Why did the United States remove Venezuela from its drug blacklist while Colombia and Bolivia remain on it? In this InSight Take, we unpack what Washington’s latest counternarcotics designations reveal about shifting cocaine routes, regional politics, and the Trump administration’s increasingly militarized approach to drug trafficking in Latin America.
Transcript
Deborah Bonello: [00:00:04] Last week, the White House sent Congress its annual list of countries involved in the supply of illegal drugs and those that have failed to cooperate with the United States. This process is more commonly known as a certification, and the big change this year is that Venezuela came off the list of nations that failed to cooperate. Colombia, Latin America’s biggest cocaine producer, stayed on along with Bolivia. So today we’re going to look at what is behind those decisions by the Trump administration and what they tell us about criminal dynamics in the region, as well as the implications for the removal of Venezuela. I’m Deborah Bonello, Managing Editor of InSight Crime, and I’m joined by our Co-director, Jeremy McDermott, who has lived in Colombia for 27 years, I think now.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:00:50] Covered 27 of these white House designations, so, yeah.
Deborah Bonello: [00:00:57] So tell us what exactly the presidential determination on major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing countries is, to give it its official line.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:01:09] Yeah, not so catchy, but, essentially it is where the White House looks at nations through a drug trafficking lens and any nation that plays a significant role in drug trafficking to the US can get swept up in it. It’s made up of two lists, Deb. The first list is called “the majors,” and these are the major drug transit or producing countries. And they get put on the list—it can be just geography and other factors that lend themselves to the transit or production of narcotics. And being on the list is not necessarily a reflection of the government’s efforts. It’s simply a statement of fact that these nations do play some part. There are 23 nations currently on that list; 17 of them are in our patch in Latin America. It’s the second list that’s more that’s more controversial. That’s for nations who, and I’m just going to quote directly here from the document: “who failed demonstrably over the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.” So these are the guys who are certified or decertified.
Deborah Bonello: [00:02:30] Right, so it’s the second list we really need to focus on. And there are only four nations on that list in the whole world, right? Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Colombia. Venezuela was there last year and has been since I think 2005. So its removal is pretty big news. You know, Venezuela has been pretty big news all year really, but what does it mean in practical terms to actually be on the list?
Jeremy McDermott: [00:02:59] It does have huge international and practical repercussions. It’s a public criticism of a nation by the United States and has historically had an effect on bilateral relations. But more practically, it means you lose US assistance. And American representatives at multilateral development banks, like the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank, they are obliged to vote against any loan requests. But there is a waiver under this system. It’s called the National Interest Waiver, which means if support to the nation in question is vital to the national interests of the United States, then support can continue uninterrupted. And three of the nations out of the four on our list have been granted that waiver. That is Burma, or Myanmar, as it’s also known, Bolivia, and Colombia. So it’s just Afghanistan that’s being sanctioned. The other three nations are still getting US aid.
Deborah Bonello: [00:04:06] So in a way, it’s more of an optic and a public sort of statement about that country than material.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:04:18] Yeah. Well, it can be material, you know, if you, if you cut aid, that’s serious. I think it’s just a chance for the US to pressure people to do, essentially, what they’re told.
Why Was Venezuela Removed From the US Drug List?
Deborah Bonello: [00:04:36] So why is Venezuela being removed from the list for the first time in over 20 years? Does it mean that the US doesn’t feel the need to apply that pressure to Venezuela anymore?
Jeremy McDermott: [00:04:47] Okay. The official reasons are, and let me quote again from President Trump’s statement: “Thanks to my administration’s arrest and removal of former illegitimate dictator and drug trafficker Nicolás Maduro and given the positive steps taken under interim President Delcy Rodríguez, I have determined that Venezuela should no longer be designated as having failed demonstrably.” Deb, President Trump has boasted that he is effectively governing Venezuela. So I think he can hardly turn around and say that it’s failing to cooperate in the fight against drugs.
