commander. According to police sources cited by Colombian media, the other leaders of the Gulf Clan’s top hierarchy are allegedly Elkin Posada Casarrubia, alias “El Cura,” and Wilmar Mejía Úsuga, alias “Richard.”

The AGC established a mixed network model, in which approximately one-third of local cells were directly commanded by the leadership in Urabá, while the others were local criminal organizations that used the AGC name and were expected to provide services or follow strategic orders when called upon. 

The AGC’s model is based on local cells that are financially self-sufficient. As such, some cells have moved into criminal economies outside of drug trafficking, such as illegal mining, extortion, migrant smuggling, and microtrafficking. Groups may also direct or tax other criminal activities within their territory.

Where do the Gaitanistas operate?

The AGC franchise has a presence in at least 20 of Colombia’s departments, as well as internationally. The group’s base and territorial stronghold is centered around the Gulf of Urabá in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó, and stretching into Córdoba. They have an extensive presence throughout the rest of these departments, as well as along the Caribbean coast, in the city of Medellín, and in departments such as La Guajira, Santander, Valle del Cauca, and Norte de Santander.

The group has also fought for control of criminal economies on the border between Colombia and Venezuela. However, given the strength of rival groups such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the ex-FARC mafia, the AGC has been unable to establish much territorial control. Its presence in the area is limited to areas around Puerto Santander and Cúcuta, while it has no presence in Venezuela. A series of arrests in Panama suggest that the AGC may have subcontracted operations to a local gang, which would receive and store large quantities of drugs smuggled from Colombia. This highlights the group’s ability to expand its franchise model and the control it has over drug trafficking and migrant smuggling on the border between Colombia and Panama.

Who are the Gaitanistas’ friends and foes?

The competition for territory sparked by the demobilization of the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) has pitted the AGC against the ELN. The groups have clashed in Chocó, Antioquia, Bolívar, and Norte de Santander, as well as other occasional conflicts in other departments.

In 2020 and 2021, it was reported that the group had made an alliance with its old enemies, the Rastrojos, to fight back against both the ELN and the ex-FARC Mafia in Norte de Santander. Meanwhile, in northern and northeastern Antioquia, the organization has also contested key drug trafficking and illegal mining territory with the General Staff of Blocks and Front (Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frente – EMBF) of the ex-FARC mafia. Since 2020, the AGC has confronted the Pachenca, also known as the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra (Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra). The two groups are seeking to control drug trafficking routes in the Sierra Nevada near the Caribbean port city of Santa Marta.

The AGC’s drug trafficking operations have also seen the group build alliances with independent drug traffickers within Colombia and Mexican drug trafficking groups like the Sinaloa Cartel. The organization’s leadership has also maintained a relationship with the ‘Ndrangheta, an Italian mafia, since the days of the AUC. It works with other European drug trafficking networks, including Balkan criminal groups.

What is the outlook for the Gaitanistas?

After Otoniel’s capture, many believed that the group’s leadership would decline. However, the AGC continues to be one of Colombia’s main criminal organizations with a significant presence in regional criminal dynamics, largely through its involvement in transnational drug trafficking.

The continuation of peace talks between the AGC and the Colombian government, as well as other conversations under the “Total Peace” framework, will depend on the outcome of the country’s presidential elections in May and June 2026. Regardless of the results, it is unlikely that the AGC will be significantly affected.