SEE ALSO: Special Series: Maduro’s Arrest and Its Criminal Aftermath in Venezuela
Deborah Bonello: [00:05:28] I can see, but what about the changes that we’ve seen in Venezuela as regards the drug trade that would be required to get removed from that list, one might argue.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:05:45] Okay. Let’s look at what’s actually happened since Delcy Rodríguez took over. The first thing kind of worthy of note was the strike that killed alias Niño Guerrero, who was the head of the notorious Tren de Aragua prison gang. If you remember, he appeared, or Tren de Aragua appeared during President Trump’s campaign, accused of staging an invasion of the US, and was accused of being a drug trafficking organization, which it actually wasn’t. But that was a concrete event. I don’t think it moved the dial on drug trafficking in any sense, because as you well know from our coverage, we don’t see Tren de Aragua as a major drug trafficking organization. The issue around—the other thing that was mentioned was the Cartel of the Suns in the lead-up to the US intervention and removal of Maduro. And the Cartel of the Suns, which we’ve been covering for decades, has been managing drug trafficking through the country for quite a long time. The question is, has the removal of Nicolás Maduro done away with the Cartel of the Suns and state-buried drug trafficking in Venezuela?
Deborah Bonello: [00:07:31] Well, we are seeing Maduro being tried under a new indictment in the United States, right? Not the 2021 where he was charged with heading up the Cartel of the Suns. And I believe the Trump administration has changed its framing of what the Cartel of the Suns actually is, from defining it less as a sort of vertically structured drug cartel into more of the vision I think that our research reflects, which is that the Cartel of the Suns is an umbrella term for corruption embedded in the state that kind of aids and abets and enables the cocaine business through corruption. So my second question would be whether Rodríguez has made any moves to dismantle this network of corruption and really changed drug trafficking dynamics in the country.
SEE ALSO: The Evolution of the Cartel of the Suns
Jeremy McDermott: [00:08:27] Okay, let’s start with the 2020 indictment. As you’ve said, we’ve always had a problem with this, and we’ve written about it in the past. It portrayed Maduro and Diosdado Cabello and a couple of others as heads of a vertically integrated drug trafficking organization, which was later given the status of a “narcoterrorist organization,” Deb, which was one of the justifications, if you remember, for the US military intervention that ended up with the removal of Maduro. We’ve been investigating the Cartel of the Suns since we were founded and spent a long time investigating Maduro, and we came to the conclusion that, as you said, the Cartel of the Suns isn’t a vertically integrated drug trafficking organization. It’s a system of what we call hybrid criminal governance, and we’ve written a lot about it on the website. But the quick and dirty is that Maduro, suffering under sanctions, hyperinflation, economic mismanagement, didn’t have enough central government revenue to assure the loyalty of his generals and senior Chavista politicians. So he essentially doled out criminal fiefdoms to secure loyalty, and this means that generals or important politicians were posted to areas along the border with Colombia, or along the Caribbean coastline, where smuggling and drug trafficking corridors were present, or to Bolívar state, where all the gold deposits are. And so the deal was, they got access to criminal rents to supplement their laughable official salaries. So that was the system that Maduro presided over and we have long called that the Cartel of the Suns—even though it predates Maduro—it’s basically corruption, especially in the military, that has long been involved in the cocaine business, and then under Maduro ended up managing and regulating that business.
Deborah Bonello: [00:10:36] So before we turn to Colombia, because they are still on the list, I think it would be amiss to not mention the missile strikes that we’ve seen in the seas around Venezuela and, you know, these very kind of unprecedented missile strikes that we’ve seen happening since more than a year ago now, I believe they began at the beginning of September. Of course, that’s not the work of the Venezuelan Rodríguez administration, it’s coming from Trump, but have we seen that help sort of bring down drug trafficking activity in and around Venezuela?
Jeremy McDermott: [00:11:19] It’s had an effect on the Caribbean coast and the smuggling in the go-fast vessels that was the principal modus operandi for drug traffickers leaving the north coast of Venezuela. We’re seeing that route reopen, not using go-fast so much, but using fishing vessels and others. Perhaps the biggest change is a switch for drugs going into southern Venezuela and going across to Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, and northern Brazil. So I’m not sure if we’ve seen a massive drop necessarily in the flow of cocaine through the country, but we have seen shifts in routes. But this, again, is not to do with the Venezuelan government or any actions that it has taken. This is US policy and these strikes.
The Politics Behind the US Drug List
Deborah Bonello: [00:12:21] Okay. So let’s turn to Colombia, which was decertified last year and remains decertified, which one could argue seems a little harsh given the arrival of the conservative president, Abelardo de la Espriella, who we’ve talked about a few times already on the InSight Take, and he’s a big ally to Trump, and I think he’s kind of very firmly, you know, returning Colombia to its role as the US proxy in the region on anti-drug stuff, especially since he since he took office last month. What do you think of that decision to not take Colombia off the list because of de la Espriella’s, you know, intent. And, you know, he has already started up his anti-drug actions in Colombia, as we’ve seen.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:13:16] Well, let’s go to last year, which was the first time that Colombia had been decertified. So this is the second year. It was a huge shock in Colombia. Colombia sees itself as in the trenches in the fight against the cocaine trade, and it’s in almost daily confrontation with illegal armed actors who manage the trade. And from the Colombian perspective, all this time, the US remains the single biggest consumer of the drug. So this has caused some bitterness, especially in the security forces. But I think the original decertification, and this decertification, is more about the previous president than the country’s efforts. The statement says that it blames Colombia’s status on the “incompetence and chaos” produced by the previous left wing government of President Gustavo Petro, and he handed over office in August this year to de la Espriella.
[00:14:23] I think this is a bit personal. President Trump clearly despised Petro. Ironically, they’re very similar in many ways, which may seem odd to say, given that they’re on opposite ends of the political spectrum, but they both use social media religiously, they are both rather thin-skinned, and they both like to pick fights. And not only was the country decertified last year, but Petro was also targeted personally. He was put on the Treasury or the OFAC list, along with his wife and kids. The designation means that any US-linked assets are frozen, financial transactions can be blocked, and it’s massive stigmatization of the individual. And Trump combined this pretty extreme punishment with abuse, calling Petro a thug and accusing him of being directly involved in drug trafficking, of which there is absolutely no evidence of that, he has many failings, but involvement in drug trafficking is not one that we’ve seen, anyway. And the statement does reference the election of de la Espriella: “The people of Colombia made the courageous choice to elect a president who has pledged to lead an aggressive campaign against coca cultivation and cocaine production, which reached record levels under the failed socialist policies of his predecessor.” So this is basically an invitation to de la Espriella that if he does do what he’s promised to do, then Colombia will come off the list next year.
Deborah Bonello: [00:16:07] But it’s not the first time that Colombia has been decertified and its president kind of named and shamed, right?
Jeremy McDermott: [00:16:15] No it’s not. Just after I arrived, President Ernesto Samper was the country’s leader and Colombia was decertified in 1996 and again in 1997. Samper was involved in a scandal where his campaign allegedly received millions of dollars from the Cali Cartel. The scandal was known as “Proceso 8,000.” The official reasons that Washington gave then for the decertification were that they hadn’t extradited the Cali Cartel leadership—and the Cali Cartel leaders were arrested in 1995 just to put that on the table—and that the country had failed to put the issue of extradition, which was constitutionally prohibited at that time, in front of Congress. So this was huge pressure on President Samper. And I think it was Madeleine Albright was then the Secretary of State, and she accused Samper of actually undermining his own police and prosecutors by working with the same criminals that they were chasing. It was about politics as well. Samper was punished. He had his US visa revoked, but he didn’t suffer anything like the sanctions that Petro is under. And one might argue that that led directly to Colombia reestablishing extradition, which it did at the end of 1997. And that’s obviously a change that’s endured. And it’s, you know, one of the central planks of the Colombia-US joint, you know, relationship as far as drug trafficking is concerned.
Deborah Bonello: [00:18:04] Right? Yeah. And President Trump’s message to Bolivia was actually pretty similar to that that he sent to Colombia this year as well. Right. He recognized the change in government, the arrival of the conservative president, Ródrigo Paz, who I think took office in November last year, unseating a socialist government. What’s your read on that?
Jeremy McDermott: [00:18:28] Yeah. It’s very similar rhetoric. The statement talks of “decades of inept socialist governments” and the opportunity to create “a new chapter” in US-Bolivian relations under President Paz. It does mention—and we covered this at the time, Deb, because it was pretty huge—the extradition of Sebastián Marset, who was—although Uruguayan, was in Bolivia and had much of his operating base in Bolivia—in March 2026, extradited to the US. But that apparently wasn’t enough, and the statement says the new government’s “not yet had sufficient time to reduce coca cultivation.” So there is the request. If President Paz can get coca crops down, then the likelihood is he’ll be off the list next year as well.
Deborah Bonello: [00:19:31] And there are other nations, from our patch here in Latin America and the Caribbean that get a mention in the president’s statement as well. What should we read into that?
Jeremy McDermott: [00:19:42] Yeah, there’s quite a few of those. Let’s list them in growing order of importance. So first of all, there’s praise for allies, you know, Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador: I “applaud three of America’s greatest allies in our hemisphere—Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador—for their leadership, resolve, and success in the fight against narcoterrorism.” The quote there. So Argentina actually isn’t even on the major’s list. So this is kind of a, you know, round of applause for their mates in the region, which is odd, that doesn’t usually happen either. Nicaragua comes in for a mention, not surprisingly: “the illegitimate Ortego-Murillo regime in Nicaragua has failed to take sufficient action against drug trafficking.” But it hasn’t been decertified. Peru got the same sort of message as Bolivia and Colombia, because Peru, of course, has a new president, Keiko Fujimori, and the statement says we “welcome the commitment of new President Keiko Fujimori” to work with the US. So again, they are listed on majors but not not decertified in any way.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:20:59] Things begin to get a little bit odd because Canada and Mexico get a rap on the knuckles, whilst recognizing Mexican President Sheinbaum’s administration for seizing greater volumes of drugs, “Mexico must take additional action against [the] narco terrorist organizations.” And of course, as we’ve discussed, Deb, the Trump administration pretty soon, upon taking office, put a series of Mexican groups on their list of foreign terrorist organizations. And Canada seems to be President Trump’s favorite punching bag at the moment, so they get a mention as well. I’m not quite sure why, but we do know that drugs come in through the Canadian border, which is obviously one of the longest borders in the world and barely policed.
SEE ALSO: US Foreign Terrorist Designations in Latin America: An Interactive Map
Jeremy McDermott: [00:21:52] The last one that’s weird is Brazil gets a mention. It’s not even on the majors list. And while it’s important in drug trafficking terms, that’s in the cocaine pipeline to Europe, Deb, as we’ve covered a great deal on the site. But the government is quoted as saying, is accused of failing to confront the designated foreign terrorist organizations, the First Capital Command and the Red Command, “which have transformed Brazil into a hub for global cocaine flows.” Now, this only happened recently, Deb, we, of course, discussed that on the website. Brazil’s cocaine doesn’t go to the United States, so I’m not sure why this, you know, this is not a direct threat to the United States, so one wonders why it’s being mentioned in this, except, of course, that President Lula, the president of Brazil, has openly defied President Trump, pushed back on tariffs, squeezed on rare earth minerals, and basically refused to be to be bullied. And so one wonders again, if this is a wee bit personal.
Deborah Bonello: [00:23:10] I mean, what I’m hearing is the whole process is as much about politics as it is about drug trafficking. And has that always been the case, or is this something that has come into focus under Donald Trump? And of course, we should mention this is all taking place on the stage of the Shield of the Americas alliance that’s being slowly built throughout the region, which of course, is very much an initiative from Donald Trump.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:23:40] I think it’s always been somewhat about politics, Deb. It has been an annual excuse for Washington to pressure political leaders to do what the US wants of them in terms of the fight against drugs. But I do think under President Trump, it has become even more political. You know, if you look at this year’s one, this is about, hey, look at my mates, they’re all doing really well, you know, love ’em. And that, you know, it’s the left wing and socialist governments that have really made a bit of a hash of things, and don’t worry, now that, you know, Colombia, and Peru, and Bolivia have right-leaning leaders, we’re expecting, you know, great things, and Colombia and Bolivia will hopefully soon get off the list. So, it is framed in a much more political way, and I think it is being used by President Trump to push his agenda, which is different, you know, this military-first agenda that we’re seeing, the Shield of the Americas, is something different from before. But previous presidents have used this tool to pressure governments ever since the process began. So you know, I would say that politics has always been perhaps a fairly significant part of this.
The Future of US Drug Policy in Latin America
Deborah Bonello: [00:25:09] So what do you think the takeaways should be for our audience with respect to this year’s statement? And what do you think we can expect to see this time next year?
Jeremy McDermott: [00:25:19] Well, one, I think Colombia will come off the list. I think that Bolivia, if President Paz gets the message loud and clear and manages to reduce, do some coca eradication, will perhaps get off the list. And like Venezuela, Bolivia has been on the list for a long time—I think since 2008, or 18 years. And the Venezuela situation I don’t think is going to change, obviously. The United States is still very much, has very strong influence over Delcy Rodríguez, and it really can’t be decertified because, you know, the US has such a strong role in Venezuela’s government at the moment. But I think if we take a step back and go, okay, what are the drug trafficking dynamics? And how much are they going to change over the coming months, or over the next 12 months, before the next series of announcements? This is all built around the Shield of the Americas and the militarized approach, and those who sign up to it—and, you know, most of the region now have, apart from, say, Mexico and Brazil—then they will be rewarded, in terms of not being named and shamed by Washington.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:26:58] The question we have to ask ourselves, as we divorce ourselves from the politics and the geopolitics in the region, is this going to move the dial on drug trafficking in the region? And as we discussed in the previous InSight Take, we are worried about the limitations of a purely military-only approach, and next year will be the acid test, to be honest. And if there—there have been no real changes so far for the—if we look at the last 18 months of the Trump administration, we have seen a shift in routes and modus operandi, mainly due to the strikes on the go-fast boats. The price of cocaine in the United States is perhaps lower than it’s ever been. The flow to Europe and the global development of the trade of cocaine trade is continuing apace. So, so far we haven’t seen any major changes to the drug industry in the Western Hemisphere.
Deborah Bonello: [00:28:06] Yeah. And I’d be interested too, Jerry, I don’t know what you think—one of the things we talked about in past InSight Takes about the Shield of the Americas, which, of course, does intertwine with certification or decertification, is whether we’re going to see any more specifics on what exactly that alliance is going to do. What are the requirements of the member governments? Does it include any extra aid from the US? Do you think we might see more details emerge there by this time next year.
Jeremy McDermott: [00:28:37] Hopefully. I, you know, I wouldn’t dare to speculate on what’s going on in the White House around this. So yeah, we are waiting with bated breath, aren’t we, Deb? And of course, as soon as any announcements are made, we will no doubt be talking again and trying to pick them apart and put them into the context of an historical framework that we do when we analyze everything in the region.
Deborah Bonello: [00:29:06] We will. That seems like a good place to end. Jerry, thanks for thanks for speaking to me today. You’ve just watched the InSight Take, to those at home, our weekly video analysis of the biggest organized crime stories in the region. Of course, we have long-running coverage and investigations of Venezuela’s cocaine economy, as well as all of its criminal groups, including the ELN from Colombia, which has expanded, of course, across the border into Venezuela and the Cartel of the Suns. You can find all of that and more at insightcrime.org. And you can find the InSight Take on our website, as well as on YouTube and Spotify. And of course, if there’s a story you’d like us to take apart, then please reach out to me at flagship@insightcrime.org. We’ll be back next week. Bye for now.
